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Abstract 
 
Political change that moves a nation towards democratization, international integration 
and globalization, is often viewed as progressive and positive. Indeed, certain political 
changes are presented as the only viable trajectories towards democratic goals. A clear 
example of this is that of membership in the European Union (EU). While there is an 
extensive academic literature on the benefits of EU integration spanning disciplines 
including international relations, political science and economics, events across 
Europe, such as Brexit, have allowed for a more complex picture of supranational 
integration to emerge by considering the everyday, sociocultural elements that shape 
how citizens make sense of political phenomena. Focusing on a prospective EU 
member state, this PhD ask: how is collective continuity managed in times of socio-
political change, and what are the implications for identity? The answer to this 
question is sought through a mixed-methods approach composed of three empirical 
papers. Study I examines the bottom-up construction of the EU and its relations to 
Serbia and its history, through a longitudinal study with qualitative data. Study II 
focuses on the top-down use of history and identity in elite discourses over time by 
analyzing political speeches over the past 20 years. Study III combines qualitative and 
quantitative data to explore and test how the relationship between power and social 
identity processes shape dual identification and support for EU accession. Study IV 
argues that historical continuity must be understood as  constructed through self-other 
relations situated in contexts of power and history. As such, there are important 
limitations on the extent to which historical continuity becomes desired, and has 
positive outcomes for social identity. As a whole, the PhD illustrates how situating 
tensions between political change and historical continuity within a self-other context 
over time allows us to understand when and how seemingly progressive political 
change means improving ‘us’ or becoming less like ‘us’.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the PhD 
How do we in Serbia see the EU? The simple answer is ‘about the same as we in 
Serbia are seen by the EU’ - with lots of prejudice, without understanding the wider 
context, and framed with the perceptions and memories from the 1990s. 
(Miščević, 2018, para.1) 
 
What is Serbia’s place in Europe? The metaphor of a bridge, or being at a crossroads, 
has become a popular imagery through which Serbian national identity, and history, 
has been positioned within the larger, European context (Russell-Omaljev, 2016; 
Todorova, 1998; Živković, 2011). In a book published in 1973, Andrei Simić reflects 
on Belgrade, the capital of present-day Serbia, as a place where “[o]ne constantly 
encounters small, but telling reminders that this is not the West, but rather some half-
way station between Europe and the East, between the past and the present.” (Simić, 
1973, p.70). Several years later, a book was published with the title ‘Divided we Stand: 
Discourses on Identity in ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia’, where author Ana Russell-
Omaljev argues that “Serbia has a difficult geopolitical position in the mental map of 
Europe: that it is neither here nor there, that it is East for the West, and West for the 
East.”(p.7).  
The root of this inbetweenness is often located in the history of the region and its 
geographical belonging to Europe alongside its affiliation to various European 
‘Others’, such as Turkey (through Ottoman occupation) and Russia (through its 
religious ties). This sense of being in a state of transition, caught between East and 
West, has made the study of Serbian identity an interesting one for scholars of the 
region, and a particularly relevant one in the present, as the country moves towards a 
more ‘Western’ future through its prospective membership in the European Union 
(EU). As Neumann (1999) has argued, the ordering of ‘self’ as Western and ‘other’ as 
Eastern within the context of European identity formation has also had consequences 
for European politics, and who is seen as belonging, but also what is required to 
change in order to belong. This in turn makes Serbia a particularly interesting context 
to explore the question of continuity in times of change. Namely, if political change 
entails moving away from the crossroads, to potentially choosing West over East, then 
what does this mean for national identity?  
Focusing on Serbia’s accession into the European Union (EU) this PhD aims to 
explore how issues of historical continuity, such as continuity in the narrative of a 
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Serbian ‘inbetweenness’, become part of how current socio-political change is 
understood and pursued. By drawing on theories from social psychology, the thesis 
will illustrate how core processes of identification, meaning-making and complex 
intergroup dynamics can be applied to make sense of how both the citizens and 
politicians construct political change as either continous with, or a rupture from, the 
past. Hence, the central research question of the PhD is how collective continuity is 
managed in times of socio-political change, and the implications this has for national 
identity.  Throughout the thesis, the tensions between continuity and change are 
discussed and illustrated through the data, but the findings will also show the limits of 
collective continuity in contexts where the past is seen as stigmatizing and a social and 
psychological burden. 
 The point of departure of this PhD is thus placing a seemingly political 
phenomenon within a social psychological framework, focusing in particular on how 
theories of identity and intergroup relations can explain international phenomena such 
as supranational integration. EU accession, as a form of supranational integration, is 
understood here as a political process shaped by important factors such as history, 
identity and power relations between, and within, the supranational group and its 
subgroups. The focus on Serbia, a prospective member of the EU (rather than an 
existing member), allows this PhD to take seriously the study of identities from a 
pespective of becoming rather than being, emphasizing in turn that political change, as 
a social psychological phenomenon, becomes negotiated and possible within the limits 
of a remembered past, constructed present and imagined future.  
 
1.1. Research Problem 
The starting-point for this PhD was an interest in trying to understand a seemingly 
contradictory phenomenon, perhaps best illustrated in the words of an interviewee; 
“We are striving towards joining the EU and we’re praying to God that we never join 
the EU”  (Participant 3, Vranje FG1). This invites further investigation into the 
contradictions between change and continuity – and demands an understanding of the 
connections between the psychological, social and political aspects of the dynamics of 
change and continuity. How can we make sense of this statement, which clearly 
illustrates the tension many nations, and individuals, experience when faced with 
socio-political change? In this thesis, I take a social psychological perspective on EU 
integration to answer the main research question; how is continuity managed in times 
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of socio-political change and what are the implications for national identity? This is 
examined in various different ways in the empirical papers of the PhD, to address the 
subquestions outlined in the table below.  
 
Table 1.1. Research Questions 
Main Research Question:  
How is collective continuity managed by politicians and the public in times of socio-
political change and what are the implications for national identity.  
Subquestion 1: 
Chapter 4 
What role do social representations of history play in how citizens 
make sense of present socio-political change, and what are the 
implications of this for how they represent the future?  
Subquestion 2: 
Chapter 5 
1) How is a sense of compatibility between Serbian identity and EU 
belonging constructed by entrepreneurs of identity to either promote or 
resist change? Which discursive strategies have become the most 
successful within political discourses?  
Subquestion(s) 
3: 
Chapter 6 
2) What are the lay understandings of supranational integration in the 
context of Serbia joining the EU, and how do these relate to identity 
and intergroup threat? (Study 1) 
What is the underlying role of power dynamics in shaping 1) fears of 
the undermining of Serbian identity by EU accession, 2) perceptions of 
prototypicality of the category ‘European’, and 3) the perceived 
compatibility of national and supranational identification? What are 
the consequences of these processes for attitudes in favour of EU 
accession? (Study 2) 
Subquestion 4: 
Chapter 7 
How is the desire for collective continuity reconciled with a 
stigmatizing past?  
 
While there is a large body of literature that has explored EU integration and 
enlargement from various angles (such as nationalism, international organization 
theories, law, political science and international relations), this literature has tended to 
focus on the more ‘technical’ side of EU integration among already existing members. 
This literature has explored the conditionality placed on candidate nations, the reforms, 
laws and regulations being put in place, as well as the economic and political benefits 
of integrations in terms of trade, opening of borders and political cooperation. 
However, a growing literature has begun to take a more social approach to the study of 
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the EU by addressing what ‘feeling European’ actually means, and how integration, as 
a process, also related to sociocultural and psychological processes (Bruter, 2005; 
Chryssochoou, 2000a; 2000b; Herrman, Risse & Brewer, 2004; La Barbera, 2015; 
Nigbur & Cinnirella, 2007; Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl & Leibhart, 2009). The current 
thesis builds on this literature by asking what the lay understandings of supranational 
integration are in Serbia, and how these relate to identity and intergroup threat. For 
instance, Chapter 6 combines qualitative and quantitative data to explore both the 
social representations of EU integration and how issues of intergroup power dynmics 
shape perceptions of belonging, compatibility and identification with the European 
community.  
Recent events have also highlighted the timeliness of this strand of research. For 
example, Brexit, the popular term for UKs vote to leave the EU in mid-2016, has 
illustrated the powerful role of psychosocial factors in contexts of EU belonging and 
membership. Brexit has also highlighted another gap in the literature on superordinate 
research in the context of Europe; namely the role of citizens and their everyday 
experiences in contexts of contentious international politics. Thus, to gain insight into 
the everyday experiences of citizens, Chapter 4 asks the question of how citizens in 
Serbia manage continuity alongside socio-political change, and what role social 
representations of history play in the process of maintaining a sense of ingroup 
continuity. Yet it is important to also consider the top-down communication of 
political change and how this has potentially framed the public discourse around EU 
integration. Therefore, another important subsidiary aim of this thesis is to explore 
how the discourse on EU integration as a source of potentially positive socio-political 
change has been communicated in Serbia by the political elite, Chapter 5 asks the 
question of how a sense of compatibility between Serbian identity and EU belonging 
has been constructed by entrepreneurs of identity attempting to either promote or resist 
political change. Chapter 6 focuses more on the identity-specific consequences of the 
tensions between continuity and change by exploring how fears of identity 
undermining emerge as a consequence of potential EU integration, and how these fears 
in turn result from a perceived powerlessness and incompatibility between Serbia and 
the rest of the EU. The chapter closely follows the work of Sindic and Reicher (2009) 
on Scottish attitudes towards Britain, but extends this research by exploring the 
explicit role of representation in shaping belonging and political attitudes.  
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A key theoretical contribution from this PhD emerges in Chapter 7. This chapter 
discusses the limits of the theoretical work on perceived collective continuity by 
arguing that ingroup continuity which is perceived as potentially negative and 
stigmatizing is not necessarily continuity which groups want to protect and maintain, 
thereby making collective discontinuity a potentially powerful change. This idea, in 
turn, which requires more theoretical development and empirical testing, highlights the 
importance of not only a contextualized approach to the study of social identities as 
temporal, but also to ways in which historical representations and political changes 
give meaning to these identities and their continuity over time.   
 
1.2. Research Context  
1.2.1 A brief overview of Serbia’s recent history 
For most of the 20th century, Serbia was part of another supranational union known as 
Yugoslavia, a multinational state that was broken apart by conflict and war, leaving 
Serbia in a state of isolation and perceived victimization from the larger European 
community (Subotic, 2010). Today, Serbia borders eight countries (Albania, Bulgaria, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania), as well 
as the autonomous province of Kosovo (southern Serbia). Five of these countries and 
provinces (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo) 
were previously part of Yugoslavia and four countries are currently part of the EU 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Hungary).  
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Figure 1.1: Map of Serbia and neighboring countries.1 
Serbian history dates back several centuries and it would be unwise to try to cover it all 
in detail in a few paragraphs. Rather, this section introduces the national and historical 
context of Serbia through its relevance to the present thesis, and does not attempt to 
offer a comprehensive reading of the literature (for this see Anzulovic, 1999; Ćirković, 
2004; Cohen, 1996; Judah, 2009; Pavlowitch, 2002; Petrovich, 1976).  
Mapping out a history of Serbia, or the ‘Serbs’ is quite challenging as the 
territory and the people have been shifting over time, taking various names, shapes and 
forms. Up until the twelfth century, a period of Christianization and Byzantine rule 
was in place in the territory known today as Serbia. After the collapse of the Byzantine 
Empire (1204 AD), the Balkan Slavs (as they were known at that time) entered a time 
of independence from the thirteenth to fifteenth century (Ćirković, 2004, p. xix). 
During this time, the Balkan Slavs were facing increased invasion by Ottoman Turks, 
and in 1389, a Turkish Sultan attacked Kosovo, an area of strategic importance due to 
its geographical placement and source of mineral wealth in the Balkans (Pavlowitch, 
2002, p. 9). The battle that occurred, which was later to become an important building 
block of a modern Serbian identity, was a massacre of great proportion where both the 
                                                          
1 Taken from: http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-
OPO6uWuASJY/VeSrlQuYR3I/AAAAAAAACiU/XqPnpS2mAYI/s640/Balkans-political-map.jpg. Retrieved 17th 
October, 2016.  
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Serbia Prince Lazar and the Turkish Sultan Murad died. This battle would become a 
legend in Serbian history, after the Orthodox Church declared Prince Lazar as God’s 
chosen successor (Pavlowitch, 2002, p. 10). The period following the battle was filled 
with turmoil and in an attempt to reinstate a sense of hope and possibility, the 
Orthodox Church linked the physical defeat and martyrdom of Lazar with a heavenly, 
spiritual victory for the nation, giving the battle a significant symbolic meaning. This 
story of the Kosovo battle as a spiritual victory gained significance as the foundational 
myth of a newly independent Serbian state in the late 1800s (Bieber, 2002). Its 
reproduction through cultural symbols, songs and religious holidays and celebrations 
has further solidified the image of Kosovo in Serbia, making it an everyday and banal 
reproduction of nationalism and national identity (Billig, 1995).   
Despite being able to ward off Ottoman influences for some time, from the 
fifteenth century and onwards (until the 18th century) Serbia was nevertheless under 
Ottoman rule, a period known as the epoch of ‘Turkish slavery’ (Ćirković, 2004, p. 
xx). In early 18th century, Serbs rose up “becoming an autonomous principality in 
1829, an independent principality in 1878 and a kingdom in 1882” (Petrovich, 1976, 
p.xiii). The kingdom would soon become the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
in 1918, later known as Yugoslavia. This Kingdom “fulfilled an ideal that must have 
seemed unattainable only a few years earlier: for all Serbs to be in one state” 
(Ćirković, 2004, p.252).  
Yugoslavia existed in two periods: 1918-1941, and then again 1945-1992. 
During World War II, the invasion of the Axis Powers in Yugoslavia led to its split, 
with the Independent State of Croatia becoming a Nazi satellite state and Germany 
occupying parts of Serbia, Slovenia and Bosnia. After a Yugoslav resistance 
movement developed, it expelled the Axis from Serbia and Yugoslavia between 1944 
and 1945. In doing so, Josip Broz Tito, leader of the communist-led Partisans, was able 
to secure a position of power in Yugoslavia, creating an independently led communist 
state (Drapac, 2010). The story of Yugoslavia, particularly its second period of 
existence, is frequently narrated as a tragic attempt at overcoming ancient ethnic 
differences between the various nations of the superordinate Yugoslavia (Gagnon, 
2004). It is a story that ended in a bitter series of wars in Slovenia (1991), Croatia 
(1991-1995), Bosnia (1992-1995), Kosovo (1998-1999) and the NATO bombing of 
Serbia that subsequently ended the long period of conflict (1999). Serbia, emerging 
from the wars as a seemingly nationalistic and xenophobic nation, formed the Federal 
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Republic of Yugoslavia with Montenegro, a union that lasted only until 2006 when, 
following a referendum, Montenegro declared independence. In 2008, Serbia was 
renamed the Republic of Serbia and this is what it remains known as until this day.  
Serbian history, filled with turmoil, conflict, instability, unification and 
division, is a complex history that becomes increasingly hard to unite under one 
narrative. Although the country has seen its share of post-communist historical 
revisionism, it has nevertheless remained a country with a troubled view of the past 
(Ramet, 2007). Further, it has become a nation whose history in the West has been 
portrayed as influenced by its Ottoman rule, culturally backwards and nationalistic 
(Billig, 1995; Ristić, 2007). It is also a history that tells the story of a country, and a 
nation, trying to find its place. The current political perspective in Serbia is one that 
portrays its place as within the EU, yet tensions from the recent, and distant, past have 
created visible obstacles on Serbia’s EU integration path.  
 
1.2.2. A brief overview of Serbia’s EU integration history 
On January 21st, 2014, official talks began concerning Serbia’s admittance as the 29th 
member of the European Union. The declaration of the upcoming negotiations was 
marked as one of the most important social events of 2013 in Serbia (B92). According 
to the Prime Minister of Serbia, January 21st, 2014 was by all accounts significant: 
“This is a historic day that cannot be ignored […] this is in the historical 
sense, the most important event for Serbia after World War II. In 
strategic terms, this day determines the future path of Serbia and the 
values which it strives for and for which it stands.” (Ivica Dačić, Blic 
Online).”  
Yet in public opinion, the importance of this event seems to have faded over time, with 
a recent Barometer survey (2017; see Figure 1.2 below) illustrating that, compared to 
its neighboring countries, Serbia exhibits the highest level of pessimism and ambiguity 
towards the EU, with the majority in 2017 considering EU membership neither good 
nor bad (Figure 1.2; 37%) or a bad thing (Figure 1.2; 30%). 
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Figure 1.2: Attitudes towards EU membership. From “Balkan Barometer 2017: Public Opinion Survey.” 
By the Regional Cooperation Secretariat, 2017. 
The beginning of talks between Serbia and the EU was seen as a symbolic 
victory after many years of hard work to fulfil the requirements of the conditionality 
placed on Serbia as part of the application process. However, with an accession story 
that was initiated in 2000 through democratic reforms, and officially recognized at the 
Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, Serbia’s path towards the EU has not been without 
its complications, especially due to unresolved issues linked to the Yugoslav wars and 
foreign relations with neighboring countries. Three key issues which have marked the 
process of Serbia’s EU are 1) its cooperation with the ICTY, 2) Serbia’s close ties with 
Russia, and 3) Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. In this section, I 
consider each in turn and reflect on their consequences for public opinion about the EU 
and membership. 
 In the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars, the International Crime Tribunal of 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was set up in Hague, Netherlands. The tribunal was met with 
criticism and resistance in most ex-Yugoslav countries, but particularly so in Serbia, as 
a disproportionate amount of Serbs were being prosecuted and convicted (Clark, 
2011). In 2004, for example, 74% of Belgrade (the capital of Serbia) saw the ICTY as 
a conspiracy, which fed into the perception of Serbia as an international victim (Clark, 
2008). In a 2007 survey, conducted by the Belgrade Center for Human Rights, only 
7% of individuals believed that the ICTY was not biased when it tried Serbs in court 
(Klarin, 2009). This sense of unfairness and selective justice was further solidified 
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when NATO officials were not put on trial in Hague for violating the UN Charter 
when approving the bombing of Serbia (Clark, 2008). Politicians in Serbia tried to 
appease public disapproval of Serbia’s cooperation with the court by framing the 
cooperation as a strategic choice in order to get financial aid and increased benefits 
from the EU and the US (Klarin, 2009). One such tangible benefit was the signing of a 
Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) in April 2008. Shortly thereafter, on 
September 15th, 2008, the Netherlands froze the SAA, indicating that EU negotiations 
would be on hold until Serbia fully cooperated with the ICTY and located former army 
commander Ratko Mladić. According to the BBC, “the case of Ratko Mladić [was] 
especially sensitive for the Netherlands, as Dutch UN peacekeepers were overpowered 
by his Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica in 1995.” (“Dutch Block EU-Serbia trade 
deal,” 2008).  Srebrenica was the massacre of over 8,000 Bosnian Muslims, a war 
crime with which Mladić was charged (see also, Lasas, 2013). This perspective on 
post-Yugoslav Serbia as unfairly prosecuted by the international community through 
the work of the ICTY and the perceived attempts by countries, such as the 
Netherlands, to block their accession process has led to public perceptions of anti-Serb 
sentiment across the Western world, sentiments further solidified in 2014 with the 
annexation of Crimea.  
 In addition to Serbia’s rocky relations with international organizations such as 
the ICTY, its steady relationship with Russia has proven another sore spot in its EU 
accession. In 2014, during the Ukrainian crisis, the EU implemented several rounds of 
sanctions against Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea, a territory under 
Ukrainian administration since 1954. During this time, Serbian media reported that 
“diplomatic pressures” were used to get Serbia to also implement sanctions against 
Russia, a demand that was met with resistance in the country (Economides & Ker-
Lindsay, 2015). On the 22nd of August, 2014, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Ivica 
Dačić, stated that “Serbia will never join any sanctions against Russia because it is not 
just about a state that is friendly towards us, an economic and political partner, but also 
about a state that never introduced sanctions towards Serbia”, alluding to the 1992 
sanctions implemented by the UN against Yugoslavia (“Dačić: Never Sanctions 
against Russia,” 2014). Russia has further been a close ally to Serbia within the UN, 
refusing to acknowledge the unilateral independence of Kosovo (see below). To many 
in Serbia, this has made Russia a more suitable political ally than the EU, and has led 
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to non-Serbian media questioning how long Serbia can maintain its “east-west 
balancing act” (Byrne, 2017, para. 3).  
The issue of Kosovo is perhaps the biggest bump on the road towards better 
Serbia-EU relations. As discussed briefly in the previous section, Kosovo holds a 
prominent identity position among Serbs through the significance of the Battle of 
Kosovo in 1389, which has become the ‘chosen trauma’ of the nation, justifying a 
sense of international victimhood (Volkan, 1997). This battle has become the core 
identity symbol built on two opposites – victimhood and strength/persistence (Pantelić, 
2007). Although the EU is said to hold no position towards the independence issue, a 
majority of its members have recognized Kosovo and the province is listed as a 
prospective EU member on its website. Further, the signing of the SAA between 
Serbia and the EU, mentioned above, came shortly after Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence in 2008, despite Serbia’s failure at the time to comply 
with the demands of the ICTY. To some, this signaled a strategic concession to Serbia 
in order to pressure the government to recognize Kosovo, thereby trading one for the 
other (Subotic, 2010). More directly, the EU as placed pressure on Serbia to normalize 
relations with Kosovo, another conditionality demand that is considered a threat to 
Serbia’s sovereignty (Obradovic-Wochnik & Wochnik, 2012). The position of the EU 
in regards to Kosovo can perhaps better be understood when considering its past 
accession of a divided Cyprus in 2004. This decision led to worsening relations with 
Turkey (which was facing tensions with the Greek Cypriots) and consequently “many 
European leaders had signaled their determination not to import any more border 
disputes into the future” (Ker-Lindsay, 2009, p.6). This in turn has made people in 
Serbia wonder; will giving up Kosovo become the final condition placed on Serbia 
before it is accepted into the EU? The intersection between psychological attachment 
and geopolitical tension is exemplified in the context of Serbia’s relations to Kosovo 
and becomes evident in the most recent Balkan Barometer (2017) on the attitudes 
towards EU in South-Eastern Europe (Figures 1.2-1.4). For example, alongside being 
generally pessimistic about EU integration, Serbs express the highest level of concern 
for a loss of sovereignty (Figure 1.3; 15% compared to second highest, Croatia, with 
12%) as a consequence of EU membership.  
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Figure 1.3: Meaning of EU membership. From “Balkan Barometer 2017: Public Opinion Survey.” By 
the Regional Cooperation Secretariat, 2017. 
In addition, this pessimism extends to the future as well, with Serbia exhibiting 
the highest number of respondents who never expect Serbia’s EU accession to happen 
(Figure 1.4; 38% compared to second-highest, 33% in Bosnia and Hercegovina). 
 
Figure 1.4: Expectations for EU accession. From “Balkan Barometer 2017: Public Opinion Survey.” By 
the Regional Cooperation Secretariat, 2017. 
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1.3. Conclusion 
In this brief, and somewhat simplified, summary of some of the key political issues 
facing Serbia’s EU accession we can see that a common thread across them all is an 
illustration of how closely interlinked politics, both domestic and foreign, are to issues 
of history, international relations, culture and identity. Serbia’s relationship with the 
larger European community through organizations such as the UN, ICTY and the EU 
has tended to position Europe as ‘Other’ in relation to Serbia. The isolation of Serbia 
from the West and Europe is not only visible in the internal context of the nation, but is 
also reflected in the images of the Balkans in the West (Todorova, 1997). During the 
Yugoslav wars, media reports in the Western world highlighted the role of ancient 
ethnic hatred and ‘hot’ nationalism in the Balkans, which became a source of contrast 
for the West to compare itself with (Billig, 1995; Hatzopoulos, 2003; Gagnon, 2004). 
This in turn has influenced the image of Serbia in the eyes of both EU politicians and 
the public.  In a 1996 Eurobarometer survey, EU citizens were asked to rank which 
countries they felt should be part of the EU by 2000. In the ranking, Serbia came in 
third to last (of 28 countries). The results from this survey, though conducted more 
than 20 years ago, speak for the “many ethnic, religious and historical factors at work 
in molding the image which people have of the future development of the Community, 
and, presumably, as a corollary of its identity” (Breakwell, 1996, p.23).  
On a larger scale, these examples highlight not only Serbia’s relations to the EU, 
but more importantly they illustrate the crucial processes, which underpin the history 
of the emergence of a European community, and, some would argue, identity. Namely, 
as with any social identity, a European identity developed in the context of an ‘Other’. 
As Neumann (1999) has illustrated, in the context of international relations, “the 
ordering of self as ‘Western’ and other as ‘Eastern’ in European identity formation is 
one way of organizing European politics.” (p. 210) and thus we need to understand 
self-other relations in their historicity. This political tension between ‘East’ and ‘West’ 
is also a historical, ideological and psychological tension which relates back to the 
fundamental ‘inbetweeness’ that has been seen as characteristic of a modern Serbian 
national identity (Russell-Omaljev, 2016; Todorova, 1997; Živković, 2011). It is from 
this perspective then that Serbia offers an interesting context in which to explore the 
question of how collective continuity is managed in times of socio-political change and 
the implications this has for identity. Particularly when the starting-point is an identity 
that has been built on, and is experienced as, in-between two ideological, historical and 
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political ‘camps’.   
In order to answer the question of how continuity is managed in times of socio-
political change, and what the implications are for identity, we need to examine the 
social psychology of national and superordinate identities, the role of history in 
contexts of socio-political change and the importance of power dynamics and 
recognition in shaping elite and public attitudes towards supranational membership 
(Chapter 2). Further, we need to consider what methods are required in order to answer 
these questions (Chapter 3) before turning to the empirical studies exploring how 
social representations of the past are utilized in public discourses to make sense of the 
present (Chapter 4), elite discourses on political change and Serbia’s relations to 
Europe over time (Chapter 5), the ways in which power relations shape national-
supranational identity processes and attitudes towards political integration (Chapter 6) 
and lastly whether the complex relationship between collective continuity and identity 
have been adequately theorized (Chapter 7). The concluding chapter (Chapter 8) offers 
a starting-point for a social psychology of supranational identity in contexts of political 
change and multinational integration. It does so by firstly highlighting how self-other 
relations permeate not only the construction of a supranational identity, but also the 
negotiation of collective continuity as part of that identity, and its consequences for the 
nation. In tying the empirical chapters together, Chapter 8 introduces the concept of 
insecure nationalism, as a theoretical concept which allows us to consider how 
supranational identification and integration brings about questions of whether change 
means improving ‘us’ or becoming less like ‘us’.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
In chapter 1, the context of this research project was outlined, showing the importance 
of developing a social psychological account of the ways in which the relationship 
between Serbia and the EU has changed over time. The aim of this chapter is to discuss 
the key concepts and phenomena relevant to this research, and to propose a theoretical 
framework emphasizing a social psychology of supranational identity which places 
self-other relations across time at the core.  
It does so by first introducing the key theories of the PhD; social identity theory 
(SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT) and their relevance for the present thesis 
(2.1). This shows the breadth of the existing literature on social identities in Social 
Psychology, and highlights what we need to examine in further detail. Section 2.1 is 
followed by an examination of how social representation theory can come to inform 
the analysis of the identity by providing a deeper understanding of the meaning given 
to social categories and its dissemination and management through communication and 
social practice (2.2). In this section I also introduce the social representations 
approach, discussing the particularly important, and less explored, area of overlap 
between social identity theory and social representation theory. Section 2.3 then 
considers how this theoretical framework applies more specifically to the context of 
national identities by discussing the role that social representations of history come to 
play in shaping the meaning given to nationhood and national identity (2.2). The 
following two sections (2.4 and 2.5) move us from national identities to consider their 
existence in a larger supranational context. Namely, the sections discuss some of the 
recent theoretical models informed by SIT and SCT which become suitable to apply 
when exploring the role of supranational membership, dual identification and how 
understanding EU integration from a social identity theory perspective can offer us 
interesting insights into discussions of belonging, boundaries and recognition. These 
issues are taken up in the section that follows (2.6), to bring to light the neglected role 
of identity recognition in contexts of macro-level social identity processes. The 
concluding section (2.7) summarizes the theoretical framework and its significance to 
the study of socio-political phenomena, and introduces the research questions of the 
project, providing an overview of the chapters and empirical studies to follow.  
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2.1 Social Identity: Self and Other in Context 
In 1960, historian Rupert Emerson published From Empire to Nation. In the book, 
Emerson argues that “the simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it 
is a body of people who feel that they are a nation” (1960, p. 102). In his definition of 
the nation, Emerson emphasized a key component in the creation of a nation-state. 
That is, the nation as a group becomes real when the people who are part of the nation 
feel part of it as well.  In other words, when they identify with the nation. Considering 
that it was this definition of the nation which Tajfel drew on when conceptualizing and 
defining a ‘social group’, it is of little surprise that literature within social psychology 
has tended to explore nationalism and national identity as a form of social identity (Li 
& Brewer, 2004; Nigbur & Cinnirella, 2007; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins & 
Levine, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Verkuyten, 2014). Before considering the 
application of the theory to the context of nations and national identities, it is first 
necessary to ouline the key tenants of social identity theory (SIT) and self-
categorization theory (SCT), particularly highlighting how both theories place 
emphasis on the role of self and other in identity, the importance of contextual 
sensitivity and the importance of hierarchies of status and power which shape ingroup 
processes and intergroup relations. 
2.1.1 The Social Identity Approach  
The social identity approach (Reicher, Spears & Haslam, 2010) refers to the ideas, 
concepts and theoretical assumptions of both Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Wetherell & Reicher, 1987). While there is much overlap between the two 
theories, there are also crucial distinctions that need to be acknowledged in order to 
understand the distinctive contributions of each theory to social psychology, and how 
these can be used to inform this study. The first, and most important difference from 
which the remaining distinctions of the theories emerge, comes from the different foci 
of Tajfel and Turner. Namely, while Tajfel (alongside his then-student Turner) was 
primarily interested in understanding intergroup discrimination and developing a 
theory of intergroup behaviour, Turner’s later focus in the development of SCT was 
more on intra-group processes and how individuals come to see themselves as part of a 
group to begin with. In a sense, the processes explored in SCT precede and inform the 
processes of social identification and intergroup relations outlined in SIT.  Due to the 
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significance of both in providing a holistic perspective of both intra- and inter-group 
processes, each theory, and its key concepts are discussed separately below.  
 
Social Identity Theory 
According to Tajfel (1978, p.63) a social identity is “that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significane attached to that 
membership”. The theory can be summarized by the ‘social categorization-social 
identity-social comparison-positive distictiveness’ sequence as outlined by Tajfel 
(1974).  
 To begin with, it is important to clarify that there is a distinction between the 
concepts ‘social category’ and ‘social group’. A social category is a “cognitive tools 
that segment, classify, and order the social environment” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 
40) while a social group can be understood as a collective of individuals “who have 
internalized the same social category membership as a component of their self-
concept” (Turner, 1982, p.36). This internalization, in turn, becomes what we consider 
a ‘social identity’.  
Among the basic assumptions of the theory is the claim that individuals strive 
to maintain a sense of positive self-concept and that, as part of our self is informed by 
our social group memberships, it is through comparison with others that we manage to 
attain, and maintain, a positive distinctiveness for our groups. Thus, inherent in SIT, is 
the role of ‘Other’ in the process of constructing an ingroup identity.  In other words, 
to the extent that individuals identify with the groups to which they belong, a positive 
self-esteem can be attained through favorable social comparison with other groups. 
However, Tajfel was far from unaware of the reality of the social world, and 
acknowledged that different groups held different status and power positions in 
society. Tajfel’s primary interest was in understanding how groups of seemingly low 
social status and power managed a sense of positive self-esteem, and how intergroup 
behaviour was in turn driven by this desire to create social change. Social identity 
theory is therefore at the core a theory about social change and the ability of 
individuals, as part of groups, to imagine and work towards alternatives to their 
existing social realities.  
Tajfel & Turner (1979) proposed three strategies that groups can use to deal 
with and challenge threatened (or stigmatized) identities. Depending on the 
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permeability of the group boundaries, an individual may choose to leave their existing 
group and join a more positively evaluated group. If the boundaries are deemed 
impermeable, two strategies become possible; social creativity or social change. Social 
creativity refers to changing social comparison dimensions in order to achieve a sense 
of positive self. This can occur by changing the relevant out-group of comparison, 
changing the evaluative dimension or simply re-interpreting the dimension of 
comparison from something negative into something positive. Studies manipulating 
aspects of national identification through type of comparison show the ways in which 
this occurs (Nigbur & Cinnirella, 2007).  The second more collective strategy is to 
mobilize for social change to either challenge or maintain the current social order. For 
example, in context where changing intergroup relations threaten to change the 
position of the ingroup in the larger social context, resistance becomes a justified 
measure (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011). It will be argued below (see section 2.3) that 
these processes of resistance, particularly the socio-psychological resistance evident in 
social creativity, can further be understood by applying the Social Representation 
Theory (SRT) to explore the micro-expressions of re-negotiation through 
communication.  
It is important to stress here, however, that both SIT (and as will be discussed, 
SCT) are context-dependent theories shaped by the many cognitive, social and 
historical factors that shape ingroup and intergroup processes (Reicher, 2004; Reicher, 
Spears & Haslam, 2010). Firstly, value is a function of culture (Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001, p.34) and also, I would argue, history, as valued dimensions develop over time 
(see section 2.3).  In the context of national identity, we frequently see value as 
something that becomes historicized, where current intergroup relations, mediated by 
group-based emotions, become rooted in the past (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Lasas, 
2013; Greenwood, 2015). In addition, a growing body of literature has illustrated how 
history, through its attachment to national identity, imbues identity with values, norms 
and meanings rooted in the past, which has consequences for the extent to which ‘new’ 
citizens are able to identify with a national ingroup (Andreouli & Chryssochoou, 2015; 
Clary-Lemon, 2014; Mols & Jetten, 2014). Secondly, social comparison becomes 
meaningful when it occurs with relevant out-groups. As Nigbur & Cinnirella, (2007) 
show, priming different out-group comparisons will shape the ways in which the 
ingroup constructs its identity, as the shift in relevant out-groups also shifts the valued 
dimensions of comparison.  
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Self-Categorization Theory 
Turner conceptualized SCT as “a set of related assumptions and hypotheses about the 
functioning of the social self-concept (the concept of self based on comparison with 
other people and relevant social interaction)” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 42). While Tajfel 
focused on developing a model of intergroup behavior, Turner’s interest was more 
focused on refining the cognitive dimensions of social identity theory. Namely, SCT 
provides a deeper understanding how how individuals are able to see themselves as 
part of a group, and what determined which type of identity becomes salient in a given 
context (Halsam & Reicher, 2015).  
 According to the theory, the self is seen as part of a particular category of 
stimuli and is thus perceived as similar to other members of that category and different 
from members belonging to other categories. The theory distinguishes between three 
levels of self-categorization which range from superordinate (human level), to 
intermediate (social level) and subordinate (personal level). No level of categorization 
is more or less fundamental to a self than another, but rather, the theory argues that 
what makes a given self-category more relevant in a particular context than another is 
based on the accessibility and fit of the category in that particular context (Oakes, 
1987). More specifically, accessibility refers to an person’s ‘readiness’ to use 
categories in particular contexts. This readiness is based on past experiences and 
present expectations, values and norms, which make certain categories more or less 
accessible and useful in making sense of social interactions. Fit has two components; 
comparative fit and normative fit. Comparative fit is a function of the metacontrast 
ratio. The metacontrast ratio refers to the idea that, all things being equal, the 
categories which maximize the differences between categories compared to within 
categories will become the most salient. Normative fit, in turn, refers to the meaning 
given to these differences and whether they are in line with the stereotypical 
expectations associated with the categories.  
 As individuals define themselves, and others, as part of particular groups, they 
also tend to seem themselves less as different individuals, and more as representatives 
of that shared group (similarly to the argument of SIT about moving from a personal to 
social level of identification). This process is known as depersonalization. The specific 
content of a self-category will determine who is seen as more or less representative of 
the category, or in the words of SCT, who is more or less ‘prototypical’ of the 
category.  The concept of prototypicality will become important later on in section 2.4, 
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when we discuss subgroup-superordinate group dynamics, and the consequences of 
prototypicality for belonging and recognition. Considering the metacontrast principle, 
it can be concluded that who is seen as a prototype of a given category, is a function of 
the comparative context and the meaning given to a social encounter.  
As Turner (1999) argues, “[p]rocess theories such as social identity and self-
categorization require the incorporation of specific content into their analyses before 
they can make predictions either in the laboratory or in the field and are designed to 
require such an incorporation” (p.34). Considering this we further draw on social 
representation theory to compliment and extend the theoretical power of the social 
identity approach by combining it with a theory focused on the social production of 
knowledge and how this informs and shapes expressions of identities and perceptions 
of intergroup relations.  
 
2.2.  Connecting Identities and Representations: Social Representations Approach 
According to Elcheroth, Doise and Reicher (2011), the Social Representations 
Approach, marrying Social Identity Theory and Social Representations Theory, can 
provide new insights into exploring phenomena at the intersection of psychology and 
politics. Following their argument, this section introduces the theory of social 
representations and then goes on to explore how this integrated approach can be useful 
in considering the role of history and identity in contexts of socio-political change.  
 
Social Representation Theory 
At the core of Social Representation Theory is an emphasis on how we make sense of 
the world and thus how knowledge is socially created and managed. It is a theory of 
meaning-making, power and social change (Elcheroth, Doise & Reicher, 2011; 
Howarth, 2006; Moscovici, 2000). Interested in how the unfamiliar becomes familiar, 
the theory of Social Representations developed from Moscovici’s seminal study 
exploring the ways in which psychoanalysis was made sense of in three different social 
groups in France (Moscovici, 1976). Drawing on Durkheim’s concept of collective 
representations, Moscovici criticized the concept for its static nature, arguing that it did 
not represent how knowledge was constructed and contested in modern societies 
(Moscovici, 1976). Instead, Moscovici developed the concept of ‘social’ 
representations, highlighting the shared, dynamic and at times contradictory nature of 
socially shared knowledge. By defining social representations as systems of values, 
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ideas and practices, Moscovici argued that they function to both establish social order 
as well as enable communication within it, and about it (1973).  
Growing numbers of scholars are advocating the theoretical and practical 
benefits of integrating Social Identity Theory and Social Representation Theory 
(Breakwell & Lyons, 1996; Condor, 1996; Reicher, 2004; Howarth, 2002). The 
distinction made in this chapter between representations and identity is to consider 
representations as part of the meaning given to identities while identities are seen as 
the processes through which group membership and group boundaries are created. In 
other words, social representations and identities play crucial roles in defining both the 
boundaries of groups as well as their meaning. Thus, this approach overcomes a 
common critique of the SIA for its emphasis on process and context but lack of 
conceptualization of the meanings of identities (Deaux, 1993; Huddy, 2001). 
Namely,by considering the content of identities as developed through processes of 
shared meaning-making, we explicitly consider how identification and intergroup 
dynamics become contextually embedded and shaped by social created knowledge 
(Reicher, 2004). In doing so, we reiterate the original premises of both Tajfel and 
Turner in emphasizing the need to incorporate both content and context into the study 
of social identity processes.  
 
Social Representation Approach 
Social identities influence exposure, acceptance and use of social 
representations, which can in turn shape the representations and their development 
(Breakwell, 1993). Exposure to representations in this framework does not mean 
automatic acceptance and reproduction, but rather it is through our membership in 
different groups that we consider some representations as more legitimate and ‘real’ 
than others. This leads us to an important criticism of SRT. Discursive psychologists 
consider the centrality given to history in shaping representations a limitation to the 
ways in which the theory can account for social change, making it somewhat 
deterministic in nature (McKinlay & Potter, 1987). By coupling SRT with the SIA we 
see how adapting and incorporating representations into one’s identity is a process 
bound up with the group memberships we hold and the values and norms within those 
groups. Therefore, by considering history as part of both the content of identities (that 
is representations) and the process of identifying, we can conceive of a space where 
individuals are able to contest, resist and re-shape identities, imagined futures and 
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existing realities. As social representations are transmitted in both communication and 
practice and become attached to identities, individuals will actively “translate (drop, 
transfer, corrupt, modify, add to or appropriate) these practices in the course of taking 
them up and passing them on” (Condor, 1996, p.291). Thus, as Billig (1991) argues, 
the process of anchoring, a fundamental concept of SRT in explaining how the 
unfamiliar becomes familiar, also leaves possibility for the anchor to be hauled up and 
dropped again (p. 72; Lowe, 2012). Therefore, emphasizing history in relation to 
representations does not entail a loss of agency on the part of individuals; rather it 
allows us to go beyond the descriptive power of SRT to explore what representations 
do for people in groups (Voelklein & Howarth, 2005). In doing so we can speak both 
of identities and identifying, as well as representations and representing.  
An interesting point of connection, which remains less developed in relation to 
the two theories, is the overlap between the process of social creativity in overcoming 
negative self-images and the process of socially re-presenting identity. To clarify, we 
consider these two processes an area where the theoretical overlap sought in the Social 
Representations Approach can be more clearly conceptualized. Specifically, in larger 
contexts of socio-political change, such as that of a nation, due to the several limiting 
factors (restrictions on movement, visas, financial instability etc.), individual mobility 
is a strategy few individuals are afforded the luxury of choosing. Further, with limited 
knowledge as to what political change might entail, lack of trust in politicians and 
general political apathy, mobilizing for social change is further restricted (Greenberg, 
2010). Thus, in many contexts, creatively re-presenting the status quo and what 
political change might mean for the people becomes the preferred choice of action, and 
a potential first step in either seeking individual or collective change. Literature 
building on this idea in contexts ranging from racial, religious, gendered and migrant 
identities has shown the creative processes through which minority groups can reclaim, 
reinterpret and resist stigmatizing identities (Duveen, 2001; Howarth, 2002; Hopkins 
& Blackwood, 2011; Rasmussen, 2013). This body of literature highlights how groups 
can cope with and challenge the power hierarchies that are part of their social realities.  
By taking a social representations approach to identity it becomes possible to 
explore the meanings of identities and how representations are drawn on to politicize 
collective identities and support or resist specific political projects (Klandermans, 
2014). A good example illustrating this comes from research by Sindic & Reicher 
(2009) on Scottish people’s attitudes towards being a part of Britain. Based on the 
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findings of their research, the authors conclude that “political attitudes towards supra-
national bodies […] are moderated by the extent to which the expression of ingroup 
identity is seen as being undermined within the large entity” (p.114). In other words, 
resistance to supranational bodies can be linked to one of the basic premises of SIT – 
the need for people to feel a simultaneous sense of sameness and distinctiveness. It is a 
fear of one’s subgroup identity being undermined, Sindic and Reicher argue, that 
makes groups less likely to support a political unity under a supranational body.  
In the case of Serbia and the EU, the documented incompatibility and the fear 
of losing distinct features of identity by giving in to the demands of the EU can both 
help to explain why there might be resistance to join the supranational organization 
(Ristić, 2007; Subotic, 2010). This tells us that there is something more at stake than 
economics and politics in processes of nation-based political change. We move to the 
next section to consider in particular how history, and social representations of history, 
play a crucial role in giving meaning to national identities, in turn shaping which 
political changes become seen as aligned with, or threatening to, a continuity with the 
past.  
 
2.3. National Identity and Historical Continuity 
History is intimately linked with the formation and meaning of a national identity, 
because it tells a story of where a nation and its people come from, as well as its place 
and role in relation to other nations (Anderson, 1983; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Malinowski, 
1926). Therefore, a key function of history is to provide nations with a ingroup foundation 
and origin. In this sense, perceptions of historical continuity become crucial in 
maintaining a sense of stability to ingroup belonging and meaning. Historical continuity 
can be understood as a sense of perceived continuity between the past and present of a 
nation, particularly in terms of maintaining continuity to key values, norms and traditions.  
Considering history as a resource for national identities entails understanding how 
history functions to inform the meaning of a group’s identity and to root this meaning in 
the past, linking it to the present and projecting it onto the future. Scholars interested in 
how history informs social identities have explored the importance of perceived collective 
continuity (PCC; Sani et al., 2007) or social representations of history provide 
individuals, as group members, with a sense of positive social esteem and ingroup 
attachment. The idea of ‘perceived collective continuity’ (Sani, Bowe, Herrera, Manna, 
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Cossa, Miao & Zhou, 2007) conceptualizes the ways in which we see our social groups 
and consequently social identities, as stable constructs moving through time. The concept 
of perceived collective continuity has further been divided into two sub-dimensions: 
essentialism and narrativism. The former is a version of continuity achieved through an 
emphasis on the stability of an ingroups ‘essence’, core features such as values, norms 
and other cultural markers that define and identity, while the latter is a version of 
continuity achieved through interlinking historical events to create a consistent narrative 
of a group’s history. As Reicher (2008) argues, “continuity is a necessary element in the 
psychological underpinning of practice. It gives meaning to action and empowers us to 
transform the world.” (p.154). As was discussed in the section on the social identity 
approach, because groups provide individuals with the existential foundation on which 
their social selves develop and stand, ingroup members can become affected in important 
ways when they perceive that foundation to be shifting, or cracking. For example, 
perceptions of discontinuity have been found to cause collective angst over the potential 
loss of a group’s values, norms and traditions (Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Wohl, Branscombe 
& Reysen, 2010). These findings are not limited to national groups facing threats to 
continuity, but have also been supported in studies on mergers and schisms (Sani, 2008; 
Sani & Reicher, 2000; Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, Monden & de Lima; 2002). 
Research on group mergers has illustrated how manipulating the perception of continuity 
in times of change can increase (or decrease) resistance to change (Jetten & Hutchison, 
2011). 
Yet a recent strand of research has criticized this distinction between continuity 
as positive and discontinuity as negative by arguing that the importance of continuity to 
the past depends on the valence of the past (Roth, Huber, Juenger & Liu, 2017). Namely, 
if the history of an ingroup is seen as negative, then historical continuity becomes 
increasingly threatening to an ingroup’s identity and historical discontinuity becomes 
preferred in order to relieve people in the present from the burden of a negative past. In 
other words, depending on how the past is remembered, whether positively or negatively, 
perceived continuity could either become a source of positive identification or a threat to 
the seemingly positive ingroup identity of the present. This more critical perspective on 
historical continuity echoes the distinction made between essentialist and narrativist 
continuity, where the former has been found to be more likely to satisfy an individual’s 
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need for self-continuity and therefore more likely to enhance ingroup identification, or 
protect it when threatened (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014).  
If history is such a powerful resource for giving meaning and continuity to an 
ingroup identity then we must also acknowledge that those who can shape and re-write 
history will be in a position of power to not only shape who ‘we’ are, but also what we 
should remember of the past and the consequences this has for how we relate to others in 
the present. In contexts of public uncertainty or resistance to political change, elites can 
come to act as ‘entrepreneurs of identity’, shaping what is remembered and how, in order 
to align it with, and thus create resonance for, their political projects (Klein & Licata, 
2003; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Olick, 2007; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The concept of 
“entrepreneurs of identity” originates from the SIT literature on leadership and refers to 
those individuals who seek to shape the actions of a group. As Reicher and Hopkins 
(2001) explain, “their skill lies both in defining categories as such that they entail the 
form of mobilization necessary to realizing the desired future and in making these 
definitions seems so self-evident that they are immune to counter positions” (p.49; 
Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005). These entrepreneurs are often political leaders, their 
affiliates or activists who wish to promote specific political agendas or political figures 
and do so by drawing on identity-related arguments (Gleibs, Hendricks & Kurz, 2017; 
Klein & Licata, 2003; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; see Chapter 5). Entrepreneurs of identity 
are successful to the extent that their proposed projects are seen as ensuring, rather than 
deviating from, a sense of national continuity. These constructions of the nation 
“essentially air-brush out individual and temporal variation in order to achieve a picture 
of a homogenous ‘us, now’” (Condor, 1996, p.299). Thus, while change inevitably occurs 
in all societies, it is those who propose change that face the task of making it appear 
natural and continuous with a group’s identity. We now turn to the specific socio-political 
change focused on in this thesis, namely EU integration, to discuss how EU accession can 
be understood as a larger, abstracted expression of the processes described within the 
social identity approach.   
2.4. The Nation and the Supranational 
The previous sections have discussed identity processes and representations of history, 
accumulating in a proposed theoretical framework to address identity, history and 
political change. I now move to examine this in the particular context of this research 
more precisely, looking first at the relevant supranational group – the European Union. 
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Literature on international organization theory has explored the development of the EU 
as a neofunctionalist strategy intended to promote identities beyond the nation-state 
and to limit the possibility of conflict (Haas, 1964). Here I explore the EU as a social 
construct, considering how the image of the EU has been shaped in various public and 
elite discourses, as well as the extent to which an EU identity exists, and what it may 
means. I do so by applying theoretical insights from the social identity approach, 
focusing on particular developments of the theory that extend to more complex, dual-
identification and nation-level processes. 
2.4.1 Dual Identities: Subgroups and Superordinate Groups  
In relation to national identity, the SIA allows us to explore the ways in which 
processes of intergroup comparison and differentiation allow nations to achieve, and 
maintain, a sense of positive distinctiveness vis-à-vis other nations. However, as 
individuals belong to several social groups, and as supranational unions are 
increasingly emerging, the search for an optimal balance between unification and 
diversification, similarity and difference, is a struggle that individuals often face when 
attempting to accommodate several, at times conflicting identities into their sense of 
selves (Brewer, 1991; Hopkins, 2011; Tajfel, 1978). Some resolve this conflict by 
compartmentalizing identities (Andreouli & Howarth, 2013) while others discursively 
separate conflicting identity narratives (Cieslik & Verkuyten, 2006). These struggles 
between similarity and difference are not only limited to intra- or inter-personal 
situations, but are frequently found in contexts of intergroup and inter-national 
changes, where previous out-groups are united within a common ingroup, such as in 
context of mergers or multinational unions (Gleibs, Noack & Mummendey, 2010; 
Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Sindic & Reicher, 2009).  
Two key models within social psychology that have been informative for our 
understanding of subgroup-superordinate group dynamics are the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model (CIIM, see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; 2012) and Ingroup Projection 
Model (IPM, see Wenzel, Mummendey & Waldzus, 2007). Both models are rooted in 
the work of Turner (1987) and self-categorization theory, but rely on different 
mediating processes in explaining when, and how, superordinate identities have 
positive or negative effects on outgroup attitudes and superordinate belonging.  
The Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) 
draws on the concept of ‘depersonalization’ to argue that the introduction of a 
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superordinate group evokes a process of re-categorization among members of a 
subgroup. As a consequence of this process, perceived out-group members are 
categorized as members of the common ingroup, and thus positively perceived. This 
new identity however, does not overtake the importance of the subgroup identity, but 
rather they co-exist, in an overlapping manner. The model frequently draws on the 
metaphor of a ‘team’ to conceptualize the unique contributions of each subgroup to the 
larger superordinate group and its goals. This approach to superordinate groups has 
been taken when considering the ways in which minorities identify both with their 
subgroups (ethnic/religious) and superordinate groups (national) (Hopkins, 2011; 
Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011) and has been successfully supported in studies of 
acculturation and migration (Berry, 2006; 2011). This literature has shown the 
complex ways in which individuals negotiate and manage inclusiveness and 
distinctiveness by re-categorizing the superordinate group through its commonalities 
with the subgroup. It therefore emphasizes the importance of perceived compatibility 
between subgroups in the context of a new common ingroup (Gleibs et al., 2010). 
However, it also speaks to the role of social recognition and power in allowing such re-
negotiations to be validated and legitimized. Namely, recognition is intimately linked 
with identity and so becomes crucial in informing it. As Taylor (1992, p.25) argues;  
 
Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to 
them a confining or demaning or contemptible picture of themselves. 
Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of 
being.  
 
Thus, while there might be benefits to common categorization, these can become 
threatened when the subgroup’s identity and diversity is not given recognition in the 
wider social context or superordinate group, but rather subgroups (particularly 
minorities) are accepted to the extent that they conform, or assimilate, to the dominant 
subgroups values, norms and traditions (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Misrecognition, or 
non-recognition can cause a threat to subgroups by potentially undermining their 
ability to practically exercise their identities. This can in turn cause reluctance to, and 
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distancing from, the superordinate group altogether (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011; 
Sindic & Reicher, 2009). Recognition therefore becomes important in contexts of 
superordinate group belonging where the co-existence of different groups within a 
larger, common ingroup can create tensions around who is more or less a member, and 
the consequential access to rights and resources this entails.   
It is this latter, more conflictual side to subgroup-superordinate group dynamics 
that the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM) has theorized in detail. IPM suggests that the 
creation of a common ingroup can have negative consequences as subgroups tend to 
project the image of their subgroup onto the common group, thereby limiting the 
extent to which other subgroups are considered as equally embodying the groups 
beliefs, norms and values (Wenzel, Mummendey & Waldzus, 2007). This literature 
draws on an important concept of prototypicality, discussed in section 2.1. A 
‘prototype’ can be defined as that person within a group that best represents its goals, 
values and norms, and is thus seen as an ideal-type member of that category in a given 
context and frame of reference (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1998). According to SCT, 
through the specific content of a self-category will determine who is more or less 
prototypical, and this will also shift with the comparative context. Although 
prototypicality was originally developed to conceptualize how individuals become 
‘ideal-type’ members of an ingroup, the present model on superordinate identity has 
extended this work by applying the concept to the ways in which one group, among 
many, perceives itself as the prototype of the common ingroup (Mummendey & 
Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey & Waldzus, 2007).  
The Ingroup Projection Model posits that subgroups project their group’s 
characteristics as the prototype of the superordinate group, and the degree to which this 
is done will determine the degree to which status inequality between different groups is 
perceived as legitimate (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Research on superordinate 
identity within this framework has shown that even on the level of the most abstract 
ingroup, humanity, individuals belonging to western, industrialized nations tend to 
consider themselves more prototypical of the world’s population than less developed 
countries (Reese, Berthold & Steffens, 2012). Similarly, on a national level, Devos and 
Banaji (2005) found that White Americans implicitly considered their subgroup as 
more prototypical of an American identity (superordinate) than African Americans or 
Asian Americans. Interestingly enough, in the case of Asian Americans, White 
Americans were also seen as more prototypical of the superordinate group than their 
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own subgroup, speaking to the importance of history and power relations in 
constraining our identification with, and belonging to, superordinate groups. Equally 
important, these results have real implications. Increased perceptions of prototypicality 
of the common ingroup can function to perpetuate inequality by legitimizing social 
hierarchies and thereby justifying the superiority of some groups over others (Reese et 
al., 2012).  
Anticipated superordinate (or supranational) membership, such as EU 
membership, therefore has consequences for intergroup relations, but also for the 
positioning of the subgroup within a hierarchical structure that grants some members 
more power than others.  These changes arising from membership thus bring socio-
psychological consequences with them, particularly for lower-status members who are 
attempting to integrate. Thus it is important to emphasize that these processes play out 
differently among different types of subgroups. Namely, as Joyce, Stevenson & 
Muldoon (2013) have argued “dominant groups, being seen as more prototypical of the 
superordinate category, experience less discrepancy between subgroup and 
superordinate identities, while for minority group members, inclusion in a higher order 
category tends to accentuate the discrepancy and exacerbate their peripherality.” (p. 
452). Here power relations play a key role in shaping how subgroup – superordinate 
group dynamics emerge and are managed, and the consequences they have not only for 
superordinate identification, but also for the psychological well-being of the 
individuals experiencing the change (Iyer, Jetten & Tsivrikos, 2008). In the next 
section we explore how issues of identity undermining shaping the extent to which 
supranational belonging is seen as beneficial or threatening.  
 
2.4.2 Supranational Membership and Identity Undermining 
The concept of ‘identity undermining’ was coined to consider the practical identity 
consequences of a common ingroup membership rather than a focus on only 
distinctiveness threat, which refers to the more cognitive process of conceptualizing 
the ingroup (and its identity) as distinct and positive (Sindic & Reicher, 2009). In the 
context of nations, identity undermining can refer both to the loss of sovereignty, but 
also to the limit or constraint on more banal practices of nationalism, such as everyday 
symbols and expressions of a national culture (Billig, 1995). Identity undermining is 
derived from a sense of incompatibility with other subgroups and the practical 
implications of this, as well as the power(lessness) of the subgroup in relation to other 
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subgroups. Thus, both factors influencing identity undermining have implications for 
the practical ability with which individuals can exercise their ‘way of life’ (Sindic & 
Reicher, 2009). This concept highlights that social identities are social psychological 
phenomena, where the cognitive processes becomes intertwined with the behavior and 
practices of social groups.  
 In working towards EU integration, candidate nations are expected to fulfill a 
series of conditions before becoming eligible for consideration. This entails a 
transformation of laws and institutional regulations and can often be a lengthy process. 
It is also a psychologically relevant process as the conditions placed on a candidate 
communicate a position of subordinate power. Within international political economy, 
the concept of ‘asymmetric interdependence’ is frequently applied to trade, but can 
also be applied to the context of the EU (Bechev, 2011). The concept lets us explore 
how, in a mutually beneficial relationship, the costs of disruption or loss of partnership 
are much higher for one party than the other (Nye & Keohan, 1977). Thus, there is a 
power-asymmetry, which lends the more powerful partner (EU) a bargaining position. 
This has been the case with Serbia, where the process of making a mends for the past 
has become part of the conditionality placed on the nation. As a consequence, Serbia-
EU negotiations were frozen (2006-2007) due to Serbia’s lack of compliance with the 
International Crime Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY; Stahl, 2013). Therefore, 
EU integration is not only politically significant, but also socio-psychologically so, as 
it communicates not only who is in a position of power to make demands, but also the 
values that candidate nations are expected to embody or develop in order to be 
considered fully European. Thus, while it might be hard to speak of a distinctly ‘EU’ 
identity, there are certainly norms, values and expectations of what an EU member is.  
This can perhaps shed light on why a nation like Turkey has been unable to integration 
in spite of a lengthy democratization process, and why public support for its 
integration in EU member states remains low (Gerhards & Hans, 2011).   
Consequently, in promoting positive attitudes towards the EU it becomes 
important to construct national identity and supranational identity as compatible. 
According to the Ingroup Projection Model, this would be possible as ingroups claim 
prototypicality of the superordinate group through the process of projection. However, 
less has been said about the extent to which contextual factors actually explicitly shape 
the prototypicality of the superordinate category and in turn create barriers for some, 
and bridges for others, between subgroup and superordinate identity (Mummendey & 
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Wenzel, 1999). In light of this, it becomes important to consider two key factors when 
providing a social psychological approach to the study of supranational identity in 
contexts of political change and integration; 1) the origins of the social category of 
‘European’ and its social identity, and 2) the role of recognition in the process of 
identification, providing either a barrier or a bridge towards inclusion and dual 
identification. These two key factors are addressed in the following two sections.  
 
2.5. European Identity: Connecting the Political and the Cultural  
To begin with, it is important to clarify whether we are talking about a European 
identity in the context of the EU, or whether there is a distinct EU identity, separate 
from a European identity. While scholars have disagreed on this, there seems to be a 
commonly accepted distinction between the EU (as a political category) and Europe 
(as a cultural / historical category). For example, Flockhart (2010) argues that “‘EU-
ization’ is different from ‘Europeanization’ because of its focus on the EU and because 
it is predominantly concerned with ‘political encounters’ […] EU-ization is a small, 
but important part of a much broader and long term process of Europeanization, which 
is predominantly concerned with ‘cultural encounters’” (p.790-791). While this 
distinction is theoretically useful, it begs the question of whether the processes can be 
equally distinguished in real socio-political events. The position taken in this PhD is 
that, while there is a clear distinction between the EU, as a political project, and 
Europe, as a geographical territory with a unique history, these distinctions cannot be 
divided into separate identities. For the most part in everyday debates it is difficult to 
separate out representations of the EU and representations of Europe, and so 
distinguish identities that relate to EU or Europe but not both. Consequently, it is 
perhaps more useful to discuss the EU in terms of its entitativity (Campbell, 1958) and 
its links to a European identity project. To do so, we must first understand the 
historical construction of the social category ‘Europe’ and its boundaries, before we 
can explore how this has influenced current conceptualizations of what it means to be 
more or less European.  
2.5.1. Europe and its ‘Other’ 
In 1999, Iver B. Neumann wrote that “‘The East’ is indeed Europe’s other, and it is 
continuously being recycled in order to represent European identities.” (p. 207). In 
2016, Katarina Kinnvall argued that colonialism is still part of European reality today 
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and that understanding Europe and European integration from a postcolonial lens 
allows us to more seriously consider the challenges involved in asserting both national 
and European belonging. What both of these authors argue (and many in between their 
times of writing) is that a reading of Europe from an identity-focused perspective 
illustrates that the construction of a European community and identity has occurred in 
the context of self-other relations. Who is then the ‘Other’ against which a European 
self has been constructed? 
Scholars answering this question have tended to position self as based on 
‘Western’ European values and Other as non-Western (Carrier, 1995; Flockhart, 2010; 
Kinnvall, 2016; Neumann, 1999; Todorova, 1997). Flockhart (2010) for example, 
identifies several different ‘Others’, which have emerged through the history of 
Europeanization; the geographical ‘Other’ (Africa and the Orient), the religious 
‘Other’ (Islam), and the civilizational ‘Other’ (inferior savages). He argues that “just as 
the introduction of a long term historical perspective revealed that the ‘historical 
content’ of Europeanization has changed fundamentally on different occasions, the use 
of SIT clearly reveals that Europe’s ‘Other’ and ‘Significant We’ have also changed on 
several occasions.” (Flockhart, 2010, p.797). In other words, while the process of 
differentiating self from other has remained continuous over time, the meaning given 
to these two categories, and the valued dimension on which European distinctiveness 
and superiority has been maintained, has differed and changed over time. Drawing the 
link between a European community and the emergence of the European Union, it 
could be argued that, while a European identity extends beyond the context of the EU, 
the EU has functioned as an entrepreneur of identity, closely aligning the values of a 
European identity with the politicization of those values as part of an EU agenda.  
Consequently, it is the leaders of this agenda who have managed to shape the 
prototypicality of what it means to be European, with EU members seen as closer to 
that prototype than non-member states. This argument can be by supported by the fact 
that candidate nations are expected to conform to the basic norms outlined in the 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) and Copenhagen Criteria (1993), 
documents that emphasize the importance of liberal democracy, rule of law, human 
rights and peace, all dimensions which are seen as stable in Western countries 
(Flockhart, 2010). Considering this, we can potentially extend the work of Billig 
(1995) on banal nationalism to consider the idea of ‘banal supranationalism’. Namely, 
whereas Billig argues that banal nationalism functions to cover the ideological habits 
46 
 
which enable established nations, such as those in the West, to appear natural and 
invisible, so we could argue that those countries driving supranational integration are 
also those who have the power to construct ‘their’ values as universal and the only, 
possible and natural way of existing. In other words, what it means to be part of a 
supranational group is not only reproduced and constructed on an elite level, but 
perhaps more importantly on an everyday level, in the ‘invisible’ actions and practices 
which come to shape what it means to be ‘European’. If we follow this kind of logic, 
we must ask what the implications of this are for those countries that have found 
themselves categorized as ‘Other’ in European history.  
For countries like Turkey, it could be argued that its slow integration process and 
bleak prospective of future membership is due to it being a religious ‘Other’ and 
incompatible with a predominantly Christian Europe. In the words of SIT, Turkey 
would thus pose a threat to the positive distinctiveness of a European identity, 
potentially undermining it. Attitude surveys such as the Eurobarometer support this 
argument, finding that some countries are seen as more favorable prospective members 
of the EU than others, with Turkey at the bottom of this list, a finding that cannot be 
explain solely by economic and political factors (Gerhards & Hans, 2011). For 
countries such as Serbia, which have a history of ‘inbetweenness’ in regards to a 
European ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, this question becomes harder to answer.  
A glance at Serbian history, as presented in Chapter 1, shows a past filled with 
conflict, instability, supranational unification in Yugoslavia and its ultimate 
disintegration (Anzulovic, 1999; Ćirković, 2004; Cohen, 1996; Judah, 2009; 
Pavlowitch, 2002). An important element that has emerged from this history, is a sort 
of identity ‘inbetweenness’ (Russell-Omaljev, 2016; Todorova, 1996; Živković, 2011), 
which refers to a Serbian identity built on both Eastern and Western influences, 
combining tradition and modernity, communism and capitalism, religious similarity to 
‘Europe’ yet also difference (as Orthodox with Ottoman influences) and political 
allegiance to both Russia and the EU. This inbetweenness has also been found in 
discourses about Serbia outside of Serbia, particularly coming to a peak during the 
1990s and the Yugoslav war, when much media portrayal of Serbia tended to be 
negative. As Todorova (1997) and others have argued, “all Balkan nations are 
intensely conscious of their outside image.” (p. 60).  In Serbia, in particular, this 
outside image became increasingly stigmatizing after the Yugoslav war, leading to 
perceptions of Serbia as being unjustly ‘vilified’ internationally (David, 2014; Subotic, 
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2011).  Yet since the 2000s, the political goal in Serbia has been to “reintegrate into 
the international community” and “make up for lost times” (see Chapter 5). This 
discourse of re-aligning Serbia with European values and norms speaks to the 
perceived importance of not only politically join the EU, but also psychosocially by 
constructing a sense of compatibility and belonging. Yet, as mentioned previously, 
identification is not a one-way process, but a joint negotiation between self and other. 
Therefore, it becomes important to consider being identified as playing a crucial role in 
the process of identification with a supranational identity.   
 
2.6. Meta-Representations and Identity Negotiation 
Meta-representations are an essential part of identity construction and negotiation as 
they becomes part of one of the two simultaneous processes at play; self-identifying 
and being identified (Duveen, 2001; Mead, 1934). Elcheroth & Reicher (2017) explain 
that “who we are, what we think and what we do is as much a matter of what we think 
others are thinking of what we think ourselves, and also of what we think others will 
allow us to do.” (p. vii). However, as the literature on minority identities shows, these 
two processes do not always align in their representational work (Howarth, 2002). 
Knowledge that is considered in opposition to our own has been discussed in terms of 
‘alternative representations’, meaning “the representations of other people’s 
representations” (Gillespie, 2008, p.376). As we interact with others, there is an 
encounter between the knowledges we hold and, at times, an unwillingness to accept or 
acknowledge the representations held by others (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Frequently this 
unwillingness can manifest itself in discourse, where semantic barriers are put in place 
to discredit the knowledge of an ‘other’. In doing so, the other becomes stigmatized 
and the representations they hold become foreign (Gillespie, 2008). Thus, in many 
social interactions, representations are denied social recognition and legitimacy.  
The ability to reject alternative representations is closely linked to the power an 
individual (or group) holds as part of dominant social groups in society. As Duveen 
(2001) argues, identification is also a form of positioning which locates us in a 
complex hierarchy of social relations, with some identities positioned as higher than 
others. It is in contexts where individuals are positioned lower on the social hierarchy 
that representational and identity work becomes the most visible, as individuals are 
made aware of their ‘inferiority’ through interactions with others (Howarth, Wagner, 
Magnusson & Sammut, 2014). For these stigmatized groups, there is a painful 
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awareness of the negative representations attached to their ingroups, and the 
maintenance of a positive sense of self becomes increasingly challenging (Howarth, 
2002). However, it is here that we see the true uniqueness of humans’ in their 
capabilities to re-present, re-create and resist representations of their selves, thereby re-
constructing social reality to fit their needs. In some context, this becomes a collective 
effort, and identities become mobilized and politicized for purposes of social change 
(Klandermans, 2014).  
In this PhD, I take this theoretical conceptualization one step further, to 
consider how recognition becomes part of shaping identity on a macro-level. More 
specifically, in the context of this PhD, I consider what the prototypicality of a 
European identity is, and what the socio-psychological and political consequences are 
of perceived low-prototypicality in a superordinate context. It is here that a 
contextualized approach to supranational identity becomes crucial, as in contexts of 
politics “superordinate identities cannot be divorced from the political settings and 
objectives within given contexts.” (Moss, 2017, p.14). In other words, we focus here 
not only on resistance as an outcome of stigmatized subgroup identities (national 
identities) but also on the role of social perceptions of recognition in providing either a 
bridge or a barrier to dual identification. This is something we frequently see in 
qualitative research where individuals who identify with two groups (i.e., Muslim and 
British) are forced to renegotiate a distinct way in which these can co-exist, a process 
brought on by the initial lack of recognition of the two identities as compatible 
(Hopkins, 2011). As Fleischmann and Phalet (2016) argue, this lack of compatibility is 
“limited by exclusionist majority definitions of national belonging and by the lack of 
public recognition of these multiple identities.” (p. 450). Similarly, if exclusionist 
definitions of supranational belonging are constructed by entrepreneurs of a European 
identity, how does this influence identification and consequently willingness to be part 
of a supranational group such as the EU?    
 
2.7. Conclusion: A Self-Other Framework of Supranational Identity  
By conceptualizing identities as in a constant state of ‘becoming’ (Hall, 1997), we 
must acknowledge a few key tenants; 1) self-other relations are inseparable in the 
process of identity construction and negotiation, whether this occurs in micro-level or 
macro-level contexts, 2) identification as a process therefore entails a continuous 
dialogue (real or imagined) between self and other, where the mere perceived ideas 
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and thoughts of others (meta-representations) are consequential in providing either a 
recognition or lack thereof, of individual belonging to chosen superordinate groups, 3) 
the everyday lived experiences of individuals become crucial in managing these self-
other relations as well as reproducing national identity and the development of a 
supranational belonging, and lastly, 4) perceived collective continuity, or in the context 
of national identities, historical continuity, becomes a source through which meaning 
is given to social groups, linking their past with the present. To return back to 
Emerson’s quote from the beginning of this chapter, we have to ask whether this 
definition of a nation (and subsequently ‘social group’ by Tajfel) needs revising. 
Namely, if “the simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body 
of people who feel that they are a nation” then what happens if a body of people who 
feel part of a nation (or supranational group) do not equally recognize each other as 
such?  
 
 2.8. Research Questions 
Chapter 1 provided an overview of the socio-political and historical context of Serbia 
and its relations to the EU, showing that this relationship has been complicated by 
events of the past. The seeming incompatibilities between Serbia and the EU, and the 
belief that Serbian identity has developed in isolation from its larger European context 
becomes important to understand when exploring this seemingly political 
phenomenon. The present chapter (2) has explored the social psychological literature 
on history, identity, group dynamics and processes of meaning-making to offer some 
theoretical insights into the relationship between the nation and the supranational 
group. Introducing a framework that situates self-other dynamics across time at the 
heart of the Social Representations Approach, I considered how processes of meaning-
making in times of change are situated in larger discourses on history, nationhood and 
politics.  
 As a whole, this thesis will focuses on how political projects become 
constructed in both elite and everyday contexts, exploring how historical continuity, 
shapes these discourses. As has been discussed above, tensions between continuity and 
change, unification and diversification, and the past and the future are inherently part 
of any social psychological process, especially when the outcomes have real-world and 
political consequences. To explore this in more detail, the present thesis is guided by 
the following questions, first outlined in section 1.1 (page 16); 
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1) What role do social representations of history play in how citizens make sense of present 
socio-political change, and what are the implications of this for how they represent the 
future?(Chapter 4) 
 
2) How is a sense of compatibility between Serbian identity and EU belonging constructed by 
entrepreneurs of identity to either promote or resist change? Which discursive strategies have 
become the most successful within political discourses? (Chapter 5) 
 
3) What are the lay understandings of supranational integration in the context of Serbia joining 
the EU, and how do these relate to identity and intergroup threat? (Chapter 6, Study 1) 
 
4)  What is the underlying role of power dynamics in shaping 1) fears of the undermining of 
Serbian identity by EU accession, 2) perceptions of prototypicality of the category ‘European’, 
and 3) the perceived compatibility of national and supranational identification? What are the 
consequences of these processes for attitudes in favour of EU accession? (Chapter 6, Study 2) 
 
5) How is the desire for collective continuity reconciled with a stigmatizing past? (Chapter 7) 
 
The methodological design of the project is outlined in Chapter 3, discussing the 
benefits of using a mixed-methods approach to exploring political phenomena. Then 
we turn to the empirical papers that address specific research questions. Chapter 4 
addresses the public perceptions of Serbia’s EU integration processes, discussing how 
the past and the future are drawn on to support political arguments.  By repeated focus 
groups in five cities in Serbia, this data provides a rich understanding of the interplay 
between history, identity, and continuity and change in shaping how the EU is 
constructed in the public sphere and how this in turn influences political attitudes. 
Chapter 5 details how Serbia’s relationship with the EU has been managed through 
political discourse, exploring how changes in political agendas have shaped discourses 
on identity and continuity. Chapter 6 uses a mixed-methods approach combining both 
qualitative and quantitative data to develop further a novel approach towards exploring 
the conditions under which identification with one’s national and supranational groups 
become either compatible or incompatible, particularly focusing on the role of 
recognition in providing either a bridge or a barrier towards inclusion. Chapter 7 ties 
the previous three empirical chapters together through a discursive analysis of  how 
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collective continuity becomes embeddes within self-other relations, and in turn the 
consequences of this for whether continuity becomes enhancing or undermining of 
national identity. Lastly, chapter 8 concludes the PhD by outlining the contributions of 
this research, both empirically and theoretically, providing an innovative theoretical 
argument for the importance of ‘insecure’ social categories and the implications this 
has for identity continuity, but also attitudes towards change.  
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Chapter 3: Methodological Design2 
This chapter outlines the rationale of the methodological framework of this PhD. The 
emphasis on exploring and connecting the micro-level processes of meaning-making 
and belonging with macro-level political phenomena demands a methodological 
approach that emphasizes both the range and diversity of the issue but also its depth 
and specificity. To tackle this, a mixed-methods approach was deemed most suitable, 
which is discussed after an overview of the research design has been outlined.  
3.1 Research Design 
Serbia was chosen as the empirical setting for this project because it is in a process of 
change – which has clear political and psychological dimensions. It has been working 
towards becoming a member of the EU for over the last 15 years. In addition to this, 
and as discussed in chapter 1, it provides a rich example of a nation striving towards a 
future which continues to clash with important markers and symbols of the nation’s 
past (e.g., Kosovo). Thus, the clash between the past and the future as it occurs in the 
present makes Serbia an ideal context in which to explore the role of history and 
identity in shaping meanings of socio-political change and their compatibility with the 
image of the nation. The questions guiding this research project are summarize in the 
table below. A mixed methods design was considered most appropriate for this project 
in order to comprehensively explore both the representations of everyday citizens 
(Chapter 4) and elites (Chapter 5), as well as the extent to which these are part of a 
larger populations perception of Serbia’s relations with the EU (Chapter 6). This 
enabled both depth and breadth of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Because of the nature of the format of this thesis (paper-based) empirical chapters are stand-alone, which means that 
the following methodology chapter will include a high degree of repetition. However, the chapter allows for a deeper 
insight into the methodological procedures than the empirical chapters themselves could offer.  
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Table 3.1 Research Design 
 
 3.1.1 Mixed-Methods Design 
The research design of this PhD included both qualitative and quantitative methods to 
answer the overall research question. A mixed-methods design for the thesis, and 
requires a brief overview of both qualitative and quantitative methods making the 
differences necessarily over-stated, before moving on to discussing their relationship 
within a mixed-methods design project. 
 Qualitative research refers to approaches that analyse so-called ‘naturally 
occuring’ data, such as words, interactions or visuals. It has its philosophical roots in 
the naturalistic philosophies, challenging the idea of ‘objective’ knowledge and instead 
emphasizing a perspective on knowledge and reality that is constructivist, mediated by 
the socio-cultural experiences and contexts in which we develop and live. The methods 
Research Question Method Analysis Paper 
What role do social representations of 
history play in how citizens make sense 
of present socio-political change, and 
what are the implications of this for 
how they represent the future? 
12 Focus 
Groups (4 
groups over 
3 time-series; 
N =32) 
 
Thematic 
Analysis  
 
 
Published in 
Integrative 
Psychological 
and Behavioural 
Science 
(2018) 
1) How is a sense of compatibility between 
Serbian identity and EU belonging 
constructed by entrepreneurs of identity 
to either promote or resist change?  
- Which discursive strategies have 
become the most successful within 
political discourses? 
 
Survey  
(N= 467) 
 
17 political 
speeches 
Critical 
Discourse 
Analysis  
 
 
Published in  
European 
Journal of 
Social 
Psychology 
(2017) 
2) What are the lay understandings of 
supranational integration in the context 
of Serbia joining the EU, and how do 
these relate to identity and intergroup 
threat?  
 
3) What is the underlying role of power 
dynamics in shaping a) fears of the 
undermining of Serbian identity by EU 
accession, b) perceptions of 
prototypicality of the category 
‘European’, and c) the perceived 
compatibility of national and 
supranational identification?  
- What are the consequences of these 
processes for attitudes in favour of EU 
accession? 
9 Focus 
Groups 
(N=67) 
 
 
 
Survey data 
(N=1192) 
Thematic 
Analysis  
 
 
 
 
Correlational 
analyses; 
moderation & 
mediation 
analyses 
(Hayes, 2018) 
 
 
In preparation 
(Intended 
submission, 
2018) 
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range from ethnographic fieldwork, to structured or semi-structured interviews and 
morerecently, various forms of micro-linguistic analysis (i.e., conversation analysis) as 
well as grounded theory and feminist methodology (Todd, Nerlich, McKeown & 
Clarke, 2004, p. 3). Qualitative data is rich, detailed and context-dependent, and 
becomes appropriate for research aiming to give voice to underrepresented populations 
within the research literature, to address contradictory research findings or literatures, 
and to shed light and understanding on phenomena in less explored contexts (Creswell, 
2014).  
 Quantitative research, in turn, is rooted in a ‘positivist’ approach which 
dominates much of psychology, albeit a less so social psychology. The positivist 
approach often assumes a common objective reality across individuals, groups and 
societies, which can be discovered through rigorous testing of theories. The approach, 
unlike qualitative methods, is predominantly deductive. Quantitative methods tend to 
used controlled environments (lab experiments) and precise measures to ensure the 
most accurate possible observations of a phenomenon are reached, and to limit the 
‘noise’ of the social world. Quantitative methods focus on determining the relationship 
between two variables within a population, and can either be designed to be 
descriptive, establishing associations, or experimental, establishing causality. Popular 
types of quantitative research methods include surveys and experiments (both quasi-
experiments and ‘true’ experiments).  
While there are many differences between the two, there are also several 
important similarities, which make mixed-methods research appear less contradictory 
and more complementary (see Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Firstly, both methods 
use empirical observations to address their research questions. Whether it is the use of 
interviews or experiments, all research in the social sciences draws on some form of 
observable behaviour. Secondly, both methods have measures in place which function 
to address and restrict confirmation bias and other forms of invalidity. Within 
qualitative research, the transparency regarding sampling, researcher subjectivities, the 
presentation of larger parts of qualitative data in reports on findings, members check, 
data triangulation and respondent validation are some of the important ways in which 
the credibility and reliability of qualitative data is reported. In turn, in quantitative 
research, measures are put in place to test the reliability of measures used (i.e., test-
retest, inter-rate reliability and Cronbach’s alpha), the validity of a research design 
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(i.e., pilot testing), and the generalizability of the instruments and findings (i.e., 
through the use of a different sample or replication).  
 Mixed methods research (MMR) is often utilized by researchers who see the 
merits of both qualitative and quantitative research, and consider a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods to provide additional insights which could not 
have been gained from either method individually (Tashakorri & Teddlie, 2009). 
While not dismissing the uniqueness of each method or their philosophical roots, 
MMR instead takes a pragmatic approach towards science. MMR advocates a 
‘compatibility’ thesis and discusses methods and paradigms through their placement 
on a continuum, rather than as sets of dichotomies (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). This 
approach emphasizes ‘methodological eclecticism’, which sees qualitative and 
quantitative methods as equally valuable but suitable of different types of research 
questions and purposes (Todd et al., 2004). The emphasis here is on allowing the 
research question to guide which method is most suitable for how to answer the 
question. Namely, the ‘what’ should preceed the ‘how’. An additional benefit to MMR 
is the ability for researchers to draw on the strengths of different methods while 
addressing their weaknesses through complimentary methods. For example, whereas 
quantitative research is often criticized for imposing categories on participants which 
might not reflect the local meanings of those same categories, the use of qualitative 
methods to complement this weakness can allow for the meaning of various concepts 
to be more fully understood, and potentially improved. If the goal of research within 
the social sciences, and social psychology in particular, is to understand, address and 
provide solutions for social problems then the use of a pragmatic approach towards the 
study of social phenomena must be given preference. In doing so, we break free from 
the constraints of methodological paradigms and open up an avenue for 
methodological creativity and the improvement of methods in the social sciences.  
Considering the above, the adoption of a mixed methods approach within 
psychology is significantly underdeveloped compared to other social science 
disciplines (Alsie & Teddlie, 2010; Roberts & Pove, 2014). Alise and Teddlie (2010) 
show that the proportion of MMR publications in ‘pure’ social sciences (such as 
psychology) is two to three times lower than in applied social sciences. Despite this 
lack of progress towards MMR within psychology, this PhD is an attempt to move 
away from this perspective of incompatibilities to acknowledge the role of 
methodological and pragmatic pluralism in answering complex, socio-political 
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questions. As such, due to the prevalence of qualitative methods within the thesis, 
there is an underlying social constructivist tone to much to the thesis, yet this can be 
seen as a reflection of the pragmatist approach of mixed-methods research, where the 
starting-point of this PhD has focused on shedding light on EU integration in an 
underexplored context such as Serbia, to moving towards exploring how meaning-
making has consequences for identification and political attitudes in that particular 
context. The below sections outline the methods of each study in detail.  
 
3.2. Study I: Iterative Focus Groups 
Research Question: How is continuity managed by citizens in contexts of socio-
political change? What role do social representations of history play in maintaining 
ingroup continuity?  
The first study conducted for the research project was intended as a longitudinal 
qualitative project with data collection occurring in three separate phases with the 
same participants over a one-year time frame. However, as one group of participants 
could not continue beyond the first interview it was decided to instead split the study 
into two data-sets; 1) a data-set including iterative focus groups with the same 4 core-
groups over a year’s time (Chapter 4), and 2) a data-set included 9 different focus 
groups with the same topic-guide in 7 different cities (Chapter 6, alongside 
quantitative data). The overlap between the data sets occurred in the initial 4 focus 
groups of both studies.  
Both studies intended to explore the ways in which everyday people discuss 
Serbia’s EU integration, national politics and expectations for the future, with the 
former focusing on gaining in-depth insights and exploring regional (north/south) 
differences, and the latter focusing on gaining a broader spectrum of views by 
interviewing people in more cities.  
 
3.2.1. Rationale for focus groups 
While most scholars within social and political psychology would recognize that 
concepts such as identity are complex, dynamic and situated in larger socio-historical 
and political contexts, less progress has been made in the development, and utilization, 
of methods to reflect this (Condor, 2011). Thus, in order to emphasize the social nature 
of meaning-making and to allow for a method that would accommodate the 
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exploratory nature of this study, it was considered most productive to use a qualitative 
methodology (Krueger, 1988). More specifically, as the Social Representations 
Approach emphasizes the social dimensions of knowledge, research on social 
representations is best explored within contexts of communication and interaction. It 
was therefore decided that focus groups would serve as the most suitable site through 
which to explore and develop a nuanced analysis of public understandings of identity, 
history and political change. Power, Single and Lloyd (1996) define a focus group as 
“a group of individuals selected and assembled by researchers to discuss and comment 
on, from personal experience, the topic that is the subject of the research.” (p. 499). 
Thus, a focus group is similar to everyday conversations as it places social interaction 
in the construction and contestations of social meanings at the core (Markova, Linell, 
Grossen & Orvig, 2007; Howarth, 2002). 
Besides being a suitable method for the exploration of social representations 
and social identities, focus groups further entail a space where knowledge can be 
debated, resisted and even renegotiated. As Howarth (2002) argues, within this kind of 
setting, “conflict and differences of opinion within the group force[s] participants to 
clarify their position, expose their attachment to particular representations, and admit 
weaknesses in their own position.” (p.3). In contexts of contested socio-political 
change, the importance of understanding the nuances and tensions that arise for 
citizens becomes crucial in exploring the ways in which psychology, history and 
politics intersect in everyday life. 
While both data sets within the present and third study (chapter 6) drew on 
focus group data, the corpus construction, procedure and analysis differed slightly for 
each, and will therefore be discussed separately (for second focus group data-set, see 
section 3.4.1 in this chapter and empirical chapter 6).  
 
3.2.2. Rationale behind separate time-frame analysis  
At the beginning of this PhD, the idea of longitudinal qualitative data collection was 
entertained as a possible way of methodologically incorporating time into the project. 
The centrality of understanding the intersections of history, psychology and politics 
placed time at the center of the PhD through the focus on processes, such as 
identification, as constantly in state of ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’. Therefore it was 
considered important to incorporate this aspect methodologically as well. We 
developed a study design that entailed repeat group interviews with the same 
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participants over a one-year time frame, which would allow the data collection to be 
iterative and situated within current events taking place at the time. While the initial 
hope was to be able to track changes in opinions and attitudes over time, it became 
clear as the time passed that not much changed in the more ‘core’ arguments of 
participants, while perhaps the references they drew on became more localized in 
current events that were salient in their frame of reference. This realization provided 
support for the importance of understanding that, while context matters, many 
identities and attitudes which are strongly held and internalized, will continue to be 
manifested in a similar manner across time (see Huddy, 2001). 
Therefore, the six-month periods planned as points for track changing 
representations and identities, were simply not long enough to document significant 
changes. Instead, the iterative focus group design was seen as providing another 
opportunity related to temporality, which was to focus on going in-depth into specific 
topics and unpacking them over several sessions with the same group. Thus, while the 
starting-point for this study was one where time was methodologically central, it 
progressed into a project where time became theoretically significant instead, with an 
emphasis on how participants drew temporal links between the past, present and 
future, but also how they saw their identities, cultures and national narratives as 
continuous and stable over time.  
 
3.2.3 Corpus Construction  
As the aim of this study was to explore the ways in which lay representations of 
history became part of understanding the present and (a potentially different) future, 
this type of question was best explored “in the in-between space we create in dialogue 
and negotiation with others” (Howarth, 2006, p.68). Considering this, focus groups, 
rather than one-on-one interviews, were seen as more comparable to ordinary talk 
(Marková, 2007). A focus group can be defined as “a group of individuals selected and 
assembled by researchers to discuss and comment on, from personal experience, the 
topic that is the subject of the research.” (Powell, Single & Lloyd, 1996, p.499). The 
use of focus groups is ideal at the preliminary or exploratory stages of a study and can 
help to generate hypotheses and develop questions for surveys (see Chapter 6 
methodology for an example).  
With this in mind, 12 focus groups (FGs) were conducted between April 2015 
and April 2016 in four cities in Serbia, two in the North and two in the South of the 
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country. While we did conduct 12 focus groups, we did so by meeting the same 4 
groups (one from each city) at three different time-points (April 2015, September 2015 
and April 2016). The rationale behind this design was that we wanted to go in-depth 
into the tensions that arose within the initial session, thereby allowing the second and 
third sessions to function as spaces to explore any unresolved or conflicting 
perspectives that emerged in the original focus group.  Furthermore, the selection of 
cities in the north and south reflected an interest in exploring the importance of 
physical proximity to Kosovo in shaping opinions, and understandings, of the 
importance of the region for Serbian identity, and subsequently collective continuity in 
the future. Prior to data collection, ethical clearance was obtained from the Ethics 
Committee at the Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, at the LSE. 
 32 individuals participated in this study, 11 of which were female and 22 male 
(see table 3.2 for demographics). Participants ranged in age from 19 to 55, with median 
age 31 (at time of first focus group). A central question when designing the interviews 
was whether to choose homogenous (according to some ‘a prior’ criteria) or 
heterogeneous groups. To allow for diversity in opinions and experiences to become 
part of the group dynamics, heterogeneous groups were chosen, and participants were 
recruited via snowballing, while ensuring that within each group one person knew at 
least another person, but that not all participants knew each other prior to the session. 
Due to the nature of the study design, with time-series focus groups, many 
participants were recruited for the first session but on average 2 participants were 
missing from each focus group at the second and third sessions. Each group was 
composed of 4-9 participants with no invited participants dropping out; instead, in 
some instances certain individuals brought a friend, co-worker or family member 
(particularly if they did not know any of the prior invited participants). In order to 
maintain a good rapport with the participants, these additional individuals were 
included as well. All focus groups took place in ‘natural’ settings such as cafes, 
participants’ homes or reserved rooms in local libraries. 
 
Table 3.2 Participant Demographics for Study I 
Participant Gender Age Occupation City 
1 Male 55 Business owner Belgrade  
2 Female 28 Student (PhD) Belgrade 
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3 Male 27 Insurance Agent Belgrade 
4 Female 28 NGO Employee Belgrade 
5 Male 25 Engineer Belgrade 
6 Male 29 Student  Belgrade 
7 Male 26 Engineer Belgrade 
8 Male 27 Journalist Belgrade 
9 Male 28 Unemployed Niš 
10 Male 30 Unemployed Niš 
11 Female 27 Retail Worker Niš 
12 Female 24 Student  Niš 
13 Female 27 Unemployed  Niš 
14 Female 24 Student Niš 
15 Male 28 Electrical Engineer Niš 
16 Male 26 Medical Technician Niš 
17 Female 50 Office clerk Niš 
18 Male 31 Architect Novi Sad 
19 Female 35 Architect Novi Sad 
20 Male 31 Accountant Novi Sad 
21 Male 31 Taxi Driver Novi Sad 
22 Male 30 Unemployed Novi Sad 
23 Male 28 Lawyer Novi Sad 
24 Male 34 Waiter Novi Sad 
25 Male 30 Military Employee Vranje 
26 Female 28 Military Employee Vranje 
27 Male      36 Unemployed Vranje 
28 Male 57 Self-employed farmer Vranje 
29 Female 55 Casino Employee Vranje 
30 Male 47 Lawyer Vranje 
31 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje 
32 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje 
 
 3.2.4. Procedure  
Within each group participants were given an information sheet (which explained the 
aims of the study) and a consent form to sign at the start (see appendix 1). Also, to 
ensure confidentiality (and address any concerns about anonymity) participants were 
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asked to provide their name, age and occupation to the group prior to the audio 
recording commenced and these were saved in collected field notes. The topic guides 
for each three sessions followed the same format, including six questions covering 
themes of history, politics and identity (see appendix 2). After conducting the first 
round of focus groups (April 2015), any remaining issues, tensions or points of debate 
for each question were used to inform the topic guide for the second session, thereby 
allowing the data collection to be an iterative process where I was able to go back to 
the participants to gain further insight on key tensions that arose. This design proved 
invaluable in providing an opportunity to probe unanswered questions and validate the 
preliminary reading of the previous focus group.  
 
3.2.5. Analysis  
All Focus groups were conducted (and subsequently analysed) in Serbian. The audio 
recordings were transcribed verbatim after the final round of focus groups and a 
thematic analysis was conducted following the guidelines outlined by Braun and 
Clarke (2006).  Thematic analysis is an analytical process where “careful reading and 
re-reading of the data” (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, p.258) allows for a form of pattern 
recognition within the data, where codes become themes and themes higher-order 
organizing themes. The use of thematic analysis for this study was deemed suitable as 
the research question was mainly exploratory and focused on meaning-making in the 
context of political change, and the analytical approach allowed for flexibility, while 
also being free from a dominant theoretical or epistemological stance, making it 
applicable in relation to various theoretical approaches (Braun & Clarke, 2006). All 
transcripts were coded using NVivo 11, a qualitative data software program. The 
coding process utilized for this study followed a data-drive inductive approach 
(Boyatzis, 1998).  
The first stage of analysis included a familiarization with the data, which was 
gained from doing the transcription myself rather than outsourcing it. The second stage 
focused on actually coding the data within NVivo, by reading one transcript at a time 
and coding segment of text and generating initial codes. From this step, codes were 
brought together under a particular theme, and the data was then read within the theme 
to make sure all coded segments were an appropriate fit. This in turned entailed an 
iterative process of revising and refining themes before finally developing the 
organizing themes that collated basic themes into one larger, topic. Figure 3.1 
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illustrates the thematic mapping developed from the analysis (for a detailed overview 
of the themes, see appendix 3).  
 
Figure 3.1: Thematic Mapping for Study I 
 
3.2.6. Limitations to focus group studies 
While focus groups are useful for eliciting several perspectives on the same topic and 
allowing for interaction, discussion, contestation and clarification in relation to 
important societal issues, there are limitations to this method. Firstly, and perhaps most 
evident, is the lack of generalizability from the limited sample size. Secondly, within a 
group setting, the researcher (as a moderator) is faced with the challenge of balancing 
his/her position as an objective researcher and the urge (or request) to share personal 
opinions and perspectives. In this sense, the impact of the researcher is important to 
acknowledge (see section 3.5). Third, the researcher has less control of the data 
(Morgan, 1988), because despite the researcher defining the set of questions that are 
introduced to the group, it is hard to control the interaction between participants 
without disrupting the ‘everyday dialogue’ atmosphere which one aims for. Fourth, 
purely practically focus group can be difficult to organize, particularly when 
Managing 
change and 
continuity
Myth of Origin
1. Narrating the battle of Kosovo
2. Political Reality of Kosovo 
3. Symbolic Meaning of Kosovo
(4. Tension: De Jure vs. De Facto Status of Kosovo)
The Nation and Europe
1. Cultural mismatch with dominant EU 
culture
2. Loss of sovereingty / powerlessness in EU
3. Positive civic changes as part of EU
4. Questioning idea of EU membership as 
progress
5. EU as historically against Serbia
(6. Tension: Integration without losing 
Independence)
People and Politicians
1. Politicians as immoral 
2. Citizens as representing 'real' Serbian 
values
3.Institutional Censorship
4. People lack agency in politics
5. Lack of normalcy
6. Negative stigma of 'Serbs'
( 7. Tension: People or System source of 
stigma and blame?)
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accommodating the time limits of several different individuals. As was experienced 
with this study, the inability of a group to continue their participation in a second and 
third round inevitably lead to a redesign of the project and a split of the data into two 
different studies. Lastly, in contexts where topics of conversation are controversial, 
interviews might prove more suitable. However, because of the potential sensitive (or 
contested) nature of certain topics, participants who knew each other (either as family-
members, relatives, colleagues or friends) were recruited to be part of the same focus 
group. In some contexts where ‘strangers’ were present, it was ensured that at least one 
other person in the group was acquainted with another individual, to ensure that no one 
was left completely unfamiliar with the faces (and voices) within the group. This, as 
Howarth (2002) argues “made it possible for controversial, and sometimes personally 
upsetting, topics to be discussed with both empathy and respect” (p.3). In conclusion, 
despite these limitations, the exploratory nature of study one and its crucial role in 
informing the third study highlights the added benefits of a mixed-methods approach 
in allowing for qualitative research to inform quantitative tools and measurements (i.e., 
Hughes & DuMont, 2005; Kelly, Njuki, Lane & McKinley, 2005).  
 
3.3. Study II: Political Discourse  
Research Question:  How is a sense of compatibility between Serbian identity and EU 
belonging constructed by entrepreneurs of identity to either promote or resist change? Which 
discursive strategies have become the most successful within political discourses? 
 
While the first study intended to explore lay representations of national identity, 
history and political change, the second study of the PhD aimed at analysing political 
discourses of history and identity, and how these intertwined in discussions on the 
socio-political changes (and potential future) of Serbia as it works towards EU 
accession.  
In the early 1990s, the political goal of Serbia was to build an independent but 
victimized image of a nation that had been treated wrongly by the world, with the EU 
being one of its scapegoats (MacDonald, 2002; Ramet, 2007; Subotic, 2011). For the 
past 15 years however, the political goal has shifted to integrating Serbia into a 
European community, epitomized in the idea of membership in the European Union. 
The second study conducted as part of this research was an exploration into the ways 
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in which politicans in Serbia have acted as entrepreneurs of identity over the past two 
decades to promote change as aligned with, and supportive of, a collective past and 
identity. In particular, the focus was on exploring how political change has been 
constructed in relation to national identity over time, examining how these discourses 
have shaped (and at times constrained) the ways in which politicians have discussed 
EU membership. This section will first outline the rationale for using political 
speeches to inform the research questions, then the sampling procedure will be 
explained followed by a description of the procedure taken during data collection. 
Lastly, the analytic procedure discusses how the data was processed using a particular 
version of critical discourse analysis which places emphasis on the historical context of 
speech and text.   
 
3.3.1 Rational for political speeches 
Much literature on the construction of national identity and the ways in which it 
becomes a mobilizing tool for pursuing political agendas acknowledges the role that 
politicians (or community leaders, elites and activists) play in this process. 
Considering this, there were two primary reasons for using political speeches within 
this PhD; firstly as it is a common method used in political science to explore political 
‘rhetoric’ (Finlayson, 2014; Frank, 2011; Nelson, 1998) but also social psychology 
when exploring how politicians mobilize support for political agendas or legitimize the 
status-quo (Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008; Gleibs, Hendricks, & Kurz, 2017; Reicher 
& Hopkins, 2001), and secondly because political speeches are a form of political 
communication intended to influence and persuade the public and is a rich source of 
data for exploring how socio-political change is managed top-down in a particular 
context. 
As discussed in chapter two, politicians can act as entrepreneurs of identity, 
engaging in an active process of constructing themselves as the prototype of an 
ingroup, while also shaping the meaning, and boundaries of who is included. In doing 
so, politicians attempt to position themselves as the most representative of a group’s 
values and goals in the hopes of gaining social and political power to shape the group’s 
future (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Therefore, drawing on political speeches in this part 
of the PhD allowed for an exploration into how elite discourses around socio-political 
change have been constructed over time in Serbia, particularly considering how and 
why, certain political agendas were more successful than others.  
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As Gibson (2012) argues, “[i]f we are to take seriously the discursive elements 
of social representations of history, we need an approach which places actual instances 
of people representing history at centre stage” (p.13.5). In other words, an analysis of 
political speeches using a discursive approach enables us to unpack history ‘in the 
making’ by highlighting the discursive tools which allowed for socio-political change 
to become successfully accepted within a larger public sphere. Similar to Augustinos 
& De Garis (2012) the rationale behind the use of political speeches was to “build on 
previous work that emphasizes the need to examine social identities as categories of 
social practice that are constructed and mobilized by social actors themselves rather 
than treating them as analysts’ categories.” (p.267).  
3.3.2 Sampling 
Due to the centrality of continuity and change over time in this research project it was 
crucial to collect speeches over a significant time frame to explore the ways in which 
national identity has been constructed in historical turning points, and the implications 
this has for the politics, and future, of the nation. In order to first determine which 
events in Serbia’s recent history were deemed memorable by the public, a survey was 
constructed and administered online. The survey included 20 event from 1989-2014 
(see appendix 4) which were chosen after consultation with a historian, a political 
scientist and a lawyer on Serbia’s recent history during a visit to Belgrade in February, 
2015, as well as an examination of the literature on Serbia’s recent political past 
(Damjanov, 2004; Pavlaković & Ramet, 2005; Živković, 2011). The survey was 
divided into two time-frames and participants were asked to rank the events in order of 
significance. The logic behind splitting up the time frame was to get an even 
distribution of political events over the past 25 years, particularly as the 1990s were a 
time of increased conflict and turbulence in Serbia as well as the region and so events 
from that time could potentially have been seen as more memorable (overall) than any 
events past 2000.  
The survey (N=467) was administered through social media channels, probably 
limiting the generalizability of the results, although no demographic details were asked 
of participants so this is unclear. Nevertheless, the events that scored the highest in 
terms of significance seem to concur with the general literature on Serbia’s political 
history (Damjanov, 2004; Ramet & Pavlaković, 2005; Živković, 2011) as well as 
political events brought up in a previous study exploring collective memory in Serbia 
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(Obradović, 2016). From the survey, the five highest ranked events of each time frame 
were chosen to inform the corpus for speech collection. Figure 3.2 below illustrates the 
results of the survey as represented in a historical timeline. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Historical Timeline of Political Events 
From these 10 events, two speeches were chosen from each event. The sampling for 
speeches followed what we call ‘oppositional sampling’ where one speech was chosen 
to reflect the party in power and another to reflect the main opposition. Two additional 
criteria for the selection process included choosing speeches that addressed the 
domestic audience (i.e., public address, inauguration speech, pre-election speech) and 
took place on, or close to the original event from the survey. 
 
3.3.3 Procedure 
Speeches were sampled from political elites, by which we mean individual politicians 
who played a central role in shaping Serbian politics at the time of a specific event. 
Initially, an attempt was made to locate official archives in Belgrade, Serbia, where 
speeches might have been stored. However, after visiting and consulting an 
administrative manager of the National Assembly Library in Belgrade it became clear 
that official archives mainly existed for parliamentary speeches or proceedings, and I 
was advised to instead use books, internet archives or political party websites to locate 
speeches. For example, it took several weeks to get access to the presidential 
inauguration speech in 2004, and this was eventually accessed by contacting (and 
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visiting) a member of the official videography team of the ceremony, and gaining a 
copy from them. It was even more difficult locating speeches prior to 2000, as the 
1990s were seen as a time of a nationalistic and xenophobic political climate in Serbia 
(Ramet, 2007), with limited official records of the political speeches that took place. 
Thus, the limited access to speeches made the sample non-exhaustive and rather 
selective.  
 Nevertheless, as the goal of the project was to offer an in-depth exploration into 
how national identity was constructed at key political moments, with a particular focus 
on the importance of managing continuity and change, the study made no direct claims 
about the generalizability of these themes. Instead, it was seen as a starting-point for 
exploring national identity in Serbia as it has developed top-down over time, as most 
studies have tended to focus on the construction of national identity in a specific time 
and context, without exploring the roots of these constructions or their further 
significance in the future.  
Despite this focus, for some events (total of 3), due to the lack of access to 
speeches, it proved hard to find complete speeches to analyze, particularly in 
attempting to find speeches that reflected the party in opposition. In these specific 
cases, only one speech was used as it was considered important to have the whole 
speech, rather than selected parts of it, to be able to analyze the discourse in its 
entirety. As some speeches were located in video or audio format (rather than written 
text), these were subsequently transcribed verbatim using ExpressScribe before the 
analysis took place. Table 3.3 below describes the sample of speeches, including the 
name, political affiliation and position of speaker, as well as the particular domestic 
context of the speech.  
 
Table 3.3 Political Speech Corpus 
Event  Speaker Political Position / 
Affiliation 
Political  
Ideology 
Speech Context 
1992 Vuk 
Drašković 
 
Leader of the Serbian 
Renewal Movement. 
 Centre-
right wing 
St Vitus Day Assembly, 
Anti-Government 
protest rally,  
June 28th, 1992 
1992 Slobodan 
Milošević 
President of Serbia, 
Leader of the Socialist 
Party of Serbia. 
Centre-
left, Left-
wing 
2nd SPS Congress, 
Closing Statement 
October 23rd, 1992 
1995 Zoran 
Djindjić 
 
President of the 
Democratic Party. 
Centre, 
Centre-
left wing 
 ‘5 Years of the 
Democratic Party’ 
Assembly,  
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3 The Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia are two different political parties.  
3rd March, 1995 
1995 Slobodan 
Milošević 
President of Serbia, 
Leader of the Socialist 
Party of Serbia. 
Centre-
left, Left-
wing 
Televised announcement 
following signing of the 
Dayton Peace 
Agreement,  
28th December, 1995 
1998 Mirko 
Marjanović 
 
Prime Minister of Serbia, 
Member of the Socialist 
Party of Serbia. 
Centre-
left, left 
wing 
Parliamentary address 
after Kosovo war 
started,  
24th March, 1998 
1998 Zoran 
Djindjić  
President of the 
Democratic Party.  
Centre, 
Centre-
left wing 
Democratic Party 
Assembly, 
17th July, 1998 
1999 Vojislav 
Koštunica  
 
Leader of the Democratic 
Party of Serbia.3 
Right-
wing 
Public announcement at 
beginning of NATO 
bombing,  
24th March, 1999 
1999 Slobodan 
Milošević 
President of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Leader of the Socialist 
Party of Serbia. 
Centre-
left, Left 
wing 
Address to the nation at 
beginning of NATO 
bombing,  
24th March, 1999 
20000 Slobodan 
Milošević 
President of Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia 
until the 7th of October, 
Leader of the Socialist 
Party of Serbia. 
Centre-
left, Left 
wing 
Public televised address 
to the nation before 
elections (which he 
lost), 
2nd October, 2000 
2000 Vojislav 
Koštunica  
 
President of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia 
after 7th October, 
Democratic Party of 
Serbia. 
Right-
wing 
Address at meeting after 
(won) election, 
5th October, 2000 
2003 Zoran 
Djindjić 
 
Prime Minister of Serbia 
until death in 2003, 
Leader of the Democratic 
Party. 
Centre, 
Centre-
left wing 
13th anniversary of the 
Democratic Party, 
1st February, 2003 
2003 Natasa 
Micić  
Acting President of 
Serbia, Member of the 
Civil Alliance of Serbia. 
Centre  Public address after 
Zoran Djindjić’s 
assassination, declaring 
state of emergency in 
Serbia, 
12th March, 2003 
2004 Boris Tadić President of Serbia, 
Newly elected Leader of 
the Democratic Party. 
Centre, 
Centre-
left wing 
Televised inauguration 
ceremony,  
11th July, 2004 
2008 
(1) 
 
1. Vojislav 
Koštunica 
 
Prime Minister of Serbia, 
Democratic Party of 
Serbia. 
Right-
wing 
Protest ‘Kosovo is 
Serbia’,  
21st February, 2008 
2008 
(2) 
Bozidar 
Đelić  
 
Deputy Prime Minister of 
Serbia, Member of the 
Democratic Party. 
Centre, 
Centre-
left wing 
Press Conference 
following SAA signing, 
30th April, 2008 
2008 
(2) 
Vojislav 
Koštunica 
Prime Minister of Serbia, 
Democratic Party of 
Serbia. 
Right-
wing 
General Election 
assembly,  
26th June, 2008 
2012 1. Boris 
Tadić 
President of Serbia, 
Leader of the Democratic 
Party,  
Centre, 
Centre-
left wing 
Press Conference 
following EU granting 
Serbia official candidate 
status,  
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3.3.4 Analysis 
Taking a functional approach to language in context, the present paper draws on 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the Discourse-historical approach (DHA) 
developed by Wodak (1996; Wodak & Meyer, 2001; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & 
Leibhart, 2009), to explore the ways in which talk is used to construct political change 
as aligned with identity and continuity. The DHA is a development within the Critical 
Discourse Analysis literature which focuses specifically on integrating the historical 
context in which naturally occurring language takes place, thereby incorporating “a 
larger quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background 
of the social and political fields in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded” (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2001, p. 65). The DHA draws on insights from critical theory, argumentation 
theory, British discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis, German ‘politicolinguistics’ and 
Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics to focus on the interrelationship between 
discourse and practice as it occurs within particular socio-historical contexts (Reisigl 
and Wodak, 2001:, pp. 32–35). Studies utilizing the DHA have illustrated the subtle 
ways in which politicians draw on history, identity and the ‘Other’ as a threat to shape 
discourses around political issues such as war and immigration (Clary-Lemon, 2014; 
Graham, Keenan & Dowd, 2004). A key concept within CDA which becomes crucial 
in successfully applying this methodology to speeches (and their consequences for 
social action) is ‘intertextuality’.  
Intertextuality refers to the ways in which texts or discourses are linked to, or 
embedded in, other larger discourses. Coined in the late 1960s, the term refers to the 
ways in which “texts and utterances are shaped by prior texts that they are 
‘responding’ to and subsequent texts that they ‘anticipate’.” (Fairclough, 1992, p.270). 
Intertextuality allows us to explore how texts, or discourses, build on the past but also 
shape it in the process. This becomes particularly significant when exploring how 
discourses change in relation to socio-political change.  
A comprehensive guide to using the DHA can be found in Wodak et al.’s 
(2009) study of Austrian national identity. Within the book (pp.30-47), the authors 
distinguish between four closely interwoven dimensions of analysis which allow for 
triangulation; (1) identification of thematic content areas; (2) analysis of micro- and 
macro-level discourse strategies; (3) analysis of argumentation schemes, or topoi, as 
they relate to micro- and macro-level discourse strategies (i.e. topos of comparison; 
2nd March, 2012 
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topos of threat); and (4) analysis of the linguistic means of realization of discourse 
strategies (i.e. the use of metaphor, rhetorical questions, referential vagueness) (pp. 
30–47). Although both thematic content areas and the linguistic means of realization 
were explored in the analysis, the chapter itself focused on presenting the discursive 
strategies and argumentative schemes (topoi) used in the speeches, with reference to 
means of realization where appropriate (see appendix 10 for detail). Wodak et al., 
(2009) distinguish between five different discursive strategies (construction, 
perpetuation, justification, transformation and demontage/dismantling) frequently 
present in political speeches around nationhood. When exploring continuity and 
change, three strategies become particularly important; construction, perpetuation and 
justification. Strategies of construction attempt to establish a certain national identity 
by promoting unification within and differentiation from others, as well as 
identification and solidarity of the ingroup. Strategies of perpetuation function to 
maintain and reproduce pre-existing groups or images, while strategies of justification 
serve a similar function while frequently drawing on the legitimacy of past acts “which 
have been put into question” in order to restore a positive image of the nation (Wodak 
et al., 2009, p.33). Relating to these strategies are various topoi, “warrants which 
guarantee the transition from argument to conclusion.” (Kienpointner, 2011, p.265). 
For example, the use of a topos of threat functions to justify the speaker’s political 
agenda (argument) as one in defense of the nation (conclusion).  
 
3.3.5 Limitations 
As the study focused on a larger time frame for exploring representations of history and 
identity in relation to EU integration in Serbia, it is limited in its ability to cover recent 
developments in the process. Indeed, as the speeches were chosen based on a survey, it 
restricted the freedom to select discourses taking place around EU specific topics. Thus, 
although the EU was not a key foreign policy priority in Serbia until 2005 and onwards, 
it has however been a constant presence in the nation due to its involvement in the 
Kosovo conflict and Serbia’s cooperation with the International Crime Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Furthermore, by extending the time-frame of speeches we were able 
to explore the ways in which discourses on EU integration in the second half of the 
sample became embedded in legitimized discourses developed in the first half of the 
sampled speeches. Future research on the role of political discourse on national identity, 
history and politics in Serbia should look at more recent developments in the EU 
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integration process in Serbia, exploring perhaps how different political parties construct 
discourses around membership and identity differently or how the EU itself has 
responded to and treated the Serbian integration process.  
In addition, perhaps a more important limitation which also influenced the 
development of the former, was the lack of access to speeches, which might have biased 
the sampling procedure to those speeches which have had larger political and historical 
significance, and are thus more widely accessible online. While several avenues were 
explored in attempts to locate archives of speeches both within Belgrade, through 
searching Serbian books on the period of 1990-2010 (particularly political science 
books) and through searching political party websites, YouTube and other online 
platforms, it was nevertheless difficult to access a larger pool of representative speeches. 
Despite these difficulties, we attempted to at least partially deal with them by making 
sure that the initial sampling criteria were met, and thus that the speeches chosen 
addressed the public or were broadcasted on national television as they took place.  
 
3.4. Study III: Mixed-methods Study 
Research Questions:  Qualitative component: What are the lay understandings of 
supranational integration in the context of Serbia joining the EU, and how do these 
relate to identity and intergroup threat? Quantitative component: What is the 
underlying role of power dynamics in shaping a) fears of the undermining of Serbian 
identity by EU accession, b) perceptions of prototypicality of the category ‘European’, 
and c) the perceived compatibility of national and supranational identification? What 
are the consequences of these processes for attitudes in favour of EU accession? 
The final study composed of the two largest data sets of the PhD within a mixed-
methods design known as sequential exploratory design (Creswell, Plano Clark, 
Gutmann & Hanson, 2003). Data-collection is conducted in two phases, with 
qualitative data collection taking place first, followed by quantitative data. This design 
was considered suitable as it 1) allows researchers to determine the generalizability of 
a phenomenon within a selected population, and 2) it is useful when developing and 
testing a new instrument (Morse, 1991), such as the one developed and tested for meta-
representations of prototypicality. 
3.4.1. Methodology for Qualitative Component 
72 
 
A total of nine focus groups were conducted between in April 2015 (5) and April-May 
2016 (4). Participants were recruited through snowballing. For each group, one initial 
participant was contacted via telephone and (if they accepted) served as the point of 
contact for that particular city, helping me to organize a setting in which to conduct the 
interview, but also gain access to other potential participants. These key participants 
were contacted several times prior to the focus group to establish a rapport. The 
rationale behind the sampling of these individuals was not to reach statistical 
representativeness or generalisability, but rather to explore the diversity in beliefs and 
opinions expressed by a larger pool of individuals (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999, p.7).  
67 individuals participated in this study (27 females and 40 males). Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 57, with median age 34 (see table 3.4 for overview and 
appendix 5 for detailed demographics). All participants self-identified as ethnic Serbs; 
58 were born in Serbia, with the exception of 9 participants (6 females, 3 males) who 
were Serbs born in Bosnia but later moved to Serbia either because of the war in the 
1990s or for university/work. Occupations ranged from students to employees of 
public and private sector.  Each group was composed of 5-9 participants with no 
invited participants dropping out; instead, in some instances certain individuals 
brought a friend, co-worker or family member. In order to maintain a good rapport 
with the participants, these additional participants were included as well. All focus 
groups took place in ‘natural’ settings such as cafes, participant’s homes or reserved 
rooms in local libraries.  
 
Table 3.4 Overview of Focus Group Demographics for Study III 
FG (City) Participants Median Age 
Belgrade 1 8; 3 Female & 5 Male 26.9 
Belgrade 2 9; 3 Female & 6 Male 21.8 
Belgrade 3 6; 4 Female & 2 Male 31.5 
Cacak 7; 5 Female & 2 Male 48.7 
Niš 9; 5 Female & 4 Male 28.4 
Novi Sad 7; 1 Female & 6 Male 31.1 
Paracin 8; 1 Female & 7 Male 30.5 
Surdulica 5; 3 Female & 2 Male 27.8 
Vranje 8; 2 Female & 6 Male 37.1 
 
 3.4.1.1 Procedure  
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Prior to the focus group, participants were given an information sheet (which explained 
the aims of the study) and a consent form to sign (see appendix 1). Also, to ensure 
confidentiality (and address any concerns about anonymity) participants were asked to 
provide their name, age and occupation to the group prior to the audio recording 
commenced and these were saved in collected field notes.  
The same topic guide was used for all groups, with a total of six questions 
covering themes of Serbian politics in relation to the EU, what Serbia’s future in the 
EU would look like, and the role of other EU countries in shaping the politics of the 
EU (see appendix 6). The topic guide was piloted on four individuals from Belgrade 
(capital of Serbia) two months prior to the first focus group, and minor changes were 
made to the wording of three questions based on their feedback.  
All sessions were conducted (and subsequently analysed) in Serbian.Each focus 
group lasted between 21 minutes and 77 minutes (mean =61 minutes). In order to 
ensure participant confidentiality all names and identifiers were modified during 
transcription.  
 
 3.4.1.2 Analysis  
The audio recorded focus groups were transcribed verbatim and a thematic analysis 
was conducted following the guidelines outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). All 
transcripts were coded using NVivo 11. After coding five of the transcripts, a 
codebook was developed and applied to the remaining transcripts. The first round of 
coding led to 42 codes. These were then revisited, and some codes were removed (due 
to infrequency), or merged with similar codes after re-reading the coded sections. The 
final codebook included 38 codes, 10 basic themes and three organizing theme (see 
appendix 11). In order to ensure reliability, a sample of six translated pages were given 
to a fellow researcher, along with the codebook and code descriptors. Further, in order 
to ensure the language barrier in coding was overcome, the same sample of six pages 
were given to a Serbian researcher from Belgrade, along with the codebook and code 
descriptors. In the former case, intercoder reliability was 85% and in the latter 92%. 
After consulting the first inter-coder two codes were merged, one was renamed and 
three new codes were added. These in turn led to some minor revision to the thematic 
network, but no changes to the overall analytical narrative that was developed from the 
data.  
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3.4.2. Methodology for Quantitative Component 
In order to explore the underlying processes which emerged in the discourse of the 
qualitative data above, I decided to construct an exploratory survey, particularly 
focusing on how issues of power related to social identity processes such as dual 
identification with a superordinate group and subsequent political attitudes towards 
prospective EU accession. 
 
 3.4.2.1 Rationale for Survey 
Much of this PhD up until this study took a qualitative approach to the research 
question, focusing on exploring the connections between history, psychology and 
politics more in-depth and within the context in which these individuals live and 
experience the tensions between continuity and change. While these studies have been 
invaluable in providing insights into the lay and elite understandings of supranational 
integration and how it intersects with questions of belonging, power relations and 
history, it was also considered important to attempt to operationalize some of these key 
issues and explore them more directly on a larger population.  
 3.4.2.2. Participants 
Participants were 1192 individuals living in Serbia who completed the survey online. 
Individuals interested in participating in the survey were invited to click on a link 
which would take them to the QUALTRICS platform. Participants were informed that 
the survey was completely voluntary and anonymous, and that the questions focused 
on exploring the attitudes of Serbian citizens towards current affairs in Serbia and 
Europe. My email was provided at the end of the survey for participants to contact me 
if they wished to do so.  29% (349) of participants self-identified as male and 58.6% 
(699) self-identified as female, with 144 not indicating their gender. Participants’ age 
ranged from 18-79 years old; the median age was 37.  
 
 3.4.2.3. Procedure and Measures 
The survey was constructed with the help of Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington (second PhD 
advisor) by discussing the findings of the qualitative study and developing testable 
measures of the processes visible in the qualitative data. The focus of the survey was 
on exploring variables that influenced identification with a supranational group and 
subsequently political attitudes towards it, however a series of measures were included 
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as potential confounding variables (i.e., ‘personal control’ and ‘social dominance 
orientation’). Taking a relational approach to identity, the survey was constructed to 
explore not only self-expressions of identification and representativeness of a 
superordinate category, but also the role of what we think other’s think (meta-
representations), power-asymmetries and symbolic threats to identity.  
 Key measures included measures on national and European identification, 
taken from Cinnirella (1997), measures on prototypicality and meta-prototypicaltiy 
adapted from Devos and Banaji’s (2005) study on the extent to which particular ethnic 
groups in America were more or less associated with the national category ‘Amerian’ 
and measures of future power(lessness) and identity undermining adapted from Sindic 
and Reicher’s (2009) study on Scots’ attitudes towards Britain. For a list of the all the 
measures and scales, see appendix 7 (English version of survey).  
The survey was initially designed in English and two research assistants from 
the University of Belgrade, Serbia were recruited for the translation and back-
translation of the items. After both version of the survey had been returned to the 
researcher, any discrepancies were discussed with a third bi-lingual research assistant. 
It became clear that it was important to manage the extent to which verbal and 
conceptual translation of the items was achieved. Once the survey had been properly 
translated it was preregistered on Aspredicted.org (REF: nr: 6039) and uploaded onto 
QUALTRICs. The order in which measures were completed was randomized, however 
open-ended questions were placed at the start and the demographics at the end. Before 
the survey was administered it was piloted by 8 individuals living in Serbia. Based on 
the pilot study, it was estimated that the survey would take about 10 minutes to fill in, 
and this was indicated when recruiting participants. After the pilot, minor spelling 
errors were corrected and mislabeled Likert-scale items were corrected as well. The 
final survey consisted of two open-ended question and 69 other items, including 
questions on national/supranational identification, power, subjective societal status, 
prototypicality and SDO and demographic questions.  
Data collection took place from September to October 2017 and social media 
channels were used to recruit participants. Due to the limited access to the Serbian 
population via academic survey platforms such as MTurk, Prolific Academic and 
Crowdflower, and due to a limited budget to go for marketing companies to get 
participants, the survey was shared widely via social networks and social media 
channels in Serbia, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, organizational email lists 
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and university email lists. While this undoubtedly limited the access to participants of 
a wide range of socioeconomic and age class, the survey was not intended to be 
statistically representative of the Serbian population to begin with, and so this was not 
seen as a pressing concern for the research design.  
Analysis 
Before the survey could be analysed, the data had to be cleaned of incomplete 
responses. The final recorded number of surveys was 3249, however as there was an 
unexpected spike in responses during a particular day of data collection, I realized that 
several surveys were empty. In order to clean out the missing data, we relied on 
percentage completed and completion time to scan and delete empty surveys. Namely, 
the average time it took participants to complete the survey was 10 minutes and so any 
surveys completed in less than 120 seconds, and with less than 10% completed were 
selected. These (N=2057) were then carefully screened to see whether the respondent 
had filled in the open-ended questions or completed enough items within one measure 
for them to be considered useful. This however was not the case, and these were all 
deleted. The final survey included N = 1192 participants.  
The analysis of the survey was divided into several different stages, the most 
important of which are discussed in chapter 6. Within this paragraph, I briefly cover 
only the preliminary stages that did not feature explicitly in the write-up of the 
findings. Firstly, items were reverse-coded where necessary to align all the items 
within a measure and to make sure that higher numbers indicated higher/stronger 
identification or attitudes, as well as more agreement if the question was a statement. 
Secondly, we explored the reliability of each scale by computing Cronbach’s alphas 
for each scale. Scores ranged from .63 to .86, thus indicating good internal 
consistency, particularly for those measures used in the analysis. As most measures 
were taken from existing and verified scales, this was expected. As this was an 
exploratory survey we also ran principal component analyses (PCAs) to see whether 
the potentially overlapping measures (such as future-power or current power-
measures) loaded on the same item. These analyses were satisfactory in indicating that 
the items were in line with the measures of the survey. Thus, the next stage focused on 
exploring the correlations between measures and testing the predictions that arose from 
the qualitative component of this study. This is outlined in detail in chapter 6, and will 
therefore not be covered here.   
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3.4.2.4. Limitations 
Coming from a predominantly qualitative background in social and cultural 
psychology, I have always been aware of the many critiques of survey data, including 
that it is often de-contextualized, does not take into account the meaning individuals 
might give to a question when they answer it, and limits the responses of participants 
to pre-set categories constructed by the researcher. I attempted to keep all these things 
in mind while designing the survey, and considered the qualitative study informing the 
survey as a positive aspect in this regard. However, many of these concerns were also 
echoed in the emails that I received from participants, who had conducted the survey 
and felt certain phrasings of questions could be constructed differently. For example, 
when we asked ‘How powerful are the following countries in Europe?’ one participant 
emailed me to state that this could be understood as economic power, political power, 
normative power, and that in this regard, countries such as Germany and Turkey would 
differ quite starkly.  
In replying to all the emails (about 10 or so) that I received, one of them also 
made me aware of the extent to which the issue of EU integration had been portrayed 
in Serbia as a very political question, and thus, dissociated from the concerns and 
thoughts of the public (a theme which was noted in the focus group data as well). 
Namely, most participants prefaced their emails by stating that they had filled in the 
survey, despite not knowing much about the EU. These comments echoed something 
that I had encountered throughout the PhD, which was a reluctance among people to 
participate in my research on the grounds that they were not very knowledgeable about 
EU integration, and it would be best if I spent my time interviewing politicians, 
political scientists of lawyers.  
Nevertheless, there were important strengths to the survey, which 
complimented certain weaknesses of the qualitative data. Unlike the qualitative 
studies, the survey allowed me to collect data from a larger sample of participants and 
thereby explore certain attitudes and processes on a bigger set of the Serbian 
population. In addition, the survey gave me the opportunity to explore more directly 
the relationships between various key themes, and to confirm certain findings of the 
qualitative studies with more robust data. Lastly, the survey gave me an opportunity to 
measure and test the role of meta-representations in relation to identification, an 
important contribution to this PhD.  
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3.5. Researcher Impact and Reflexivity 
Serbian identity, history and politics are topics of contested and sensitive nature in 
Serbia, due to the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars and Serbia’s role in it. The 
construction of Milošević’s Serbia as one of nationalistic, xenophobic and exclusionist 
sentiments has made many Serbs wary of claiming a strong national identity, but also 
of discussing the past with their children, grandchildren and future generations to come 
(see Obradović, 2016). These contextual factors are important to highlight in 
understanding the role of the researcher and the dynamics between myself and my 
participants.  
Namely, the presence of me – the researcher – as an individual of ethnic-
Serbian origin, but born and raised in a Western European country (Sweden) may have 
allowed for a more open approach to participation by positioning me as an insider, a 
native speaker and someone familiar with the history and the culture of the country, 
but also as somewhat of an outsider having grown up elsewhere and spent little actual 
time engaging in these kinds of questions and debates in Serbia. This simultaneous 
‘insider-outsider’ position had an impact on the dynamics of the group in at least three 
ways, as I explain below, and were important in making me reflect on my own 
assumptions and subjective positioning while doing this research.   
Firstly, while participants were receptive towards me, while reading and 
signing the consent form many questioned the use of the data and the potential for the 
supervisor (whose name was also on the form) to misunderstand and misconstrue their 
opinions because they just did not understand the Serbian experience. Participants 
were reassured of the anonymity and confidentiality in the handling of the data and 
their personal information, but nevertheless in more than one instance did the issue of 
wrongfully portraying Serbs surface. This concern can only be understood if you are, 
or become, familiar with the current socio-political context in which Serbs live, where 
debates about Serbia’s role in the Yugoslav wars, and their perceived unjust treatment 
and portrayal in international media during the conflict (Cox, 2012; David, 2014; 
Subotic, 2011; 2013) are still very much salient in their everyday lives. In several 
instances, I had to position myself as a ‘naïve insider’ in an attempt to convince 
participants that the goal of the study was to explore and understand their perspectives, 
rather than pass judgment or attempt to validate non-Serbian representations of Serbia. 
While the emphasis on ‘no right or wrong answers’ was both written in the information 
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sheet and communicated orally, it was often necessary (and expected) of me to 
communicate who I was and why I was doing this research, in what could only have 
been an attempt to make sure their views and opinions were not misrepresented to a 
non-Serbian audience. In addition, as many participants eventually ended up sharing 
stories that were at times painful or self-critical, the importance of knowing who was 
listening became more obvious. In many instances there was also a source of pride 
located within my role as a PhD student at a prestigious university in a Western 
European country, with participants remarking on the importance of ‘people like me’ 
in improving the image of Serbia outside of its borders. This type of comment is 
something I have frequently come across in other Serbs who have left Serbia in their 
later years in life, either temporarily (students) or permanently (through reallocating 
with their partner or because of employment). The importance of acting as a positive 
‘Ambassador’ for Serbia was echoed in these informal conversations and was present 
within the focus group context as well.  
Secondly, (and following on from the first point), many participants showed 
awareness of me as reflecting a ‘Western gaze’ (Greenberg, 2010) and thus often 
engaged in a dialogue with an ‘imaginary West’ as embodied in my thoughts and 
beliefs. This was done in different ways, either by positioning me as ‘less Serbian’ for 
not having the lived experience of Serbs living in Serbia, or by eliciting reactions and 
responses from me as a representative of the West, in an attempt to legitimize and 
support their point of view. For example, in response to a question about a statement 
made by politicians that Serbia will join the EU by 2020, one participant stated (to me) 
that “you’re from a functioning society, so it’s a little stupid that you believe in 
something that’s been said on our television.” (Study I, Niš-1 transcript). I soon 
became aware that they were often made in an attempt at claiming a positive self-
esteem in the eyes of someone who, to some of them, represented a seemingly 
stigmatizing ‘Western’ or ‘European’ perspective on Serbia. These remarks were not 
always made in a negative fashion, but could also be made to elicit support for their 
own progressive attitudes, which they contrasted with those of the general public.  
Thirdly, while these challenges at times made me uncomfortable, they served 
an even more crucial role of forcing me to uncover some of my own subjective 
assumptions that I had brought into my research. Namely, my initial, somewhat naïve, 
belief that because I was ethnically ‘Serbian’ I would be accepted as an insider, was 
turned on its head, and the focus groups made me realize that claims to identity and 
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belonging are frequently embedded within the everyday lived experiences that people 
share. ‘Being’ Serbian for these people was more than simply biological or symbolic, 
it was practical and continuously constructed in their everyday lives. These interaction 
then renewed the importance for me as a researcher to continue to be dedicated to an 
understanding of these social psychological processes as processes ‘becoming’, of 
which identity became a clear example of. Another important assumption which I was 
forced to come to terms with, was the extent to which sharing their thoughts, beliefs 
and attitudes with me (and others) was oftentimes painful, highlighting the importance 
of making sure I treated their voices with respect when conducting and analyzing their 
experiences. This became particularly important in contexts where I felt personally 
rejected by participants (in terms of my knowledge of Serbia and what it means to ‘be’ 
Serbian) as I had to step away to consider how this positioning served a purpose for 
them, rather than defensively rejecting it as an attack on me.   
In conclusion then, my position as both an insider and outsider of the Serbian 
collective created an interesting dynamic within the focus groups in several ways. 
While predominantly, participants engaged with one another, I was often drawn on to 
either exemplify the voice of the West, or to support an argument that outsiders simply 
could not understand Serbs because they lacked the lived experience of being a Serb. 
This emphasis on the strategic negotiation of self-positioning in relation to current 
affairs in turn highlighted the significance of the ‘Other’ in the construction of their 
sense of self, political attitudes and place in the world. Despite these obstacles, the fact 
that I am of Serbian ethnic descent, spoke Serbian, and often took time to develop 
rapport with participants before beginning the official interview, most likely helped in 
eliciting honest responses from participants, which was visible in the many instances 
of talk where emotions (both positive and negative) were freely expressed. Lastly, 
being reflexive about my role in the micro-contexts of this research ultimately helped 
me to also be reflexive in regard to the larger context of the PhD, and the subjective 
assumptions which I was previously unaware of that guided not only how I entered 
into the phase of data collection, but also constructed (and subsequently revised) my 
theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
Preface 1: Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 focuses specifically of the role of history in the processes of making sense of 
political change in the present by analysing how individuals in Serbia, as part of focus 
group discussions, construct an ‘essence’ or ‘core’ of the modern Serbian nation, and 
how this in turn becomes linked to how Serbian identity and politics is represented in 
the present. The aim of Chapter 4 is to given an introduction to the underlying role of 
history in shaping representations of national identity and how this has consequences 
for which political actions are deemed legitimate for the future. Chapter 4 draws 
extensively on the social representation theory, including key theoretical concepts 
which delve deeper into the ways in which social representations are formed and 
shaped. In particular, the concept of ‘thema’ is introduced in this chapter. ‘Thema’ (or 
themata in plural) originates in the work of Holton (cited in paper) and was later 
developed further by Markova. The concept refers to the ways in which social thought, 
or common sense thinking, is characterized by opposites. Thinking in opposites is a part 
of cultural socialization; we know what is long with reference to what is short, what is 
day by what is night (Markova, 2000). These opposites, or antinomies as Markova calls 
them, are mutually interdependent. Markova argues that not all opposites become 
themata. This essentially means that not all opposites of thinking become problematized 
or a source of conflict. Instead, this occurs as a consequence of socio-cultural and 
historical events. In the present study, the recent push towards EU accession in Serbia 
has become the event which has triggered debates and tensions around how this political 
change will influence Serbs as a people. The oppositional pair which defines the core 
representations of a Serbian identity (as that of both victim and resilient, as inbetween) 
discussed in Chapter 1, thus comes to the fore in shaping how this potentially new 
future is perceived and understood. In other words, Chapter 4 focuses explicitly on how 
social representations of history feature in discussions of political change by 
considering how these opposites come to frame how individuals perceive both the 
domestic and international context. Chapter 4 offers a first glance at the themes which 
emerged when participants discussed Serbia’s EU accession. Chapter 4 was published 
in Integrative Psychological and Behavioural Science as an online first article in 
December 2017.  
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Preface 2: Chapter 5  
Chapter 5 moves us from a focus on bottom-up constructions of national identity (in 
Chapter 4) to focus instead of how politicians have discursively attempted to construct 
continuity as compatible with their political goals for Serbia. Chapter 5 focuses less on 
how history is represented, and more on how national identity and its content (informed 
by history), is used to mobilize support for certain political actions. The importance of 
this chapter for the thesis as a whole is to provide both an overview of how EU 
integration emerged as a viable political goal in post-communist Serbia, and how 
politicians have framed the goals as compatible with Serbian values, norms and 
traditions. The chapter further focuses on another important aspect of the theoretical 
framework of the thesis, namely the role of continuity in discourses on identity and 
change. The discursive analysis in the chapter allows for an understanding of the 
strategic uses of specific words, metaphors and references in arguing for, or against, 
change. Chapter 5 therefore provides a bit of ‘historical’ contextualization for Serbia’s 
EU accession path, and how various existing political goals (such as maintaining the 
status of Kosovo as part of Serbia) have become embedded within larger narratives of 
nationhood and nationalism. Focusing on the period 1991-2014, the data follows a 
period where Serbia’s membership in one superordinate union fell apart, and the dream 
of membership in another emerged. The time-period in question is one of important 
socio-political transition in Serbia where the political discourse of the democratic 
opposition faced the challenge of addressing the wrongdoings of Serbia in the Yugoslav 
wars and proposing a ‘new’ perspective for Serbia, while simultaneously ensuring that 
their criticisms and changes were not seen as stigmatizing of their own citizens.  The 
chapter illustrates that collective continuity, much like identity, is flexible and 
malleable, and discontinuity can at times be constructed as positive, and as a small price 
to pay to regain and recover the true ‘essence’ of an identity.  
Chapter 5 was co-authored with Caroline Howarth and published in the European 
Journal of Social Psychology in February 2018. 
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Preface 3: Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 combines both qualitative and quantitative datasets to bring together the 
exploratory, in-depth parts of the thesis with data designed to test some of the key 
threads that emerged from the qualitative findings. Namely, Chapter 6 provides an 
explicit focus on the role of power, and how it interlinks with identity processes, in the 
context of supranational integration. Discussions around power and powerlessness 
featured heavily within much of the qualitative data and point to the importance of 
explicitly considering how it shapes both the relationship between continuity and 
attitudes towards change and the relationship between compatibility and dual 
identification. The chapter brings together many of the themes from the previous 
chapters and focuses specifically on how these shape processes of identification and 
attitudes towards change. While Chapter 4 focused on giving more in-dept insight into 
how Serbs use a historical perspective for making sense of Serbia’s present and future 
politics in the context of EU accession, Chapter 6 focuses more specifically on the 
supranational context and the subgroup-superordinate group dynamics that permeate it. 
In doing so, Chapter 6 contributes important insights into how subgroup and 
superordinate group dynamics are shaped by perceived belonging, compatibility and 
power. Questions of identity undermining, as a form of threat to a way of life, become 
central throughout the chapter and highlight the importance of representation within a 
superordinate group. The chapter draws heavily on the work of Sindic and Reicher 
(2009) and attempts to extend this work to consider the temporalities of power and the 
importance of both self- and meta-representation in managing a sense of belonging in a 
superordinate group.  
Chapter 6 was co-authored with Jennifer Sheehy Skeffington and the manuscript is in 
preparation for publication.  
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Chapter 6: Power, identity, and belonging to a superordinate group: 
The case of Serbia and the EU. 
 
Abstract: 
Politicians have argued that the expansion of the European Union (EU) allows European 
populations to overcome intergroup differences and promote a common identity that can 
co-exist with strong national identities. However, recent events such as the Brexit 
referendum result and the Eurozone financial crisis, have illustrated that the EU as a 
superordinate group can often become a source of threat and tension vis-a-vis national 
identity concerns. Taking a mixed methods approach, using focus group (N=67) and 
survey data (N=1192), we explored the psychosocial dynamics underlying national 
population ambivalence toward European Union integration in the case of a potential 
future member state, Serbia. The findings from the qualitative study highlight concerns 
about national identity continuity as part of the EU and perceptions of compatibility 
between a Serbian and European identity. To explore these issues further, a survey was 
administered to Serbs across the socioeconomic spectrum, asking questions about 
power, identity and attitudes towards EU accession. Results demonstrated a relationship 
between perceptions of relative power in Europe and sense of belongingness in the EU, 
as illustrated through two moderated mediation models. In the first, perceptions of future 
powerlessness of Serbia as an EU member led to heightened fears of identity 
undermining in the EU, which in turn had downstream consequences for attitudes 
towards EU accession. In the second, perceptions of Serbia’s current relative 
powerlessness lowered perceptions that Serbia was representative of Europe, and this 
lowered identification of Serbs as European. Both indirect pathways were stronger 
among high national identifiers. We conclude by discussing the importance of 
considering intergroup power relations in processes of superordinate group dynamics, 
and the extent to which these can function as either barriers or bridges to positive 
integration. 
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The present state of the European Union (EU) is one of growing scepticism toward 
membership and enlargement, both among existing and prospective member-states. 
Prominent questions of belonging, culture, history, and intergroup dynamics become 
important to consider when making sense of the current state of global politics and the 
rise of nationalism in various forms. Doing so requires taking seriously the EU, its 
enlargement and integration, as inherently social psychological phenomena, making it 
useful to consider how theories of intergroup relations can be applied to make sense of 
negative attitudes towards the EU. If EU membership is seen as threatening to nations, 
what, specifically, does it threaten, and why? 
In this article, we consider the case of Serbia, a prospective EU member, as an 
example through which to explore (1) how citizens perceive national identity-related 
threats posed by accession to a supranational body, (2) the underlying role of power 
dynamics and representativeness in shaping the perceived compatibility between a 
national and supranational identity, and (3) consequences for attitudes in favour of 
joining a supranational body. Taking a mixed methods approach, we consider the 
extent to which a sense of intergroup power asymmetry and threat to national identity 
might shape citizens attitudes toward EU accession and integration, in part by 
constraining the perceived compatibility between identifying with one’s country and 
identifying with the higher level grouping it is about to join.  
 
Threat in the context of superordinate membership 
Social psychological theorizing on threat in contexts of intergroup relations has 
illustrated that there are two different types of threats that can be experienced: realistic 
and symbolic. Though early research on intergroup conflict positioned realistic threat 
as pivotal (cf. Allport, 1954 Bobo, 1983; Sherif, 1966), the role of symbolic threat, in 
the form of threat to values, culture, and identity, is increasingly being recognized 
(Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2015). In an attempt to 
overcome the perception of threat as either realistic or symbolic, Sindic and Reicher 
(2009) propose using the concept of identity indermining, to allow for a 
conceptualization of identity threat that encompasses both threat on a cognitive level 
and on the level of practically realizing one’s social identity.  The concept of identity 
undermining, unlike previous conceptualizations of symbolic threat, addresses the 
more ‘active’ dimensions of social identity: the ability to enact a certain identity and 
thus to maintain its continuity as part of a superordinate group. Drawing on research 
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on Scottish people’s attitude towards Britain, Sindic and Reicher argue that the 
concept of identity undermining is derived from two factors; incompatibility and 
power(lessness). Firstly, incompatibility refers to the perception that different 
subgroups within a superordinate group are not (or will not) be able to express or enact 
their identities at the same time. Secondly, power(lessness) refers to the perceived 
position of power of the subgroup vis-à-vis other subgroups. In the case of 
membership in a supranational group such as Britain or the EU, the prospect that one’s 
subgroup (national) is neither compatible with, nor powerful within, the larger 
supranational context, can have important consequences for whether people support 
independence or integration.  
 Again taking the case of supranational identity, we explore these two key 
antecedents of identity undermining by considering how existing models of 
superordinate identities address, or explain, the key processes at play in shaping sub- 
and superordinate group dynamics.  
 
Compatibility: Superordinate membership and dual identification 
Two key models within social psychology that have been informative for our 
understanding of subgroup-superordinate group dynamics are the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model (CIIM, see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; 2012) and Ingroup Projection 
Model (IPM, see Wenzel, Mummendey & Waldzus, 2007). Both models are rooted in 
the work of Turner (1987) and self-categorization theory, but rely on different 
mediating processes in explaining when, and how, superordinate identities become 
either conflicting or compatible with subgroup identities.  
The CIIM draws on the concept of ‘depersonalization’ to argue that the 
introduction of a superordinate group evokes a process of re-categorization among 
members of a subgroup. As part of this process, perceived out-group members are 
categorized as members of a new, common ingroup, are seen as more similar to 
oneself, and are therefore more positively perceived than previously. The outcome is 
the creation of a ‘dual identity’which allows subgroups to maintain a sense of 
distinctiveness alongside membership in a larger, common ingroup (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000; Hopkins, 2011). As Dovidio, Gaertner and Saguy (2008) explain “[a] 
dual identity involves the simultaneous activation of original subgroup identities and a 
common ingroup identity.” (p.301). In this scenario, identification with one’s subgroup 
becomes positively correlated with identification with the superordinate group, as the 
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two identities can exist in harmony. This approach to superordinate groups has been 
successfully applied to studies of acculturation and migration, which outline the 
complex ways in which individuals balance needs for inclusiveness and distinctiveness 
by re-categorizing the superordinate group through its commonalities with the 
subgroup (Berry, 2006; Hopkins, 2011; Gomez et al., 2013; Vezzali et al., 2015).  
In contrast to the CIIM, the IPM sees subgroups as inherently in tension with one 
another as part of a larger superordinate group. The IPM draws on the concept of 
‘prototypicality’ from self-categorization theory, which defines a ‘prototype’ as a 
person within a specific group that best represents, or embodies, the goals, values and 
norms of the group, and is therefore seen as an ‘ideal-type’ member in a given context 
(Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1998). The IPM extends this concept to superordinate 
group dynamics by arguing that subgroups will tend to project their own image onto 
the ‘prototype’ of the superordinate group, closely aligning their subgroup’s values 
with those seen to be representative of the superordinate category (Wenzel et al., 
2007). These dynamics have consequences for the extent to which other subgroups are 
perceived as compatible with the superordinate group, as the more one projects one’s 
own group’s identity onto the superordinate identity, the less positively one evaluates 
members of other groups within that broader category. Thus, according to the IPM, the 
process of projecting one’s subgroups identity onto the larger superordinate identity, 
becomes a way for compatibility between the two to be achieved. Yet unlike the CIIM, 
it limits the extent to which all subgroups are seen as compatible with the 
superordinate group. In addition, this process has real implications for group dynamics 
as prototypicality affects the legitimacy of unequal status relations between groups, 
and the access to resources that these entail. Specifically, the more prototypical 
member or subgroup will be perceived as more entitled to the privileges associated 
with membership in the superordinate category than less prototypical members 
(Wenzel et al., 2007, p. 336; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel & Boettcher, 2004).  
What factors determine prototypicality? The IPM emphasizes that ingroup 
projection is affected by reality constraints such as historical intergroup relations, 
status and power, which can lead to one group being regarded as more prototypical 
than another in a superordinate context (Waldzus et al., 2004).  As such, the literature 
refers to relative ingroup projection, in that prototypicality tends to be higher in 
relative terms than absolute terms, especially among subgroups of lower social status 
and power. In other words, ingroup members subjectively rate their group as more 
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prototypical of the superordinate group than out-group members would rate them: they 
see themselves as more representative of the umbrella identity than others do. Yet this 
does not happen to the same extent for all groups, as demonstrated by research 
showing systematic asymmetry in ingroup projection. Devos & Banaji (2005), for 
example, reported that Asian Americans rated their own ethnic group as less 
prototypical of the superordinate category ‘American’ than they rated White 
Americans. Ultimately, the determinant of which group comes to see itself as 
prototypical of a superordinate group, and to be recognised as such, is the level of 
power it has in the intergroup context. 
 
Power(lessness): Ingroup projection, prototypicality and defining ‘us’ 
Before we discuss the role of power, it is important to distinguish between status and 
power, especially as IPM has focused more explicitly on addressing questions of status 
rather than power. According to Turner (2005), power is a social means of having 
impact on the world through people. Following Turner, Reicher (2015) argues that 
“[t]hose who are in a position to define the meanings of group identities, and how they 
should translate into action in any given context, are in a position to wield that social 
power: They control a world-making resource.” (p. 4). It is this definition of power that 
we employ throughout this paper.  
While closely aligned with this definition of power, status has in turn been 
conceptualized as the social value of a person or a group, and has often been given 
preference over the concept of power within research following the social identity 
approach (Gleibs & Haslam, 2016). Yet in the present context, where the focus is on 
the EU as a superordinate group, it is being that powerful entails being in a position to 
define what it means to be European both on a cognitive and practical level.   
 The IPM does in fact acknowledge how asymmetries in both group status and 
power can limit the extent to which low status groups can claim a sense of 
prototypicality of a superordinate group (Waldzus et al., 2004). However, within this 
work the focus has been predominantly on status, its antecedents and consequences for 
ingroup projection and superordinate group dynamics (Weber, Mummendey & 
Waldzus, 2002). In contrast, the application of insights regarding intergroup power has 
not yet come with the direct measurement of perceptions of power within studies of 
ingroup projection, which have so far inferred them from the socio-political or 
historical relations between two groups (i.e., Waldzus et al., 2004).  
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 As a key antecedent to feelings of identity undermining, perceptions of 
intergroup power become important to consider as they can constrain the extent to 
which subgroups feel they will be able to maintain a sense of identity continuity as part 
of a superordinate group. This type of scenario has been considered more explicitly 
within studies of migration and acculturation, focusing on the different expectations of 
minority and majority groups within a superordinate national context (Berry, 2006; 
Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2015; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). For example, across 
three studies, Verkuyten & Yildiz (2007) illustrate that perceived rejection of 
minorities by majorities (within a superordinate context) can lead to both an increase in 
minority identification and a weakening of superordinate identification (p. 1460). This 
literature highlights the importance of recognition of one’s representativeness and 
belonging by more powerful relevant others. In other words, it highlights the 
usefulness of considering not only what ingroup members think and believe, but also 
what they perceive relevant others to think and believe.  
What we think other people think is core to the concept of ‘meta-representation’, 
as it involves the representation of the mental and social representations of others 
(Elcheroth, Doise & Reicher, 2011; see also literature on meta-perceptions and meta-
stereotyping; Vorauer, Main & O’Connell, 1998; Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2015; 
Owuamalam & Zagefka, 2011). Meta-representations come to matter, particularly 
among low power groups, as they can indicate the extent to which individuals see their 
groups’ claims to group membership (at a superordinate level) to be considered valid 
and legitimate. Considering meta-representations and their link to intergroup power 
relations thus allows us to extend the work on identity undermining to consider the 
ways in which not only subgroup-superordinate group continuity, but also subgroup-
subgroup dynamics, shape identification with, and attitudes towards, supranational 
entities.  
In the case of EU accession, we must ask whether citizens’ perceptions of 
representativeness and power of one’s own and other nations, and of other nations’ 
perceptions of such factors, can offer a window into whether the supranational identity 
of the EU is seen as either enhancing or undermining of their subgroup identity.  
 
Present Research  
How are the above dynamics between groups of unequal power articulated by low 
power group members, and how do they affect the possibility of identification with a 
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superordinate identity it is applying to join? In this paper, we explore the antecedents 
of superordinate group identification from a low power group’s perspective, 
highlighting the threat to identity continuity and compatibility made salient by an 
unequal intergroup power context. Focusing on Serbia, a country facing accession to a 
European Union arguably dominated by more higher power countries (i.e., 
Chryssochoou, 2000a), we examine the processes enabling and constraining the vision 
of the EU: to maintain a sense of national identity alongside an affiliation with a 
supranational community.  
We adopt a mixed-methods approach, drawing on its potential to overcome some 
of the limitations of single methods and result in a more synthetic research product 
(Power, Velez, Qadafi, & Tennant, 2018). By firstly drawing on qualitative focus 
group data, we explore the meaning given to national and supranational identities as 
well as the complex ways in which these meanings shape discourses on EU 
integration. We then draw on quantitative survey data to test the generalizability of 
insights regarding the relationships between identity, power, recognition, and change. 
Thus, in Study 1, we explore how identity and intergroup relations feature in 
discussions among Serbs about political integration into the European Union. We then 
use insights from this qualitative analysis to quantitatively assess the relationship 
between perceptions of power, prototypicality, identity undermining, and superordinate 
group identification, and the consequences of these for political attitudes.  More 
precisely, the two studies ask the following questions; 
Study 1: What are the lay understandings of supranational integration in the context of 
Serbia joining the EU, and how do these relate to identity and intergroup threat?  
Study 2: What is the underlying role of power dynamics in shaping 1) fears of the 
undermining of Serbian identity by EU accession, 2) perceptions of prototypicality of 
the category ‘European’, and 3) the perceived compatibility of national and 
supranational identification? What are the consequences of these processes for 
attitudes in favour of EU accession? 
Study 1 
Methods 
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A total of nine focus groups were conducted in Serbia between 2015 and 2016. 
Participants were recruited through snowball sampling, targeting Serbian citizens 
living in different cities, both urban and rural, across the country. For each focus 
group, one initial participant was contacted via telephone and (if they accepted) served 
as the point of contact for that particular city, helping the first author to organize a 
setting in which to conduct the focus group and also to gain access to other potential 
participants. The first four focus groups were conducted in 2015 and the remaining 
five were conducted in early 2016.The rationale behind the sampling of these 
individuals was not to reach statistical representativeness or generalisability, but rather 
to explore the diversity in beliefs and opinions expressed by a larger pool of 
individuals (see Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999, p.7).  
 
Participants 
Sixty-seven individuals participated in this study (27 females and 40 males). 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 57 (M=34).  Each focus group was composed of 
5-9 participants. Occupations ranged from full time study to employment in the public 
and private sector.  All focus groups took place in ‘natural’ settings such as cafes, 
participant homes, or reserved rooms in local libraries. 
Procedure 
Prior to the focus group, participants were given an information sheet, conveying the 
aims of the study, and a consent form to sign. The same topic guide was used for all 
groups, with a total of six questions covering themes of Serbia’s relationship with, and 
potential future in, the EU, as well as the nation’s history within Europe and questions 
of how domestic politics would be influenced by the EU. The topic guide was piloted 
on four individuals from the capital city, Belgrade, two months prior to data collection, 
and minor changes were made to the wording of three questions based on their 
feedback. All focus groups were conducted (and subsequently analysed) in Serbian by 
the first author. Each focus group lasted between 21 and 77 minutes (mean = 61 
minutes). In order to ensure participant confidentiality all names and identifiers were 
modified during transcription 
Analysis 
The audio-recorded sessions were transcribed verbatim and a thematic analysis was 
conducted following the guidelines outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). All 
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transcripts were coded using NVivo 11, a qualitative data software program. After 
coding five of the transcripts, a codebook was developed and applied to the remaining 
transcripts. The first round of coding led to 42 codes. These were then revisited, and 
some codes were removed (due to infrequency), or merged with similar codes after re-
reading the coded sections. The final codebook included 38 codes, 10 basic themes and 
three organizing themes (see Figure 1 below).  In order to ensure reliability, a sample 
of six translated pages were given to a fellow researcher, along with the codebook and 
code descriptors. Further, in order to ensure the language barrier in coding was 
overcome, the same sample of six pages were given to a Serbian researcher from 
Belgrade, along with the codebook and code descriptors. In the former case, intercoder 
reliability was 85%, and in the latter it was 92%. 
 
Results 
The thematic analysis brought to the fore three organizing themes which permeated 
much of the discussions around politics and Serbia’s place in the EU: 1) The EU as a 
source of civic improvement 2) Political change as rupture to collective continuity and 
3) The EU as a source of inferiority. In presenting them below, all names have been 
changed to either W (indicating female participant) or M (indicating male participant) 
followed by a number, which was assigned through order of speaking in the focus 
groups.  
 
Theme 1: The EU as a source of civic improvement 
An important theme across focus group discussions centered on unpacking what the 
benefits of EU membership were, and which sections of Serbian society were in need 
of change. Emphasis on the structural benefits of EU integration was common, and 
participants voiced belief in the idea that Serbia would “become more organized if it 
joined the EU, particularly in relation to laws” (Participant 6, Novi Sad). In these 
discussions, participants collaboratively managed the conflict between critiquing the 
lack of progress made by Serbia vis-à-vis EU countries, and situating the blame for 
that lack of progress.  
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Figure 6.1: Overview of Thematic Analysis 
 
Excerpt 1: Vranje, Southern Serbia  
W1: [Joining the EU would bring] safety, legality, order, some normalcy, certainty that 
you’ll be able to live a normal life tomorrow, a humanitarian life, and to live and 
expect a normal retirement with a pension and that everything is covered by the law. 
We currently don’t have that.  
M2: But that needs to start with us. The EU can’t come and now it’s like ‘oh, it’s going 
to change my mentality’. No. We have to start with us, that is, everything depends on 
you and me.  
W1: No, I’m saying that I expect that because they [EU] would probably have some 
influence, or allow for a new generation of politicians […] if someone makes you do 
the right thing, I think there is some logic to that…  
 
Excerpt 1 illustrates that there is a clear tension in relation to who is responsible for 
bringing about change in Serbia, but also what exactly needs to change. Underlying 
this tension is a deeper ambiguity in regards to whether the ‘problem’ of Serbia lies in 
its system (i.e., institutions and political leaders) or its people (i.e., the mentality of 
Serbs). While W1 argues for institutional and political changes, M1 situates change in 
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the mentality of the Serbian people. The implications of problematizing the Serbian 
‘psyche’ and constructing it as if at odds with the EU can be seen more explicitly in the 
excerpt below;  
Excerpt 2: Čačak, Central Serbia 
W4: I think that the EU can bring one very good thing for us, and that is its laws, 
regulations, rules and generally all procedural matters […] We’re a people where ‘oh it 
can be done this way, oh or maybe that way it doesn’t matter’, but there [in the EU] 
M3: No I don’t agree, the Germans are no better people than us, they just have to 
respect the laws, and we would be like Germans if we respected the laws –  
W4: we cannot be like Germans – 
M3: We can, we can  
W4: We aren’t  
M3: When the law would force you, yes you would.  
A seemingly tautological argument emerges in the discourse of participant M3, where 
improvement entails respecting the laws, which can only be done if the law in turn 
forces you to do so. Interestingly enough, without previous reference to Germany, M3 
uses Germany as a synonym for the EU, a seemingly unconscious replacement that 
begins to reveal the meaning given to the social category of the EU. In fact, throughout 
the focus group discussions, countries such as Germany, France and England (noting 
that data was collected before the British ‘Brexit’ referendum) were frequently 
mentioned when participants were asked about the EU as a whole. This echoes 
findings from previous qualitative studies on how the meaning given to the EU identity 
project tends to situate Western European countries as more prototypical of a European 
identity than non-Western countries (Chryssochoou, 2000a). The use of Germany to 
signify the EU constructs Serbia as incompatible with the EU, as Serbs ‘cannot be like 
Germans’. Consequently, in both the first and second excerpts, the emphasis on civic 
change is countered with arguments of cultural, and psychological incompatibilities, 
which hinder the ‘Europeanization’ of Serbia. 
Theme 2: Political Change as a Rupture to Collective Continuity 
The second theme of the qualitative study focused on how political change was seen as 
potentially undermining of a Serbian way of life. This sense of threat permeated both 
micro-level expressions of continuity through social practices, and macro-level 
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expressions of continuity in relation to geopolitics and national sovereignty, 
emphasizing the need to understand both realistic and symbolic threat as relevant to 
questions of identity. One such potential threat was to the historical and cultural ties 
that Serbia had with Russia, which seemed for many participants to be in direct 
conflict with the political aspirations of its government.  
Excerpt 3: Belgrade (1), Capital of Serbia 
W5: It’s simply not possible that we’ll join the EU without previously having done 
with Russia what they [the EU] wants us to in order to get on board with the EU’s way 
of thinking in relation to Russia. Because if they let you join them they surely won’t let 
you have anything independent of that 
[M2: Of course] 
W5: In terms of thinking. That’s a big topic, meaning, now you’re going to have to 
explain to Serbs, to get them to think that Russians aren’t all that nice, even though 
that’s what you’ve been telling them for hundreds of years. That’ll require a lot of 
work.  
The assumption that EU integration entailed not only a common foreign policy but 
also a common ‘way of thinking’ speaks to social psychological underpinnings of 
sense making in contexts of political change. For example, many participants weighed 
the cost-benefit relationship of EU integration from the perspective of what the EU 
would bring vs. what it would take away.  In some cases, what would be taken away 
was quite tangible;  
Excerpt 4: Belgrade (3), Capital of Serbia 
W2: The question is, when that moment comes, and the last condition is the ‘de jure’ 
recognition, both de facto and de jure recognition of Kosovo? Because you can’t join 
the EU when you can’t define your borders. […] they messed up once with Cyprus, 
which was a comparably smaller problem than this.   
In other discussions, loss to continuity was expressed through references of ‘banal’ 
nationalism (Billig, 1995), evident in social practices.  The following two excerpts 
highlight this;  
Excerpt 5: Belgrade (2), Capital of Serbia 
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W1: The standards, we want EU standards, but to say to a farmer from Sumadija 
[region known for the production of plum brandy, Serbia’s national drink] “you can’t 
make your own brandy”, he’ll say “who me? What do I need the EU for?”  
Excerpt 6: Niš, Southeast Serbia 
M4: Our people, an average citizen with a high school education says “we’ll get this 
and that [benefits], that’s great!” but when you tell him “you can’t park your car 
wherever you want man” then it’s “oh, what, the EU? What’s the point?” 
With topics ranging from foreign relations to parking cars, it is evident that 
participants see a certain incompatibility between Serbia and the EU. Where does the 
fear of a rupture to collective continuity come from? The third, and final theme, 
suggests an answer to this question. Namely, these perceptions of the EU as a threat to 
continuity are rooted in discussions about the subgroup dynamics within the 
superordinate group. In particular, perceptions of unequal power relations between the 
nations of the EU was linked with arguments that those nations with more power were 
afforded the ability to dictate what being European means, both politically and 
psychologically.  
Theme 3: EU as a source of inferiority: the importance of ‘others’ in supranational 
groups 
Two interrelated discussions featured within this final theme, which centred on the role 
of other subgroups within the EU and the power relations within the supranational 
group itself. Namely, participants’ sense of incompatibility with the EU came from 
perceptions of the EU as a union dominated by Western European countries, which in 
turn were seen not only as different from Serbia, but also intolerant towards creating a 
diverse European community and thus recognizing Serbia’s place within it.    
Excerpt 7: Belgrade (2), Capital of Serbia  
M1: In any case I think they should at least try to ‘Europeanize’ us, even if those aren’t 
some values that, I don’t consider the ‘Europeanization’ paradigm to be, we are Europe 
just as much as they are and with regards to civilization, well maybe we are a little bit 
on the edge, with some influences from the Oriental, and both East and West. But I 
think that we are no less European from them over there […] and I think that no one 
will ever, even if we do join the EU, we’ll be some third class country there. You 
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know exactly which countries are of first class, such as for example Germany and 
France, which for example have the right to subsidize agriculture, France is so 
powerful that I can do that. But for us, that won’t be allowed…  
M4: and we expect that.  
 
Within this excerpt, we see how Western European countries (Germany and France) as 
positioned as powerful in the EU and Europe through their ability to define what it 
means to be European, over and beyond a geographical belonging (‘we are Europe just 
as much as they are’) and through the expectation of Serbs that they use that power 
to‘Europeanizing’ Serbs. Interestingly, the need to claim that Serbia is ‘no less 
European than them over there’ indicates that participants draw on meta-
representations of ‘Europeanness’ when negotiating the meaning of this social 
category, meta-perceptions which in turn might position Serbia as less prototypical of 
a European community than other countries. This was evident in other groups as well, 
where participants voiced negative meta-representations of Serbia as rewarded by 
Europe at large (i.e., They see that Europe is rewarding anyone who hates Serbs, and 
so they go “oh we hate Serbia too.”, Niš, Southeast Serbia). In other words, power 
became an important resource in dictating not only politics in the EU, but also the way 
of life and identity of the supranational group (Sindic & Reicher, 2009). Consider the 
following quote (again, data collected prior to the British ‘Brexit’ referendum); 
Excerpt 8: Čačak, Central Serbia 
W6: All we want is to be an equal member, but there are no equal members there. 
Everyone knows who’s who. 
M1: Who’s in charge.  
W6: Like they say, ‘all countries are small, only Britain is Great.’ (Laughter) 
R: What are some of the things you think might be less beneficial with joining the EU 
then? 
W4: Loss of identity 
W3: In fact, we’ll become a colony 
M2: We already are 
W4: Yes! Either way we already are… 
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Echoing the awareness of a privileging of Western European countries seen in the 
previous excerpt, the current exchange illustrates the extent to which some participants 
see EU integration as not only undermining of a Serbian identity, but potentially 
destructive of it. The use of the word ‘colony’ interlinks questions of power and 
belonging, and anchors the EU project in Europe’s colonial past. This in turn 
highlights that the construction of meaning in regards to a superordinate group such as 
Europe cannot be detached from the historical context within which the superordinate 
group was formed (Kinnvall, 2016). The implication of this for many participants was 
not only a sense of stigmatization, which was in many cases internalized, but also a 
sense of incompatibility with the EU.  
Discussion 
Data from focus groups from across Serbia revealed that, at least in everyday 
conversations, Western European countries are spontaneously drawn on as the 
prototypes of Europe, creating an exclusive superordinate identity. This in turn makes 
the process of negotiating a sense of belonging in Europe in general, but the EU in 
particular, a principally challenging one for Serbia (as it is for the Balkans at large). 
For many of the participants, the stigma attached to the nation’s identity, the perceived 
power hierarchy within the EU (and Serbia’s place at the bottom of it), alongside 
issues of deeper historical, cultural and practical incompatibilities created a sense of 
ultimate sacrifice; to belong to the EU would mean to become less Serbian. Thus, 
participants, due to the socio-political context shaping the relationship between their 
nation and the EU, seem unable to project their country’s characteristics onto a 
European identity. 
These findings have important implications for understanding processes of 
identification with, and perceived belonging within, a superordinate group. They 
highlight, firstly, the importance of symbolic concerns alongside the potential material 
and symbolic benefits on offer from joining the supranational group of the EU. For the 
participants within this study, there was a clear tension between wanting to be seen as 
part of a civilized, stable, economically productive, and regulated Europe, and the 
perception that Serbia was neither welcome nor representative of the cultural values 
and norms of a European identity. Those countries spontaneously referred to in 
discussion of Europeanness are described as having a great deal of power in defining 
the unique perspective on reality which is seen as aligned with a European identity 
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(i.e., excerpt 3), and which Serbia would need to adopt in order to fit in. In sum, there 
seemed to be two interrelated threads which permeated the focus group discussions; 
the first related to the relationship between the subgroup and the superordinate (the 
nation and the EU, incorporating Themes 1 and 2, above), while the second centred on 
the relationship between subgroups within the superordinate (Serbia and other nations, 
such as Germany, corresponding to Theme 3, above). Both threads, in turn, were 
placed in a larger context of questions of power and powerlessness, and the 
implications this had for identity and the ability to ‘be’ Serbian in an EU future.  
Looking at the first thread, perceptions of Serbia’s future power-position, were it 
to be a member of the EU, seemed to be intimately linked with perceptions of the 
sustainability of the unique identity of Serbs once they become EU members, and this 
mattered for whether participants were supportive of, or resistant towards, EU 
accession. There are similarities here to the findings of Sindic & Reicher (2009) in the 
case of Scottish identification with the UK, in which perceptions of the future 
powerlessness of the subgroup in the superordinate group predicted perceived identity 
undermining, which in turn shaped attitudes towards supranational membership. Our 
focus group findings suggest that this model applies beyond the case of existing 
members of a supranational union to that of prospective members. This leads to the 
prediction that support for obtaining supranational group membership depends on the 
perception that such membership will enhance, rather than undermine, the subgroup 
identity. Identity undermining in turn, depends on perceptions of the power one’s 
group will have in that scenario. If this set of processes follows the same pattern as in 
national populations considering leaving supranational groups (see Sindic & Reciher, 
2009), then they should play out most clearly among high national identifiers, as these 
will be the most worried about threats to national identity.  
If this negative association does exist between perceived future power-position, 
identity undermining and attitudes towards support for accession, then it would seem 
that members of low power groups do not perceive their ingroup as compatible with, 
let alone representative of, the superordinate group. The question then becomes, why? 
As hinted by the second thread running through the qualitative findings, perceptions of 
current power-position in the EU seem to be important in shaping who is seen as more 
or less European, and this matters for the prospect of being able to successfully 
identify both as Serbian and as European. We thus need to consider how perceptions of 
national power constrain the possibilities for dual identification, looking to ingroup 
131 
 
projection as a key mediator. Given the importance of consensus and validation in the 
representations of superordinate groups, what should matter are not only Serbs’ 
perceptions of prototypicality, but also their perceptions of how prototypical key others 
in the EU would see them to be. Thus, we might expect that successful dual 
identification will depend on perceptions (held by Serbs, and as perceived to be held 
by citizens of high power European countries) of the prototypicality of Serbia as 
European. This form of consensually validated prototypicality should in turn depend 
on perceived differences in power between Serbia and that of Europe’s highest power 
countries.  
If the above processes operate as suggested, it would mean that support for EU 
expansion and integration, and the successful dual identification on which it depends, 
requires accommodation of European identity to incorporate that of new member 
states.  
 
Study 2 
Study 2 was designed to assess, in a large sample of Serbs, whether the two conceptual 
threads identified in Study 1 have quantitative empirical grounding. Are the themes we 
discuss above representative only of the particular set of conversations that arose with 
our small sample, or might they characterise how Serbians more broadly think about 
the symbolic concerns arising from potential EU accession? If so, they might have 
important insights to yield, not only for the tension between EU integration and insular 
nationalism, but also for the challenges of superordinate group endurance in unequal 
intergroup contexts. 
We administered a survey to a large, diverse sample of Serbian nationals; 
designed to measure the key constructs emerging from the qualitative study and its 
theoretical interpretation. Drawing on the two threads identified from Study 1, we set 
out to test two hypotheses: 
H1: Support for EU accession among Serbs will be predicted by perceived future 
power of Serbia in the EU, and this relationship will (at least in part) be mediated by 
lower potential undermining of Serbian identity in an EU context. This mediation 
model will in turn be moderated by national identification, with the indirect effect 
being strongest among high national identifiers. 
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H2: Identification of Serbian citizens with Europe will be predicted by the perceived 
current relative power of Serbia vis-à-vis other European nations (specifically, 
Germany), and this link will (at least in part) be mediated by the prototypicality of 
Serbia as European, as estimated by Serbs, and as perceived to be estimated by a 
higher power European nation (Germany). As an indicator toward successful dual 
identification, this relationship will be stronger among high national identifiers. 
Methods 
Participants 
An online survey was administered to individuals living in Serbia, recruited through 
various social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, Facebook). Participants were informed 
that the survey was voluntary and anonymous, and that the questions focused on 
exploring the attitudes of Serbian citizens towards current affairs in Serbia and Europe. 
At the end of data collection a total of 3 249 responses had been recorded. In order to 
identify invalid responses the surveys were explored based on percentage completed. 
As can be seen in appendix 6.1, there is a stark contrast between participants who 
completed 10% (or less) and those who completed more than 10% of the survey. 
Considering this, and the high likelihood that those completing very small proportions 
of the survey were either ‘bots’ or ‘low effort participants’ (Buchanan & Scofield, 
2018), we removed all responses with 10% or less completed as invalid. The total 
number of remaining and valid responses were 1192. Of these participants, 29% (349) 
self-identified as male and 59% (699) self-identified as female, with 12% (144) not 
indicating their gender. Participants’ age ranged from 18-79 years old; the median age 
was 37. 
 
Materials & Procedure 
The survey was preregistered via aspredicted.org (REF nr: 6039) and was first 
constructed in English, after which two research assistants from the University of 
Belgrade, Serbia were recruited for the translation and back-translation of the items. 
After both versions of the survey had been returned to the researcher, any 
discrepancies were discussed with a third bi-lingual research assistant, and the survey 
was uploaded onto Qualtrics. The order in which measures were completed was 
randomized, with the exception of placing open-ended questions at the start and 
demographic questions at the end. Before the survey was administered it was piloted 
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by 8 individuals living in Serbia. After the pilot, minor spelling errors and cases of 
scale point mislabelling were corrected. 
 
Measures 
National identity and Superordinate identity: These were assessed by asking 
participants to respond to five items (7-point scale; 1: Strongly disagree, 7: Strongly 
agree) that were taken from previous studies on national identity and European identity 
(see Cinnirella, 1997). Sample items included “To what extent do you feel Serbian / 
European” and “How important is being Serbian / European to you?” The five-item 
scales were internally consistent for both national identity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86) 
and superordinate identity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). For both measures a higher score 
indicates a stronger identification with the national/European identity.  
Identity undermining: Adapted from Sindic and Reicher (2009) to reflect a prospective 
superordinate membership rather than a current one, identity undermining was 
assessed via four statements addressing their perceptions of the implications of EU 
membership for national identity (α = 0.80). Items (e.g., “Becoming part of the EU will 
allow Serbia to keep its specific and separate identity” and “If Serbia becomes part of 
the EU it will undermine the Serbian way of life”) were rated on a scale of 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree).  
Prototypicality and Meta-prototypicality: Participants were asked to indicate how 
‘European’ seven countries (France, Germany, Ireland, Romania, Serbia, Spain and 
Turkey) were from both their own, and a German person’s perspective. Specifically, 
for the prototypicality measure, participants were asked to:  
 
Bring to mind individuals who were born and live in the greater European area. In 
your mind, how “European” are people who belong to the following countries? That 
is, how strongly do you identify them with Europe and all things European? 
 
To measure meta-prototypicality, participants were asked to: 
 
Imagine that you are German, and have to answer the following question from the 
perspective of a German on Europe. According to Germans, how “European” are 
people who belong to the following countries? That is, how strongly would Germans 
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identify the following groups with Europe and all things European?  
 
For each country, participants were asked to indicate their opinion on a 7-point Likert 
scale with labels ranging from 1 (Not at all European) to 7 (Extremely European). 
Participants were asked to report their personal beliefs (rather than cultural norms) and 
the instructions to the survey explicitly stated that there were no right or wrong 
answers to these questions.  
Current power in Europe: To test whether participants perceived a power asymmetry 
within Europe, the same seven countries rated for prototypicality and meta-
prototypicality were rated individually in terms of their power-position, on a scale of 1 
(Powerless) to 7 (Very powerful).  
Future power of Serbia in the EU: Also adapted from Sindic and Reicher (2009), five 
statements were used to assess the extent to which participants expected Serbia to hold 
a position of power in shaping EU decision-making. Items included “The Serbian 
interest will play a part in determining EU government decision-making” and “When 
push comes to shove, Western European countries always get their way in EU policy 
(reverse-coded)”, rated on a scale of 1 (Completely disagree) to 7 (Completely 
agree)(α = 0.68). A higher score indicated perceptions of more power in the future as 
part of the EU.  
Support for Serbian government focus on EU accession was measured through one 
item asking participants to rate seven domestic and foreign political goals from a scale 
of 1 (not at all important) to 10 (very important); these included 'Gaining EU 
membership', 'Improving the health care system' as well as 'Educational system 
reform.’ 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics of the main variables appear in table 6.1. In order to explore how 
power asymmetries shaped prototypicality, we created a composite variable labelled 
‘power asymmetry’, formed from subtracting ratings of Serbia’s current power from 
the rating of Germany’s current power. This new variable thus reflected the perceived 
difference in power between Serbia and Germany, where a higher score indicated a 
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higher power-position of Germany vis-à-vis Serbia. 4 As we were testing two separate 
themes emerging from the focus group data, we divided the variables and analysed 
their interrelationships in two multiple regression analyses5. 
 
Table 6.1: Correlation Matrix for Main Variables 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. National 
identity 
4.37 1.55        
2. European 
Identity 
3.90 1.45 -.006       
3. Identity 
Undermining 
4.20 1.46 .307** -.347**      
4. Prototypicality  3.21 1.7 .195** .281** -.142**     
5. Meta-
prototypicality 
2.23 1.40 .093** .167** -.081** .452**    
6. Power 
asymmetry 
4.5 1.3 -.096** .056 .034 -.156** -.184**   
7. Future power 
in Europe 
2.7 .94 -.167** .194** -.421** .023 .162** .283**  
8. Importance of 
EU integration 
5.43 
 
3.0 -.236** .359** -.543** .036 .074* -.029 .373** 
Note. N = 1092. *p <.05. **p<.01 *** p<0.001 
All items on 7-point scale except item 8, with 10-point scale.  
 
Subgroup-Superordinate group dynamics 
Our first hypothesis focused on exploring the subgroup to superordinate group 
dynamics in relation to the EU. We tested whether the relationship between future 
power-position in the EU and support for EU accession was mediated by identity 
undermining, and in turn different among low and high national identifiers, using a 
moderated mediation analysis (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007; Hayes, 2018). We 
utilized the SPSS macro PROCESS (Model 14) to explore the conditional indirect 
effect of identity undermining on the relationship between perceptions of future power 
in the EU and support for EU accession, at different levels of national identification. 
The analysis is an example of ‘second-order’ moderated mediation, meaning that the 
                                                          
4 It is worth noting that only 4 out of 1192 participants reported negative values on this variables, 
indicating that more than 99% of participants saw Germany as more powerful than Serbia.  
5 Multiple regression was chosen instead of a more complex structural equation model involving all 
variables, as the latter would entail testing the impact of one set of variables while controlling for the 
impact of all other variables and their interactions, thereby distorting the analysis of the two theoretical 
threads.  
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role of the moderator is explored only through the effect of the mediator on the 
dependent variable (see Figure 6.2, taken from Hayes, 2018, p. 591). 
 
Figure 6.2. PROCESS Model 14: Conceptual Diagram of Second-order Moderated Mediation. 
 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6.2 and illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
Firstly, perception of increased future power in the EU was negatively correlated with 
perception of identity undermining as part of the EU (b= -.65, t1046 = -14.8, p < .001), 
implying that the more power Serbia was perceived to have as a future EU member, 
the less individuals perceived the EU as potentially undermining of a Serbian identity. 
Higher perceptions of identity undermining, in turn, led to lower levels of support for 
EU accession, though this was moderated by national identification. Namely, support 
for supranational accession depended on the possibility of the maintenance of national 
identity, most strongly for high national identifiers (+1 SD; b=-1.10, t1043 = -13.69, p 
<.001), though also for those at average national identification (b=-.94, t1043 = -15.48, p 
< .001) and at low levels of national identification (-1 SD; b=-.79, t1043 = -9.91, p < 
.001).  
The full moderated mediation analysis illustrated that identity undermining is a 
significant mediator of the effect of perceived future power on support for EU accession 
and that this indirect effect is stronger among high national identifiers (b=.71, CI [.58, 
.85]) than among low national identifiers (b=.51, CI [.37, .66]). This was a case of 
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partial mediation, as the direct effect of future power in the EU on support for EU 
accession remained significant (b= .55, t1043 = 6.07, p < 0.001) when the indirect 
pathway through identity undermining was added. The index of moderated mediation 
provides a final inferential test as to whether the indirect effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable, through the mediator, is dependent on the moderator 
(see Hayes, 2015). This coefficient (b=.07, CI [.02, .11]) had bootstrapped confidence 
intervals (k = 5000) not including zero, implying significant moderated mediation.  
 
Table 6.2: Regression results and indirect effects for moderated mediation model (1) 
 B SE t p 
Mediator variable model (DV = Identity Undermining) 
Constant 5.93 .12 47.54 .0001 
Future power in EU -.65 .04 -14.84 .0001 
 
Dependent variable model (DV = Support for EU integration) 
Constant 6.66 .74 8.95 .0001 
Future power in EU .55 .09 6.06 .0001 
Identity undermining  -.50 .16 -3.19 .0014 
National Identity  .29 .15 1.91 .0559 
Identity undermining x National Identity -.10 .03 -2.97 .0030 
Conditional Effects of Identity Undermining on Support for EU integration at values of 
moderator 
National Identity  
Boot indirect effect 
 
Boot 
SE 
 
Boot t 
 
Boot p 
- 1 SD (2.8) -.79 .08 -9.91 .0001 
M (4.3) -.94 .06 -15.57 .0001 
+ 1 SD (5.9) -.1.10 .08 13.59 .0001 
Conditional Indirect Effects of future power in Europe on Support for EU integration via 
identity undermining, at values of moderator 
National Identity Effect Boot 
SE 
Boot CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
- 1 SD (2.8) .51 .07 .37 .66 
M (4.3) .61 .06 .49 .73 
+ 1 SD (5.9) .71 .07 .57 .85 
     
Index of Moderated mediation     
 
Mediator 
 
Index 
Boot 
SE 
Boot CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
Identity Undermining .07 .02 .02 .11 
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Figure 6.3. Identity undermining as mediator between future power in EU and support for EU accession, 
at low and high levels of national identification. Direct effects in parentheses. 
 
Subgroup dynamics within a superordinate group 
Our second hypothesis explored the subgroup-to-subgroup dynamics within a 
superordinate context. In particular, this section explores whether power differences 
between subgroups play a role in shaping perceived prototypicality vis-à-vis the 
superordinate group, and whether prototypicality (and meta-prototypicality separately) 
in turn mediates the relationship between perceived power asymmetry and 
superordinate group identification at different levels of subgroup identification. As can 
be seen in Table 6.1, prototypicality and meta-prototypicality were highly correlated 
but distinct. In the moderated mediation analysis discussed below we focused on the 
mediating role of prototypicality rather than meta-prototypicality as direct perceptions 
of representativeness are likely to matter the most when it comes to European 
identification6.   
H2 was tested using Hayes’ (2018) PROCESS Model 14, the results of which are 
reported in Table 6.3 and illustrated in Figure 6.4. The analysis showed a significant 
                                                          
6 The results, including the moderated mediation model, were similar for meta-prototypicality – see 
Appendix 6.2 
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main effect of power asymmetry on prototypicality (b=-.21, t1031 = -5.10, p < .001), 
indicating that the more power Germany was seen as having compared to Serbia in 
Europe, the less Serbs felt representative of the category European, supporting the first 
part of H2. Prototypicality, in turn, was positively associated with European identity at 
all levels of national identity.  Specifically, the link between prototypicality and 
identification with Europe was strongest at high levels of national identification (+1 
SD, b=.39, t1033 = 12.04, p < .001), but was also significant at average (b=.26, t1033 = 
10.12, p < .001) and low levels of national identification (-1 SD, b=.13, t1033 = 3.55, p < 
.001). The link between national identity, European identity and prototypicality is 
further illustrated if we consider prototypicality as the moderator in the relationship 
between national and European identity. Here, the nonsignificant zero-order 
relationship between national and European identity (see Table 6.1) changes once we 
include prototypicality as the moderator. The link between national identity and 
European identity is positive and significant at high levels of prototypicality (+1 SD; 
b=.09, t1056 = 1.99, p<0.05) but negative at average (b= -.10, t1056 = -1.66, p =.09) and 
low levels of prototypicality (-1 SD; b= -.10, t1056 = -2.28,  p<.05). The reversal of the 
correlation between national and European identity from negative (at low levels of 
prototypicality) to positive (at high levels of prototypicality) seems to indicate that a 
sense of representativeness is a necessary condition for perceived compatibility 
between Serbian and European identity—one way of operationalising dual 
identification.  
The results of the moderated mediation analysis illustrated that the link between 
perceived power asymmetry and European identification was partially mediated by 
prototypicality, as power asymmetry continued to be a significant predictor of 
identification with Europe, once prototypicality was controlled. The indirect effect of 
power asymmetry on European identification through prototypicality was significant at 
all levels of the moderator (-1 SD; b = -.03, CI [-.05; -.01]; M; b= -.05, CI[-.08, -.03]; 
+1 SD; b = -.08, CI [-.12, -.05])7. Lastly, the bootstrapped confidence intervals of the 
index of moderated mediation (b= -.02, CI [-.03, -.01]) did not include zero, indicating 
that the indirect path from power asymmetry to European identity through 
prototypicality was significantly stronger (i.e., more negative) among those who 
                                                          
7 As seen by comparing Tables 6.1 and 6.3, the nonsignificant correlation between power asymmetry and 
European identification became a positive direct effect once prototypicality was added as a covariate. As 
this is likely a suppressor variable effect, it should be interpreted with caution.   
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identified more strongly with their national identity than those who identified only to a 
weak extent.  
Table 6.3: Regression results and indirect effects for moderated mediation model (2) 
 B SE t p 
Mediator variable model (DV = Prototypicality) 
Constant 4.18 .19 21.63 .0001 
Power asymmetry  -.21 .04 -5.10 .0001 
 
Dependent variable model (DV = European Identity) 
Constant 4.02 .29 13.66 .0001 
Power asymmetry .10 .03 3.08 .0002 
Prototypicality -.11 .07 -1.57 .1175 
National Identity  -.33 .05 -6.20 .0001 
Prototypicality x National Identity .08 .01 5.76 .0001 
Conditional Effects of Prototypicality on European Identity at values of moderator 
 
National Identity 
 
Boot indirect effect 
 
Boot 
SE 
 
Boot t 
 
Boot p 
- 1 SD (2.8) .13 .04 3.55 .0004 
M (4.3) .26 .03 10.12 .0001 
+ 1 SD (5.9) .39 .03 12.04 .0001 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Power asymmetry on European identity via Prototypicality at 
values of moderator 
National Identity Effect Boot 
SE 
Boot CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
- 1 SD (2.8) -.03 .01 -.05 -.01 
M (4.3) -.05 .01 -.08 -.03 
+ 1 SD (5.9) -.08 .02 -.12 -.05 
     
Index of Moderated mediation     
 
Mediator 
 
Index 
Boot 
SE 
Boot CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
Prototypicality -.02 .001 -.03 -.01 
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Figure 6.4: Prototypicality as mediator between power asymmetry and identification with Europe, at 
low and high levels of national identification. Direct effects in parentheses.  
 
 
Discussion 
The current study was designed to assess whether the two conceptual threads identified 
in Study 1 had quantitative empirical grounding. It did so by formulating two 
hypotheses arising from the qualitative research and the theoretical issues it raised, and 
testing them with a large, diverse sample. Moderated mediation analyses testing these 
hypotheses yielded supportive results in both cases.  
With regard to the first hypothesis, support for membership of the EU was shaped 
by perceptions of future national power as an EU member, which exerted their impact 
both directly, and indirectly via triggering fears of the undermining of national 
identity. Though this pattern held across levels of national identification, it was 
particularly pronounced among high national identifiers, which makes sense as these 
would be the people for whom the continuity of Serbian identity and influence is most 
cherished. The findings support H1 and closely match those of Sindic and Reicher 
(2009), originally found in the context of an existing member of a supranational body, 
however extended here to the case of a prospective member. The findings further 
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highlight how perceptions of continuity, or lack thereof, in the future, have significant 
consequences for political attitudes in the present. 
National identification was also a proposed moderator in our second set of 
analyses, in which we sought to predict identification with a European identity. The 
mediated moderation model allowed us to investigate the underlying drivers of 
successful dual identification, operationalised as a positive correlation between 
national and European identification. This was predicted by the extent to which Serbia 
was seen, by Serbs and by Germans (according to Serbs), as prototypically ‘European’.  
These results illustrate that the more one identified with one’s national identity, the 
more positive the relationship between prototypicality and European identification 
became. Considering this interaction the other way around, the representativeness of a 
superordinate category was a significant moderator of the positive correlation between 
national and supranational identification. Namely, when perceptions of prototypicality 
were low, the relationship between Serbia and European identity became negative. In 
contrast, when perceptions of prototypicality were high, the relationship became 
positive, indicating that prototypicality can come to play an important role in either 
making subgroup-superordinate groups compatible or conflicting. Prototypicality was 
in turn predicted by the perceived asymmetry in power between Serbia and the country 
perceived to have the highest power in Europe, Germany, and mediated the path 
between power asymmetry and European identification in a significant, and positive 
way. This indirect path, as well as its moderation by national identity, was found to be 
significant using bootstrapped estimates, thus providing support for H2. 
 
General Discussion 
Across two studies, using focus group and survey data, we explored how the 
psychosocial dynamics underlying perceptions of identity undermining could be used 
to make sense of citizens’ ambivalence toward European Union integration in the case 
of a potential future member state, Serbia. The mixed methods design of the current 
paper allowed us to explore themes around EU integration and national identity and to 
draw on these, alongside the literature on superordinate group dynamics, to formulate 
and test two hypotheses on a larger sample of the Serbian population. Within both 
studies, the role of power was central in shaping core social identity processes. 
Namely, perceptions of power (both current and future) were closely linked with 
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perceptions of representativeness of the prototype of ‘European’ and whether or not 
subgroup identities would be undermined as part of the superordinate group. These, in 
turn, had consequences for the extent to which participants felt part of a European 
identity, and were supportive of EU accession.  
 These findings lend support for previous research by Sindic and Reicher (2009) 
on identity undermining in the context of a supranational union show that they hold 
true even in contexts of prospective, rather than existing, membership. By doing so, we 
further extend these findings by adding the importance of temporality in considering 
the consequences of perceived powerlessness on superordinate group dynamics. 
Namely, whereas perceptions of current power asymmetries between subgroups in the 
superordinate context were strongly correlated with identification processes on the 
superordinate level (i.e., who is prototypical of European and how European do we in 
turn feel?), perceptions of future power as part of the EU were in turn more important 
for questions of subgroup identification and consequently attitudes towards 
membership (i.e., will Serbian identity be undermined as part of the EU, and if so, are 
we more or less supportive of joining?).  This latter finding is consistent with research 
on the importance of ingroup continuity in contexts of group mergers (Gleibs, Noack 
& Mummendey, 2010), while extending it to the international context.  
By considering a context of prospective superordinate group membership our 
findings illustrate that power plays a more dominant and persistent role in shaping 
identification and attitudes towards a superordinate group than has previously been 
found. While models such as the Common Ingroup Identity Model and the Ingroup 
Projection Model explore the dynamics of dual identification and subgroup to 
superordinate group dynamics in depth, they have been less explicit about the role that 
intergroup power relations play in shaping who is seen to have the most valid claims to 
represent, and thus influence, the superordinate group. These findings show that once 
perceptions of power are measured directly, their predictive power vis-à-vis ingroup 
projection, and the acceptance of such projection, comes to the fore. Consequently, 
process-oriented models such as the IPM could benefit from becoming sensitized to 
the ways in which ingroup projection becomes shaped explicitly by questions of 
power, legitimacy to claims of belonging, and recognition of inclusion and 
representativeness of a superordinate group. As the second model of the quantitative 
analysis illustrated, power relations, via prototypicality, can have particular 
consequences for the extent to which identities are seen as compatible rather than 
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conflicting. Lastly, prototypicality itself becomes important to understand as a 
moderator of dual identification. As Study 2 showed, subgroup and superordinate 
group identities are not inherently incompatible, but rather this incompatibility (and 
likewise compatibility) depends on the extent to which individuals see the former as a 
part of the latter, and recognized as such.   
With recent events such as the UK vote in favour of leaving the European Union, 
it becomes increasingly pressing to consider how these psychosocial dynamics shape 
how citizens positions themselves within, and towards, a superordinate entity. Namely, 
questions of changing intergroup status and power relations, and their role in causing a 
perceived rupture to ingroup continuity, can become crucial to consider if we want to 
better understand why certain social groups feel more or less part of a superordinate 
group, and the consequences this has for their attitudes towards the politics of the 
superordinate group. To tackle perceptions of identity undermining, particularly among 
low-power groups, it would be beneficial to think about the ways in which we can 
make the superordinate category more inclusive, by recognizing the various practices 
and identities of not only existing, but also incoming, subgroups, as representative of a 
diverse superordinate group.  
It is important to note that these implications extend beyond the context of the 
EU, and can also be considered in the broader literature on subgroup-superordinate 
group dynamics, such as the literature on migration and acculturation. Integration into 
a new group, whether it is through organizational mergers, ethnic subgroups within a 
nation or nation-states within larger, international unions, brings up questions of how 
to manage continuity and compatibility with the new, common ingroup. While 
research on acculturation strategies has focused on including both minority and 
majority expectations (Brown & Zagefka, 2011), the findings of this study highlight 
yet another potential dimension to this relationship; how perceptions of intergroup 
power relations can come to play a role in shaping processes of superordinate 
belonging. Thus, considering the explicit role of power, both current and future, in 
processes of superordinate group integration and identification allow us to extend the 
insights of superordinate identity models, such as the Ingroup Projection Model, into 
the realm of political psychology.  
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Limitations and Further Research 
There are a number of limitations to this set of studies, which can provide potential 
avenues for further research. Firstly, the findings are limited to the context of Serbia, 
and the superordinate group dynamics are consequently shaped in important ways by 
the history of Serbia and its place in Europe. While the paper attempted to couple some 
of the more specific meaning-making processes with underlying social identity 
processes, the links explored in Study 2 were nevertheless informed by the specific 
content and context of Serbian identity and representations of Europe. As such, these 
dynamics might play out differently in another subgroup-superordinate context. 
Nevertheless, testing the explicit role of power in relation to social identity processes, 
particularly in contexts of dual identification and subgroup-superordinate group 
dynamics, would be beneficial in providing further support for the importance of 
power relations in shaping attitudes towards, and identification with, a superordinate 
group.  
Secondly, another important limitation comes from the use of meta-
representations of prototypicality rather than actual perceptions of others (i.e., 
Germans) on the extent to which a subgroup is representative of a superordinate group. 
However, as Elcheroth et al., (2011) argue, in context of intergroup relations 
permeated by ambiguity, “what people guess about their mutual mental states, 
ironically, becomes much more real in its consequences than what each of them 
‘really’ thinks and feels.” (p.752). Future research should consider drawing on all three 
levels (self-perceptions of prototypicality, meta-perceptions and the direct perceptions 
of others) in the process of exploring the role of prototypicality in superordinate group 
contexts.  
Thirdly, the large number of empty surveys or surveys with less than 10% of the 
questions viewed or answered is problematic and shows the potential damaging role of 
automated bots or automated form fillers. As such it would have been useful to include 
the timing resource of Qualtrics to overcoming important screening limitations in 
regards to invalid responses (Buchanan & Scofield, 2018).  
Lastly, as both studies were exploratory, and our survey data are correlational, 
clear claims of causality cannot be inferred from it. Future research should consider 
devising an experimental design to test how more or less power (and recognition of 
that power) shape attitudes towards being part of a superordinate group, and 
identification with it.  
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Conclusion 
The question posed at the beginning of this paper was, if EU integration is seen as 
threatening to nations, what specifically does it threaten? The findings presented seem 
to indicate that this question requires revising in order to become more meaningful. 
Namely, if EU integration is seen as threatening to nations, how does it become 
threatening? Our two studies support findings by Sindic and Reicher (2009) on the 
importance of understanding identity content and how it informs processes. Building 
on this work, our studies further highlight the centrality of power dynamics throughout 
these processes, as power plays a crucial role in shaping whose version of the social 
category representations becomes legitimate and consequential for the symbolic and 
practical aspects of the identity. 
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Appendix 6.1: Percentage of survey completed by participants 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.2: Regression output with meta-prototypicality as 
mediator.  
 
 B SE t p 
Mediator variable model (DV = Meta-Prototypicality) 
Constant 3.14 .15 20.94 .0001 
Power asymmetry  -.20 .03 -6.41 .0001 
 
Dependent variable model (DV = European Identity) 
Constant 3.70 .30 12.31 .0001 
Power asymmetry .09 .03 2.76 .006 
Meta-Prototypicality -.06 .10 -.59 .5570 
National Identity  -.15 .05 -3.00 .0032 
Meta-Prototypicality x National Identity .06 .02 3.00 .0028 
Conditional Effects of Meta-Prototypicality on European Identity at values of moderator 
 
National Identity 
 
Boot indirect effect 
 
Boot 
SE 
 
Boot t 
 
Boot p 
- 1 SD (2.8) .11 .05 2.18 .0292 
M (4.3) .20 .03 6.00 .0001 
+ 1 SD (5.9) .28 .04 7.18 .0001 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Power asymmetry on European identity via Meta-Prototypicality at 
values of moderator 
National Identity Effect Boot 
SE 
Boot CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
- 1 SD (2.8) -.02 .01 -.05 .00 
M (4.3) -.04 .01 -.06 -.02 
+ 1 SD (5.9) -.06 .02 -.10 -.03 
     
Index of Moderated mediation     
 
Mediator 
 
Index 
Boot 
SE 
Boot CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
Meta-Prototypicality -.01 .005 -.02 -.003 
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Preface 4: Chapter 7 
 
The first three empirical papers have explored various sub-questions intended to 
inform the answering of this question by providing both data on elite and everyday 
citizen discourses on political change, as well as testing out the ways in which specific 
identity-related processes such as compatibility and continuity, influenced a sense of 
identification with a superordinate group and a willingness to support political actions 
to join it. 
In chapter 7, I draw these findings together and combine them with a micro-analysis of 
some of the qualitative data (originally part of chapter 6’s thematic analysis but not 
reported in the results) to present the case for a social psychological approach to 
supranational identity in contexts of political change and integration. More precisely, 
this next chapter functions as an empirical and theoretical discussion of this PhD as a 
whole, by unpacking how discourses on international relations and global integration 
are conceptualized and made sense of through a dialogical construction of identity.   
It will be argued in both Chapter 7 and in the conclusion (chapter 8) that our current 
theoretical understanding of identities needs to be developed to allow us to account 
more fully for insecurities in identities, as brought on by insecurities in the meaning of 
the social category to begin with. Thus, the starting-point has to shift from exploring 
the boundaries between groups to considering how the problematization of the 
meaning of the group itself has social and psychological implications for identity and 
intergroup dynamics.  
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Chapter 7: The nation in times of socio-political change: how self-
other relations shape whether continuity becomes desirable or 
threatening to social identity.    
 
Abstract: 
It has been argued that continuity to an ingroup’s identity across time and space serves 
as a crucial source of stability and self-esteem for group members (Jetten & Wohl, 
2012). It has further been illustrated that discontinuity can have negative consequences 
both for individuals and groups by undermining the group’s way of life (Jetten & 
Hutchison, 2011). However recent work has explored the consequences of continuity 
when the meaning of a group’s past is seen in a negative light, and the potentially 
threatening consequences this has for the negotiation of a positive identity in the 
present (Roth, Huber, Juenger and Liu, 2017). The present paper builds on this latter 
area of research by further situating questions of continuity within a perspective of 
self-other relations. Through an analysis of the discursive management of national 
identity within focus groups in a post-conflict context (N=67) the paper focuses on 
how the tensions between continuity and discontinuity manifest themselves in 
discourses on political change and the consequences this has for what individuals 
expect, and hope, for their future. It will be illustrated that continuity to an ingroup’s 
identity is given meaning through discussions of self-other relations and their 
management over time, which can serve to limits the extent to which continuity is seen 
as positive, or even desired. The paper will conclude by exploring the limits of 
continuity and the importance of considering what the literature says about contexts 
where continuity is seen as either impossible or a cause of further stigmatization.  
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Identities as self-other relations over time 
According to self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Wetherell & 
Reicher, 1987), our sense of self is constructed and defines in relation to an ‘other’. It 
is through the process of self-categorization that people come to define themselves in 
terms of their membership in various social groups, such as ethnic, gender and national 
groups. This process in turn, accounts for the cognitive underpinnings of social 
identity. As a theoretical framework then, SCT provides us with a deeper 
understanding of how individuals are able to see themselves as part of a group, and 
what determines which type of identity becomes salient in a given context (Halsam & 
Reicher, 2015). 
Through the process of self-categorization, individuals define themselves, and 
others, as part of particular groups. In doing so, they begin self-stereotype in relation to 
the category; they see themselves less as different individuals, and more as 
representatives of that shared group, more similar within the ingroup, and more 
different from the out-group. This process is refered to as depersonalization and it 
explains the psychological reality of groups. The theory distinguishes between three 
levels of self-categorization which range from superordinate (human level), to 
intermediate (social level) and subordinate (personal level). No level of categorization is 
more or less fundamental to a self than another, but rather, the theory argues that what 
makes a given self-category more relevant in a particular context is based on the 
salience (shaped by both readiness and fit) of the category in that particular context 
(Oakes, 1987).  
A key idea underlining the formation of different levels of self-categories is that 
lower-order categories are formed through social comparison within higher-order 
categories, while higher-order categories are formed on the basis of lower level ones 
(Turner, Reynolds, Haslam & Veenstra, 2006).  In addition, the specific content of a 
self-category will determine who is seen as more or less representative of the category, 
or in the words of SCT, who is more or less ‘prototypical’ of the category. Thus, crucial 
for the explanatory power of the theory is the incorporation of both content and context 
in understanding processes of categorization and identification. 
 Yet where the theory has been less explicit is on the role of continuity to 
processes of self-categorization over time. Namely, if the self is defined in relation to 
an other, then this would imply that the construction of a continuity to the collective 
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self, across time and space, becomes managed and negotiated in a context of relevant 
others. However, as Condor (1996) argues, SCT “doesn’t account for, or even 
conceive of, continuity over time […] there is no account of how specific moments can 
be seen to fit together diachronically. This is due in large part to the fact that, in SCT, 
the “social field” or “context” is treated (or at least spoken of) as if it were essentially 
external to the perceiving subject: a stimulus display which individual subjects view, a 
set of instructions to which they respond, rather than a process of which they are a 
part.” (p. 289).   
Nevertheless, on both a theoretical as well as methodological level, exploring 
social identities and their movement through contexts and change requires an emphasis 
on time. The idea of ‘perceived collective continuity’ (PCC; Sani et al., 2007) offers a 
starting-point for this kind of focus.  
 
Ingroup continuity, threat and resistance to change 
Perceived collective continuity conceptualizes the extent to which we see our social 
groups (and identities) as stable over time, and the implications this has for identity, 
attitudes and intergroup relations (Liu, Sibley & Huang, 2014; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 
2014; Smeekes, McKeown & Psaltis, 2017). Ingroup continuity can be divided into 
two sub-dimensions: essentialism and narrativism. The former is a version of 
continuity achieved through an emphasis on the stability of an ingroups ‘essence’, core 
features such as values, norms and other cultural markers that define and identity, 
while the latter is a version of continuity achieved through interlinking historical 
events to create a consistent narrative of a group’s history. According to Smeekes and 
Verkuyten (2014), essentialist continuity (rather than narrativist continuity) is more 
likely to satisfy individual’s need for self-continuity and is thus likely to enhance 
ingroup identification.  
 Continuity to an ingroup’s identity across time and space serves as a crucial 
source of stability and self-esteem for group members (Jetten & Wohl, 2012). 
Research on mergers and schisms has been particularly informative in demonstrating 
the consequences to ingroup (and inter-group) processes when change is seen as a 
deviation from a constructed version of identity (Gleibs, Mummendey & Noack, 2008; 
Sani, 2008; Sani & Reicher, 2000; Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, Monden & de 
Lima; 2002). Research on mergers between groups has illustrated how continuity to 
the ingroup in times of change has positive implications for how groups deal with the 
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challenges, and potential threats, brought on by group mergers (Jetten and Hutchison, 
2011). In a similar vein, research on schisms within groups has also demonstrated that 
proposed change often becomes resisted when it is seen as moving the group away 
from its core values, beliefs, and inherently, it understanding of the group identity 
(Sani & Reicher, 2000). What these two areas of research tell us is that, whether it is 
change within a group or between two groups merging, continuity becomes an 
important factor in shaping how this change is interpreted. It further tells us that threats 
to continuity have both symbolic and practical implications.   
Continuity is not only a psychological construct, but also underpins how we act in 
the world, by making social practices meaningful in the present, through their purpose 
for the future (Reicher, 2008). Because of this, threats to continuity becomes not only 
threats to ‘our’ sense of self as a group, but also our ability to realize the social 
practices that are rooted in that concept, both in the present and the future. Developing 
this idea further in a context of national identity, Sindic and Reicher (2009) draw on 
the concept of ‘identity undermining’ to express how threats to the ingroup’s way of 
life are not only consequential on a cognitive dimension, but also pose threats to the 
active dimension of an identity. The concept of identity undermining challenges the 
distinction between realistic and symbolic threat, by highlighting the ways in which 
threats to a social group have both symbolic and practical implications. Namely, 
identity undermining refers to the perception that change will undermine the ability of 
group members to enact their identities and their “way of life”. Drawing on a study of 
Scottish citizens attitudes towards Britain, the authors illustrate that perceptions of 
power and incompatibility (between the subgroups composing a superordinate group) 
serve as the antecedents for identity undermining. Implicit in this work is also an 
understanding that identity undermining becomes a threat to perceived identity 
continuity as well, enacted on an everyday basis through social practices, norms and 
values.  
 
Positioning continuity in a self-other context 
A growing literature has begun exploring the underlying factors shaping when 
continuity between a groups past, present and future enhances or undermines a social 
identity. Within this literature, experimental work has illustrated that the consequences 
of continuity for social identity is dependent on the valence of the content of the social 
category itself. Namely, in research on national identity continuity and historical 
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representations, Roth et al. (2017) illustrate that historical continuity only decreases 
identity threat (compared to historical discontinuity) when the group’s past behavior is 
presented in a positive light. In contrast, when the past is remembered in a negative 
way, historical continuity become more threatening to the group’s identity. Similar 
findings have been shown in contexts where stigmatizing representations of the past 
have been presented to present-day nationals, leading to feelings of collective angst 
and shame (Hanke et al., 2013; Leone & Mastrovito, 2010) but also to resistance to 
acknowledge and communicate about past transgressions (Obradovic, 2016). However, 
while most of this literature has explored the subtleties of the dynamics between 
continuity and discontinuity by manipulating how the past is remembered, less has 
been said about how this meaning given to the past becomes negotiated in the context 
of relevant others.  
If history is such a powerful resource for giving meaning and continuity to an 
ingroup identity then we must also acknowledge that those who can shape and re-write 
history will be in a position of power to not only shape who ‘we’ are, but also what we 
should remember of the past and the consequences this has for how we relate to others 
in the present. However most literature that acknowledges this have focused on how 
this occurs within the group, placing less emphasis on how powerful others outside of 
the group become influential in this process. In an increasingly globally interconnected 
world, the representations of history found on a national level quickly become 
intertwined with the larger, global narratives of a shared history perpetuated. For 
example, in a study on representations of world history across 12 countries, Liu and 
colleagues (2005) finds that representations of history are more Eurocentric than 
ethnocentric and center around politics and war. Their research illustrates the 
importance of underlying power dynamics in shaping what is remembered and how by 
situating national memory work within a larger context of transnational memory work. 
This has implications for the extent to which a nation’s version of its past, deeply 
embedded within a transnational context, can be seen as legitimate if it deviates 
significantly from the more dominant versions of world history.  Considering this, it 
becomes necessary to acknowledge that the consequences of perceived collective 
continuity for social identity must be understood from the perspective of how the 
content of that identity continuity is perceived to be defined by both self and other. 
This in turn will determine whether continuity or discontinuity become seen as 
favorable to an ingroup’s self-image and future. 
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To summarize, the present introduction has attempted to outline a theoretical 
framework for the study of social identities in times of intragroup change, by 
combining the insights of self-categorization theory with the work on perceived 
collective continuity to situate self-other relations within a temporal context, as well as 
a socio-political and historical one. The argument put forward in the remainder of this 
this paper can be summarized in the following way; because self-other relations 
permeate the construction of an ingroup identity, it means that the management of 
identity continuity also becomes informed by both self and other. As such, relevant 
others become important in shaping how a social category is defined, and whether 
continuity to it is desired or seen as stigmatizing.  
 
The discursive management of continuity and change 
Research Context 
For purposes of illustration, the following section draws on qualitative data 
from focus groups conducted in Serbia. The core purpose of the focus groups was to 
engage participants in a discussion about Serbia’s prospective membership in the 
European Union (EU) and to explore the meaning given to this political change and its 
implications for their lives and their society. The choice to explore these questions in 
the context of Serbia comes from the nation’s unique self-conceptualization as a nation 
inbetween East and West. Namely, the metaphor of a bridge, or being at a crossroads, 
has become a popular imagery through which Serbian national identity, and history, 
has been positioned within the larger, European context (Russell-Omaljev, 2016; 
Todorova, 1998; Živković, 2011). The root of this sense of inbetweenness is often 
located in the history of the region and its geographical belonging to Europe alongside 
its affiliation to various European ‘Others’, such as Turkey (through Ottoman 
occupation) and Russia (through its religious ties). This sense of being in a state of 
transition, caught between East and West, has made the study of Serbian identity an 
interesting one for scholars of the region, and a particularly relevant one in the present, 
as the country moves towards a more ‘Western’ future through its prospective 
membership in the European Union (EU).  
Some would argue that a European identity is not necessarily exclusive to 
members of the EU, and we agree with this point, however we argue that, as with any 
social identity, a European identity developed in the context of an ‘Other’. Addressing 
this point, Neumann (1999) argues that “the ordering of self as ‘Western’ and other as 
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‘Eastern’ in European identity formation is one way of organizing European politics.” 
(p. 210). Similar arguments have been made by other scholars from disciplines such as 
history, political psychology and political science (i.e., Flockhart, 2010; Kinnvall, 
2016, Todorova, 1998). Applying the knowledge of SCT we also see that any higher-
order category is formed on the basis of lower-order ones, and thus could argue that 
the formation of a superordinate European identity has occurred by taking inspiration 
from the intermediate level categories in this context, such as that of the ‘nation’. It is 
from this perspective then that Serbia offers an interesting context in which to explore 
the question of how collective continuity is managed in times of socio-political change 
and the implications this has for identity. Particularly when the starting-point is an 
identity that has been built on, and is experienced as, in-between two ideological, 
historical and political ‘camps’.  Considering this, we ask; how is continuity and 
change reconciled in a context where an image of the social self has been defined by 
being inbetween?   
 
Method 
A total of nine focus groups were conducted in Serbia between 2015 and 2016 
(N=67) in seven different cities. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 57 (M=34) with 
occupations ranging from full time study to employment in the public and private 
sector. Each focus group followed the same topic guide, with six questions covering 
themes of Serbia’s relationship with, and potential future in, the EU, as well as the 
nation’s history within Europe and questions on domestic politics. Each focus group 
lasted between 21-67 minutes (M=61 minutes) and the audio-recorded sessions were 
transcribed and analysed in Serbian, with any illustrative quotes translated for the 
purpose of presentation.  
Considering the emphasis on how participants construct continuity and national 
identity, it seemed most fruitful to apply a discursive analysis to explore how self-other 
relations are used, and for what purpose. In other words, following SCT (and Social 
Identity Theory), we acknowledge that people argue over the meaning, boundaries and 
prototypicality of group identities because these have powerful consequences for who 
is included, and how they should act (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). In order to construct 
a more manageable corpus for analysis, the transcripts were read and any references to 
1) the EU and/or other ‘external’ political actors (i.e., nations, or organizations such as 
NATO),  2) Serbian ‘domestic’ actors (i.e., politicians, parties or social groups) and 3) 
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historical and/or political events (i.e., WWII or the democratic revolution) were 
extracted for analysis. Often these criteria overlapped, as will be visible from the 
various extracts below.  
The analysis entailed following the guidelines of a particular strand of critical-
discourse, which explicitly considers the role of history in contexts of communicative 
acts (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). Namely, the discourse-historical approach (DHA) was 
utilized to analyse how historical contexts were used to situate self-other relations, 
negotiate identity, and position the ingroup in relation to proposed political change 
(Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart, 2009).  
The discourse-historical approach emphasizes triangulation through the inclusion 
of different levels of context within which a text is embedded. These levels are further 
differentiated through the examination of 1) contents or topics of discourse, 2) 
discursive strategies, and 3) linguistic means of realizations (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). 
The DHA allows for a rigorous micro-analysis of discourse while simultaneously 
linking the strategies used, and claims made, to larger, macro-level processes such as 
the construction of national identity, the management of intergroup relations or the 
opposition to political change. The illustrative examples used below are therefore 
discussed both in terms of the discursive strategies and means of realization, as well as 
the broader, socio-political implications of these claims.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Three key dimensions through which the tensions between continuity and change were 
managed arose in the data; 1) through the use of temporal arguments, continuity to 
inbetweenness was constructed as impossible due to Serbia’s lack of power in the 
present, thus highlighting the need for change, 2) through strategies of deconstruction, 
threats to continuity were alleviated by deconstructing the importance of ‘East’ in 
Serbian identity and thus its meaning for continuity, and 3) through constructive 
strategies compatibility and continuity to the ‘West’ in Serbian identity was 
problematized through historical references which constructed the West as a continued 
‘Other’. The final section provides the foundation for the theoretical novelty of this 
paper by discussing how perceived collective continuity must be placed in a larger 
framework of self-other processes in order to consider whether continuity is seen a 
positive or negative for a group’s identity and sense of self-esteem.  
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The growing impossibility of inbetweenness: The difference between then and now 
Being at a crossroads between East and West has been a prominent metaphor in 
describing Serbia’s history, politics and identity ((Russell-Omaljev, 2016; Todorova, 
1998; Živković, 2011).). This metaphor has embedded itself both within political and 
public discourse through the popular saying that Serbia ‘sits on two chairs’, a 
statement that epitomizes the current political balancing of Serbia’s ties with Russia 
and the EU. While this sense of inbetweenness might have been sustainable in the past, 
the political context of Serbia has changed through its commitment to a future within 
the EU. Thus, with this political goal, the management of inbetweenness has come to 
the fore, as well as its ability to sustain itself in the future.  
 
1. Belgrade (1) 
5: We’re in Europe, it’s completely normal that we become [part of the EU].  
1: Absolutely, geographically yes, and we shouldn’t run away from that, but we should 
be bold, and the way that Tito knew how to balance [politics], that’ll never happen 
again.  
6: I agree, but back then you had a significantly bigger state, it wasn’t just Serbia, and 
he was able to keep up the balancing act because Yugoslavia was a significant factor 
in the Balkans, in Southern Europe, and now we’re nothing. 
 
2. Novi Sad:  
5: We should keep both.  
R: Is that possible?  
5: It used to be.[…]  
4: We should take advantage of, take money from one and the other, like we used to in 
the past, someone really intelligent needs to come, like we used to have, but it seems 
that that’s not possible in the present. 
 
3. Paraćin:  
1: Today, they [politicians] are sitting on two chairs, and going nowhere.  
3: They [EU] shouldn’t be meddling in our affairs but it is problematic to be sitting on 
two chairs.  
8: Especially now.  
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3: In fact, we should be only on one, but we’re on two. And that’s the problem. 
Because we’re small, balancing becomes impossible. 
 
All three extracts above draw on temporal references as part of the strategic 
construction of the present as different from the past. The use of words such as ’never’, 
‘back then’, ‘now’, ‘used to’, ‘was’, and ‘today’ are all means of realizing 
argumentative strategies that construct the present as different from the past. In the 
first quote for example, the first speaker constructs EU membership as natural and 
inevitable, drawing on spatial references to construct similarity between Serbia and the 
EU (‘we’re in Europe’). This statement is responded to with a ‘yes but’ argument, 
where the second speaker agrees to a geographical belonging to Europe but downplays 
this as a determinant of political allegiance, instead emphasizing the importance of 
being ‘bold’ and balancing politically the way Tito did. This reference to Tito is 
however met with resistance through the use of parallels between ‘then’ and ‘now’ 
which emphasize a loss of regional power and influence (‘now we’re nothing’). 
Through topos of comparison and changed circumstances, the present becomes a time 
of dependence on others, where the ability to choose to be in-between is replaced with 
the importance of aligning yourself with one side, instead of run the risk of falling 
between the cracks. The importance of power in allowing for balancing is evident as 
well (‘because we’re small, balancing becomes impossible’), warranting the 
conclusion that the strategic management of political balancing is seen as thing of the 
past, when Serbia was both powerful and had competent leadership.  
The implications of this lack of continuity to power is that there is a perceived 
lack of continuity to autonomous decision making and a truly Serbian perspective on 
politics. How can Serbia then reconcile not being inbetween? The next section focuses 
on one such attempt at moving away from inbetweenness by considering how 
participants try to re-imagine self-other relations as less positive, and thus less in need 
of continuity, than previously considered.   
Deconstructing the ‘East’ in Serbian identity: dismantling historical continuity with 
Russia 
4. Belgrade (2):  
2: It’s simply impossible that we join the EU and don’t do what we have to in regards 
to Russia, to be able to join an EU way of thinking in relation to Russia.  
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4: Of course, because if they’re going to let you join them, they sure enough won’t let 
you have any independent way of thinking.  
2: You have to respect them common foreign policy.’ 
 
Drawing on normative language (‘have to’), participants draw on the topos of 
consequence to argue that political change entails transformation from an independent 
way of thinking to a unified way of thinking about the world and the social groups 
within it. A common approach by individuals in tackling this tension was to draw on 
strategies of dismantling. These aimed to deconstruct parts of an existing national 
identity construct (Wodak et al., p.33) without providing alternatives. In the case of 
Serbia and Russia, this frequently occurred by attempting to deconstruct a sense of a 
positive relationship with Russia over history, by debunking ‘myths’ with seemingly 
factual claims.  
 
 5. Belgrade (1):  
4: I think that Russia is our biggest fake friend, the biggest fake friend we’ve had 
throughout centuries, that’s a big blunder that we should be pro-Russia and that they 
always protect us, that they’re always with us and that we should look up to them […] 
1: But you lose your roots. The EU destroyed your country. Germany destroyed it, 
which was first to support the war. Germany destroyed SFRJ [Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia], it supported that. That makes her your true friend?  
5: Who constructed SFRJ tell me please?  
1: The same people who destroyed it.  
5: So! Whose product was it then?  
1: That’s irrelevant, it’s politics. But how can you forget just like that, that someone 
who was beating you, is today your friend and you’re running around trying to grasp 
onto him… If someone hurt you once, you can expect him to hurt you again, because 
he doesn’t care about you, he cares about his own interests. 
 
Within this exchange there are several important discursive elements which function to 
construct Russia as either friend or foe. Firstly, the use of personal references (‘our’, 
‘we’, ‘you’, ‘I’) serve different functions in the discourse. For the first speaker, 
participant 4, the use of ‘I think’ when criticizing the dominant perception that Russia 
is a ‘friend’ of Serbia, denotes his awareness of the potential conflicting opinion that 
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he offers. As Wodak et al. (2009, p.131) argue, frequently in contexts of discussions of 
national identity participants tend to use the self-inclusive ‘we’ when making claims 
but revert to an ‘I’ position when making potentially taboo or contradictory points. As 
will be evident throughout the rest of the section, the continued use of ‘I’ when making 
anti-Russia claims shows the awareness of a positive representation of Russia within 
the dominant national narrative of history, and thus limits the extent to which 
participants feel comfortable to use ‘we’. In response to this statement, participant 1 
draws on arguments of continuity to persuade the previous speaker of the 
consequences of rejecting Russia.  
 For participant 1, the use of ‘you’, rather than ‘we’, to refer to Serbia denotes 
her strategic construction of a pro-European Serbia which she distances herself from. 
Throughout the focus group, participant 1 was vocal about her resistance towards 
joining the EU, and her argument about losing ‘your roots’ functions to construct pro-
EU Serbia as losing its roots by forgetting the history of Serbia’s relationship vis-à-vis 
Europe. Through an analogy of friendship, participant 1 constructs Serbia’s 
relationship to the EU as one of victim-perpetrator. When this argument is in turn 
resisted by participant 5 (‘who constructed SFRJ please tell me’) participant 1 is 
strategically able to dismiss this argument by dismissing it as about ‘politics’. This 
seems rather at odds with the conversation as a whole, yet highlights the subtle 
differences that participants make between constructing self-other relations between 
nations and cultures, and those between governments. It is worth examining this in 
more detail by drawing on a longer illustrative excerpt: 
 
6. Belgrade (2):   
2: Can I go first? I think that Serbia absolutely isn’t pro-Russian, I think that the 
influence of Russia is blown out of proportion and that that is a fear of the West, that 
Serbia will, now I’m not saying we’re innocent, there’s an ugly expression [that’s 
true]; we’re on the fence, we want to, but we don’t want to, and the Russians aren’t 
idiots, even they’re tired of us. And then we’re acting like we don’t want to join either 
but in reality we are more inclined towards the EU, and we end up looking like idiots 
in the eyes of both. Yes, Serbia historically has closer ties with Russia than say Croatia 
has had, and I agree with the decision not to implement sanctions against Russia 
[during the Crimean crisis] but that’s not valued where you’re trying to go. […] 
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3: Those are stories from the second world war, Russians are our brothers, those are 
old stories, and I mean, for example, yes our brothers came towards the end of WWII 
and they freed Belgrade, and that’s great, everyone talks about that. But no one talks 
about how their soldiers raped our women.  
4: That’s right.  
2: Okay but they also helped us during World War 1.  
3: Yes, sure they did, I’m not saying they didn’t, I’m saying they did, really, a lot, but 
then after that it was followed by raping. […]  
2: Russians are, apropos our balancing and Kosovo, we used Russia for as long as 
Kosovo was of interest to us, because evidently it isn’t anymore. We grabbed on to 
Russia to defend us and to be our support in the UN Security Council, anyways, we 
asked Russia, ‘please help us with Kosovo, please help us please help us’ and then our 
domestic politics changed and Russia got pissed off. And then, Cepurin, their UN 
Ambassador, or whatever it’s not important, said ‘hold on, we can’t be more Serbian 
than Serbs themselves’. So, we’re uncommitted, we don’t know what we want, we 
change state politics and history every ten years. We can’t expect complete loyalty 
from Russia or the EU when we don’t give anyone our loyalty. 
 4: Okay, no one is looking for a bad relationship with Russia. Why should anyone 
come and fill our minds with ideas that ‘no those Russians are a bad people’, because 
we obviously, as a people, like Russia, even if no one is singing their praise as a genius 
nation.  
3: That relationship both with Russia and the EU comes down to what nr 2 was saying 
in the beginning, that we want this and we want that. We’re balancing and not doing 
anything for anyone. But expecting everything from everyone.  
 
Again, we see the use of ‘I ’ (‘I think’, ‘I mean’, ‘I’m saying’) to make controversial 
claims about Russia, before moving on to use the more inclusive ‘we’ to discuss the 
current inbetweenness of Serbia and its negative consequences. Namely, the first two 
speakers begin by strategically dismantling the myth of a pro-Russian Serbia as 
something ‘blown out of proportion’, perpetuated through Western, rather than 
Serbian, narratives, and lacking a critical lens on Russia’s role in Serbia (‘no one talks 
about how their soldiers raped our women’). This strategy of dismantling the historical 
significance of Russia is then built on to construct Serbian inbetweenness as a negative 
national uniqueness that is not only unproductive (‘we’re balancing and not doing 
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anything’) and stigmatizing (‘we end up looking like idiots’), but also draws Serbia 
away from the possibility of actually being Serbia (‘and then their UN Ambassador 
said “we can’t be more Serbian than Serbs themselves”.’). In other words, the 
discursive logic behind the discussions of participants 2 and 3 is to re-negotiate the 
self-other relations within a temporal context; if Russia is seen as ‘never’ being 
important to Serbia, then joining the EU and renegotiating the role of ‘East’ in Serbia’s 
identity does not harm continuity, but rather shows progress. 
In response to this attempt at deconstructing a sense of continuity and 
significance of Russia, participants draw on strategies of justification to downplay the 
responsibility of Russia for negative events in Serbia’s past by comparing it to positive 
events (‘okay but they also helped us’) and minimising the importance of Russia 
without fully rejecting it (‘okay, no one is looking for a bad relationship with Russia’). 
What is significant here is also that, while participants might have been persuaded of 
the more ambiguous historical relationship with Russia, this is countered by 
comparisons between Russia and the EU, by drawing on fictitious quoting (‘no those 
Russians are bad people’) to delegitimize the authority of the EU in making demands 
not only on Serbian politics, but more importantly on the way people think (‘why 
should anyone come and fill our minds with ideas’). This comparison was also visible 
in excerpt 5, where negative representations of Russia are countered with negative 
representations of the EU (‘the EU destroyed your country’). Consequently, for many 
participants, despite the dismantling of a positive historical continuity with Russia, 
there was an inability to couple, or recognize, that this made the ‘West’ a more 
‘essential’ part of the ingroup identity.   
 
Deconstructing the ‘West’ in Serbian identity: Constructing continuity to the EU as 
‘Other’  
In many of the discussions around political change and the normative pressure to 
change relations with Russia, the construction of an ambiguous relationship with 
Russia was contrasted with the construction of a more definite historical continuity to a 
negative relationship between Serbia and the EU, as can be seen in extract 5 and 6 
above and here in extract 7:  
7. Vranje 
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8: You know what, I’ve always been a believer in the whole idea that history repeats 
itself. And if you go through history, Russia never hindered you. Even if they didn’t 
help you, the sure enough didn’t hinder you.  
5: That’s what I’m talking about.  
8: While Germany, the US, England, France, they didn’t spare any ammunition, if you 
see what I mean. (General agreement). They screwed you over at least once or twice in 
life.  
 
The present exchange draws on strategies of perpetuation to defend a particular version 
of a Serbian national identity; one victimized by the West. This is accomplished by 
drawing on argumentative schemes of history as a teacher (‘I’ve always been a 
believer in the whole idea that history repeats itself’) and topos of difference, to 
position Russia as closer to the self (‘they never hindered you’) and the West 
(interchangeably used with EU) as ‘Other’ (‘they screwed you over at least once’). The 
use of parallelism in this context of historical comparison strategically constructs 
continuity to self-other relations which position the EU as against Serbia rather than 
with it. Similar strategies of comparison were visible on other focus groups;  
 
8. Paraćin:  
3: If the EU offers us more, then we should move towards the EU, but the EU hasn’t 
proved itself to be particularly generous, nor giving, in any sense in regards to us, and 
those wars, and Kosovo, and everything possible. While Russia has at least, in a 
certain way, been with us. 
 
It becomes important here to take into consider the role of relevant others (Elcheroth, 
Doise & Reicher, 2011) in giving meaning to these various constructions of continuity 
and identity. Why is association with Russia so negative? As mentioned in the 
previous section, the choice to integrate into the EU entails adopting a common foreign 
policy, but also, to the dismay of many Serbs, a common way of thinking about the 
world. This reflects the argument put forward by SCT that categories reflect, rather 
than distort, social reality (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994) and that the prototypical 
member of a category is given the power to shape who ‘we’ are, how we act and how 
we make sense of the world. As such, the category ‘European’ reflects, to Serbs, a 
certain perspective on who belongs, and who does not, and has downstream 
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consequences for how Serbia  has been historically positioned in relation to the 
European Self. Consider the following exchange:  
 
9. Niš:  
6: It’s simply fashionable in the Balkans to hate Serbs. Even Montenegro, which, even 
they hate Serbs. Even Macedonians. 
9: But why??  
6: Well it’s simply fashionable, when they see that everyone hates you, they hate you 
too.  
9: But do you, do you think we’re that bad or that good that we should, I mean, what’s 
going on here?  
6: We’re not, but it’s just fashionable. They see that Europe is rewarding anyone who 
hates Serbs, so then they just tag along and say ‘we hate Serbs too.’ Europe has 
always looked at us like little Russia and that’s the problem. Even when we weren’t 
‘little Russians’ they said we were.  
9: I think that’s out of spite against Russia. Literally.  
 
Through argumentative strategies of similarity, Serbia and Russia are both constructed 
as Other in the eyes of Europe, and these representations in turn cause a sense of 
positioning of Serbia as not European, and thus not recognized as belonging to the 
social category itself (‘Europe has always looked at us like little Russia’). The idea of 
accepting stigmatizing representations of Serbia as a strategic tool for making progress 
(‘They see that Europe is rewarding anyone who hates Serbs’) becomes seen as a 
current trend in European politics (‘it’s just fashionable’) and functions to reaffirm a 
sense of isolation and Othering of Serbia in Europe at large.  
The only thing that is continuous is rupture; defining the meaning of ‘us’ and the 
limits of continuity  
Serbia, a nation constructed on a historical narrative of being between East and West, 
is clearly facing tensions in the present, leaving many citizens asking, if we are neither 
East nor West, what are we? The meaning of social categories is crucial in determining 
the ways in which social identity processes are realized. In a country like Serbia, the 
continued management of identity through negating what ‘we’ are not, has led to less 
focus on defining what we are. I therefore conclude the current paper by considering 
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one particular extract, and what it can tell us about Serbian national identity and the 
importance of collective continuity.   
 
10. Belgrade (1): 
4: I think the killer here is that every 10 years our elite changes, and our value 
systems, and that causes you to always, and that’s what I’ve been saying, we might be 
able to run our own state if we didn’t change our basic value system where you first 
have a King, and then everything changes.  
2: But territorially you’ve moved around a lot more than an English person […]  
1: He created his system and to this day it remains in its original character. […]  
4: I think the problem is that we don’t have, some well-known standards, to say ‘that’s 
our value system, that’s our elite’, instead everything changes here. When the 
government changes, everything changes. Like I said, one minute we have a monarchy, 
the next communism, then we’re pro-democracy.  
1: But what does that tell you? That’ we’re an unstable people.  
5: That we’re an uneducated nation. […]  
6: Let’s compare us to the English. England traces its roots back to the middle ages, 
and all that has remained, has stayed continuous, without occupation of over 500 
years. Here, you were annihilated for 500 years, and your state was only created in the 
19th century. In the 19th century, we were, compared to Europe, set back, even if we 
might have been ahead of them in the past, if we look at history. We’re lagging behind 
a whole century, with regards to everything, and our national consciousness is 
endangered.  
 
Underlying this exchange is an attempt to strategically defending the lack of political, 
democratic and regional progress of Serbia, by drawing on temporal comparisons 
(‘always’, ‘one minute – the next’) to argue that Serbian history is defined by ruptures, 
in comparison to the stable continuity of other nations (‘England […] has remained, 
has stayed continuous, without occupation’). This constructive strategy functions to 
justify the current international status quo and Serbia’s low position in the hierarchy of 
nation by emphasizing the legitimacy of past events in setting Serbia back (‘we were 
[…] set back, even if we might have been ahead of them in the past’). It also attributes 
blame for this lack of progress on the Ottoman occupation (‘annihilated for 500 years’) 
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which not only made Serbia lag behind, it also diluted, and endangered the national 
consciousness and character of Serbs.  
This quote, alongside the previous excerpts included in this paper, seem to 
illustrate that what defines the Serbian category is a continued history of ruptures, 
caused by various relevant Others (the EU, Germans, the Ottoman Empire etc.) which 
has resulted in a sense of instability and undefined belonging. Continuity and 
discontinuity seem to exist as two different levels; discontinuity to the narrativist 
dimension of history (the interlinking of events of the past) alongside an attempt to 
protect the essentialist dimension of history (values, norms and beliefs) which is seen 
as ‘endangered’ because of these continouos ruptures. This data therefore paints a 
more complex picture of role of continuity/discontinuity for social identity by 
supporting the argument that valence becomes crucial in determining the way forward 
(Roth, et al., 2017). In addition, the present paper builds on this work by situating 
valence, or the meaning given to continuity as either positive or negative, within an 
interdependent self-other context. It not only matters how Serbs see their history, but 
how relevant others recognize that same version of history as legitimate and valid.  
 Percieved collective continuity to a state of inbetweenness, defined by 
participants as rapid changes in ideology and system of rule, is seen as stigmatizing to 
Serbia’s image as a modern and developing nation because it is moving towards a 
European future without any clear definition of its national self.  This sense that the 
only thing that is continuous is rupture further reinforces participants fear of being 
unable to both define and maintain a ‘real’ Serbian identity. Consequently, when 
supranational integration is seen as joining a higher-order category which is built on 
the basis of lower-order categories (Western nations) it becomes potentially 
undermining of the Serbian national identity. As such, conclusion follows that if we 
want to be European, we have to become more like ‘them’ and less like ‘us’. 
Ironically, and perhaps counter-intuitive, for many participants this change and 
discontinuity was welcomed.  
  
Conclusion  
Many readers familiar with the recent history of Serbia, including its communist past 
and unique leadership of Tito, the rise and fall of Yugoslavia and the aftermath of the 
1990s for both the country and the region, will find the lack of references to these 
events stricking. One might ask whether this is because of the questions asked, or the 
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present climate of the country. It is likely a combination of both. Yet what this paper 
also brings to the fore is the importance of understanding that the management of a 
sense of collective continuity is as much informed by what is selectively remembered 
as well as what is conveniently forgotten. The benefits of data from group discussions 
has particularly highlighted this by illustrating how participants question and challenge 
each others representations of self-other relations across time and their role for present 
day politics. Absences of historical events and figures are equally as important as 
presences because they demonstrate the constructive nature of continuity. As Reicher 
(2008) argues, essentialism and constructivism go hand in hand; it is the continued 
revision of meaning that allows us to construct, and experience, our identities as stable 
over time. Yet identities, as well as collective continuities, are not only shaped by the 
self, but also by relevant others.  
Within the current paper, the data presented and analysed shows that 
discussions around EU integration in Serbia become situated within a larger discourse 
on how a European future for Serbia ‘fits’ with an inbetween past, and the perceived 
stigmatization that this past casts on the Serbian identity. Integration into the EU, 
while seen as simultaneously threatening to a positive Serbian identity and its ability to 
be recognized as such, is also seen as potentially positive, by creating a discontinuity 
to a history of inbetweenness and opening up a space between the cracks where a true 
Serbian identity can be carved out. 
Combining the theoretical insights from self-categorization theory with the work 
on perceived collective continuity has allowed us to illustrate that the consequences of 
ingroup continuity for social identity depend on how the social category is defined by 
self and other. As such, there are important limits to the perceived benefits of collective 
continuity, as well as the dangers of discontinuity. While valence becomes crucial in 
shaping whether continuity is seen as enhancing or undermining of a social identity, this 
valence itself becomes negotiated within a context of self and other, underlined by 
important power dynamics. 
Without the constraints of relevant others, we would not have representations of 
the past that were stigmatizing, nor experience our identities as such. Yet it is precisely 
because self-other relations are intertwined that these dynamics exist and become 
consequential for intragroup processes. Therefore, maintaining a positive identity can 
sometime become contigent upon the ability to disconnect it from its past, particularly if 
there are limited options to challenge how its is remembered by more powerful others. 
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Consequently, we must situate collective continuity in an intergroup context, asking not 
only about the meaning that we attribute to our past and its continuity in the present, but 
also the implications of how others remember our history and the role these 
representations play in shaping our self-categorization process.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Aims of the thesis 
In this thesis I examined the role of history, power and national identity in the process 
of supranational integration. I did so by focusing on Serbia, a prospective member of 
the European Union, exploring how elite and lay representations of socio-political 
change became intertwined with discourses on maintaining continuity to the nation-
state, its history and identity. The focus on Serbia was motivated by a desire to 
critically examine the process of ‘becoming’ a member of a supranational group as it 
occurred, and to answer the question of how, and why, seemingly positive political 
change towards democratization and integration might be resisted or seen as 
undermining for a particular nation.  
More specifically, the thesis focused on investigating how ingroup continuity was 
managed and maintained in times of socio-political change, and the focus on Serbia 
provided an ideal setting which to study this. As discussed in Chapter 1, Serbia’s 
national identity and history is one built on a sense of inbetweenness, situating the 
nation, both geopolitically and symbolically, at a crossroads between East and West. 
Within this context, movement towards joining the European Union has by many been 
seen as a moment of choice where one road is chosen, and the crossroads is 
abandoned. This has in turn led to a tension, both politically and publicly, between 
wanting to join the EU for civic reasons, but resisting it for cultural ones (as illustrated 
in Chapters 4 and 5).  
There were a few aims that grounded this thesis; firstly, on a purely topical level, 
research on EU integration and identification with a European community has 
predominantly focused on existing EU member states, or non-EU countries of high 
economic power in Europe (i.e., Norway and Switzerland). Less has been said about 
how issues of identification, history and international relations shape the path toward 
accession as it is occurring, specifically in low-power countries. Therefore, one of the 
aims of the thesis was to provide evidence of how these processes are experienced as 
they are happening, and how they are made sense of by elites and citizens. Secondly, 
on a theoretical level, the thesis aimed to contribute to the literature on perceived 
collective continuity and its role for social identities by situating the negotiation of 
change and perceived historical continuity within a self-other context.  
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With this focus in mind, temporality became a central element in designing the 
thesis and applying the theoretical framework, aimed at extending our understanding 
of perceived collective continuity as encompassing both self and other as well as the 
various temporal dimensions of these categories. In other words, the analyses in the 
various empirical chapters focused explicitly on how present politics and intergroup 
relations became situated within, and constructed through, temporal links to the past, 
or anticipations for the future. Lastly, the application of a mixed-methods design aimed 
to provide both an understanding of content and context through the depth and richness 
of the qualitative data, and how this meaning in turn informs and shapes the 
relationships between processes of identification through the quantitative data.  
 
8.2. Summary of findings 
The research questions guiding this thesis were; 
How is collective continuity managed by politicians and the public in times of socio-
political change, and what are the implications for national identity?  
 
1. What role do social representations of history play in how citizens make sense of present 
socio-political change, and what are the implications of this for how they represent the 
future? (Chapter 4) 
 
2. How is a sense of compatibility between Serbian identity and EU belonging constructed by 
entrepreneurs of identity to either promote or resist change?  
- Which discursive strategies have become the most successful within political discourses? 
(Chapter 5) 
 
3. What are the lay understandings of supranational integration in the context of Serbia 
joining the EU, and how do these relate to identity and intergroup threat? (Chapter 6, 
Study 1) 
 
4. What is the underlying role of power dynamics in shaping a) fears of the undermining of 
Serbian identity by EU accession, b) perceptions of prototypicality of the category 
‘European’, and c) the perceived compatibility of national and supranational 
identification? What are the consequences of these processes for attitudes in favour of EU 
accession? (Chapter 6, Study 2) 
 
5. How is the desire for collective continuity reconciled with a stigmatizing past?  
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The main aims of this thesis were addressed in four empirical studies, combining both 
qualitative and quantitative data. Chapter 4 analysed iterative focus group data 
collected with four different groups of participants in four cities in Serbia over a one-
year time frame. The focus of Chapter 4 was to examine how historical representations 
were drawn on to construct continuity to ingroup identity and in turn make sense of 
political change. Moving from public to political discourse, Chapter 5 drew on a 
diachronic data set of political speeches from 1990-2015 focusing on exploring how 
political leaders have framed their support for, or resistance, to political change 
through identity-related arguments. Chapter 6 in turn combined both qualitative focus 
group data and quantitative survey data in a sequential exploratory design, to explore 
lay discourses around European identity, national identity and EU integration, and then 
to test the emerging relationships on a larger sample of participants. Lastly Chapter 7 
provided an analysis of the discursive management of continutiy in times of change, 
illustrating the limits of continuity when the past is seen as stigmatizing by both self 
and relevant others. While the chapters drew on different data sets, both top-down and 
bottom-up discourses on national identity and political change, the findings from each 
illustrate that there are clear tensions between aligning ingroup identity with EU 
integration and maintaining a sense of continuity in the process. A summary of each 
chapter’s findings is given below.  
Chapter 4 provided a first, exploratory and in-depth analysis of lay 
representations of national identity, history and politics in relation to the EU. The 
thematic analysis gave an illustration of the core underlying tensions present in the 
beliefs and attitudes of a selected group of Serbs in regards to their country’s current 
political situation and how these in turn can be tracked back to the core tenants of a 
Serbian national identity. The underlying tensions between being a victim, both 
domestically and internationally, while also re-affirming a sense of agency through 
themes of resilience and resistance, showed the struggles individuals experienced when 
trying to reconcile the need for external help to improve Serbia, and the perception that 
help itself was coming from a historical enemy of Serbia.  
Chapter 5 focused on how political leaders, both in power and in opposition, have 
strategically positioned themselves as entrepreneurs of identity in order to gain public 
support for their political agendas. The discursive analysis of key political speeches 
illustrated the creative ways in which politicians navigated the many tensions arising 
from attempting to move away from the stigma of the 1990s and re-integrate Serbia 
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into an international community, by decoupling a civic Serbia from a cultural one, in 
order to attribute change to the former, while protecting the continuity of the latter. It 
echoed the findings from Chapter 4 highlighting the important role of Kosovo in 
providing a symbolic continuity to a national identity and history, which in turn 
became rooted in the geopolitical conflict regarding Kosovo’s independence, within 
which Serbia was seen to take one side, and the EU another.  
Taking into consideration the findings from the previous two studies, Chapter 6 
was intended to explore some of the key ideas that emerged with regards to national 
identity, history and power in the context of EU integration. The collection of focus 
group data with a larger sample of cities and participants compared to Chapter 4 was 
intended to allow for saturation in regards to the themes that emerged when discussing 
Serbia and the EU. The qualitative data, while mirroring some of the themes from 
Chapter 4, focused more on the dynamics between dual identification as both Serbian 
and European, and the relevant ‘Others’, which were seen to shape what both social 
categories meant. Combined with the quantitative component, Chapter 6 illustrated 
that future-oriented fears of powerlessness and identity undermining were significant 
in predicting lower support for EU membership, highlighting support for the 
importance of exploring identities as in the process of ‘becoming’ (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001). The findings further illustrated that subgroup dynamics within the 
superordinate context mattered for processes of dual identification, where those who 
were seen as more powerful were also seen as more representative, and the lower in 
power Serbia was seen, the less representative it was, and the less compatible Serbian 
and European identities were. Lastly the findings from Chapter 7 illustrated the limits 
of current theorizing on perceived collective continuity as the case of Serbia shows the 
complex ways in which historical continuity, and whether it is seen as positive or not, 
becomes negotiated within a self-other context, where it matters not only how we 
remember our past and its implications for national identity, but also how we percieve 
relevant others to remember it.  
 
8.3. Contributions  
There are a number of contributions from this PhD, both empirical and theoretical, as 
discussed in turn below.  
 
Empirical/Methodological contributions 
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The use of qualitative data to explore social psychological phenomena has been a 
common tool within the social representations theory, but less so with research using 
social identity approach. The difference between the theories is that while social 
identity approach is a process-driven theoretical framework, social representations 
theory has mainly been used to provide in-depth understandings of how meaning is 
constructed and negotiated in a social context. In this thesis, the use of focus group 
data allowed me to combine the two by considering how social knowledge and social 
identities become co-constructed. The qualitative data allowed us to remain close to 
the ‘social’ in social representations by illustrating how representations of historical 
continuity and identity were collaborative achievements. Some important empirical 
and methodological contributions which resulted from this theoretical approach are 
discussed below.  
 
The shifting perspective on Serbian identity 
One important empirical contribution of this thesis is to the domain of research on 
Serbian identity. Much of this research has emphasized that Serbian identity is built on 
a victimhood narrative, including some emphasis on resilience, but mainly highlighting 
how Serbs have continuously claimed a sense of victimhood internationally, 
particularly after the Yugoslav wars. While this thesis did find support for that, it 
illustrated that this victimhood narrative was not intended to construct Serbs as 
helpless victims, but rather it was used as a strategic tool to shift responsibility and 
accountability for lack of progress to ‘Other’ actors; whether domestically (politicians) 
or internationally (the EU). In doing so, individuals managed to position themselves as 
the true bearers of a Serbian identity which was being threatened both from within, and 
by external forces. Thus, the qualitative data, particularly from Chapter 4, shed some 
nuance on this literature on Serbian identity by emphasizing the importance of current 
socio-political affairs in how identity is negotiated and constructed. Furthermore, the 
findings from Chapter 6 and 7 also show the nuances of Serbian identity by bringing to 
light the critical attachments to Serbian history and identity in present-day discussions 
of the nation. In particular, Chapter 7 illustrates not only that Serbs are aware of the 
negative representations attached to their history but have also, to some extent 
internalized these and began to question the importance of maintaining a sense of 
continuity with the past. Instead, historical discontinuity with Serbia of the past, 
particularly the narrativist dimension of history (i.e., the interlinking of historical 
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events into a continuous narrative) was considered potentially stigmatizing and 
undermining of the ability of Serbs to progress and redefine Serbian identity in a more 
positive light.  
 
The contributions of critical discourse analysis to the study of national identity 
Chapters 5 and 7, drawing on speeches by politicans and discourses on identity, history 
and politics amongs Serbs in a group setting, bring important methodological 
contributions to the study of historical continuity and national identity.  
In Chapter 5, the use of a diachronic data set of comparative speeches from the 
same context illustrated how discourse on change becomes contextualized and 
embedded within pre-existing public and private narratives. Firstly, the initial survey 
conducted to sample the speeches showed that certain political events which 
internationally have been considered crucial for the region, are seen as less so within 
the eyes of the public. For example, the 1989 speech in Gazimestan by Slobodan 
Milošević, seen as the match that lit the fuse in the Yugoslav conflict, was not 
considered one of the most important events in Serbia’s recent history by the 
individuals surveyed. While the insignificance of this event might come from an 
attempt to forget, or supress it, due to its negative implications for Serbia, it 
nevertheless tells us that it is crucial, when conducting research on political speeches, 
to consider not only which speeches have had a global impact, but more importantly, 
which speeches are relevant in the minds of ingroup members. In addition, the 
limitations on locating speeches also brought to the fore the troubles that researchers 
may experience when trying to explore official, or institutionalized discourses on the 
recent past in post-conflict settings, as these records might have been lost, destroyed or 
purposefully distorted. Nevertheless, the findings from the study contribute evidence 
for the use of a discourse-historical approach towards critical discourse analysis, where 
context is given a central role in shaping what is said, and why. Namely, the findings 
illustrated that Kosovo, as a the root of the Serbian nation, has been continuously 
drawn on by all sides of political debates to purport their agenda, showing the 
symbolic power behind the historical narrative rooted in the geopolitics of Kosovo.  
Chapter 7 further showed how a critical discourse analysis can provide an 
important methodological tool for analysing how individuals construct self and other, 
social categories and continuity through dialogue. The use of a discursive analysis of 
focus group data, unlike a thematic analysis in the previous chapters, gives an insight 
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into the functional role of meaning-making in regards to history, and the ways in 
which communication is a form of practice where individuals, as part of the same 
social group, negotiate who they are, who they used to be, and what that means for the 
political choices the group should make in the present and future.  
 
The relevance of mixed-methods research 
Chapter 6 focused on contributing to the limited output of mixed-methods papers in 
social psychology, showing how qualitative data can be powerful in informing 
quantitative studies in crucial ways. Firstly, the qualitative findings aided in the 
development of contextualized and situated survey questions. The survey design for 
the quantitative component would not have been as appropriate or specific had it not 
been informed by the qualitative data collected prior to it.  For example, an important 
contribution of the survey design was the use of an item to measure meta-
representations, which has mainly been discussed in context of qualitative research 
(Hopkins, 2011; Howarth, 2002). While there are tools for exploring meta-stereotypes 
and meta-perceptions (i.e. Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2015), the former tends to 
assume these will always be negative, while the latter has to some degree exhibited 
more neutrality in valence, but has also been inclined towards utilizing negative 
statements as part of measuring meta-perceptions. In contrast, within Chapter 6 we did 
not start from the assumption that meta-representations would be inherently negative, 
but rather from the assumption that they would be consequential for the process of 
identification. Secondly, the qualitative study also informed the analytic strategies 
taken towards the exploratory data of the survey, by highlighting key threads linking 
the relationship between power, identity and belonging in significant ways. While the 
survey data was correlational, and so no causal claims made, it nevertheless was able 
to provide an added dimension of support for some of the theoretical arguments of the 
thesis. The combination of qualitative and quantitative data to address different 
dimensions of the same phenomenon lended strength to the thesis and the specific 
findings in Chapter 6.  
In addition to the methodological contribution of this chapter, it also offered 
important empirical insights into the process of understanding why Serbs might be 
resistant towards EU integration, directly measuring what Serbs think others think, in a 
context where the literature on Serbian identity has constantly emphasized the presence 
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of an ‘Other’ (i.e., ‘the Western Gaze’, Greenberg, 2010; Subotic, 2011; Todorova, 
1997).  
 
Theoretical contributions 
Beyond the empirical and methodological contributions of this PhD, there are a 
number of theoretical contributions that can be taken from the thesis to inform theory 
on social identity, ingroup continuity and subgroup/superordinate group dynamics.  
 
A temporal context for the study of social identities 
Firstly, an important theoretical contribution of this PhD is the emphasis on 
temporality in allowing us to both study and theorize identities as processes. The 
importance of time has featured in previous social psychological work (Arrow, Poole, 
Henry, & Moreland, 2004; Gleibs, Mummendey & Noack, 2008; Levine, 2003) and 
this thesis build on this by re-affirming the importance of a temporal context in 
understanding social identity processes. That is, while previous research and theorizing 
has brought temporality in to explore change over time, the present work brings in 
temporality as an argumentative dimension through which claims to historical 
continuity are made. The use of iterative focus groups (Chapter 4), diachronic speech 
data (Chapter 5), an explicit distinction between current and future power dynamics 
(Chapter 6) and the analysis of the use of temporal arguments in discussions of 
historical continuity and political change (Chapter 7) contributes to the literature on 
perceived collective continuity, by providing insights on how social identity processes 
become crucial in shaping how change is understood and whether it is accepted or 
rejected.  
In Chapter 4, temporality featured heavily in shaping how political elites, as 
entrepreneurs of identity, were able to construct change as compatible with continuity 
and how change, over time, moved from ‘being’ a possible alternative for the future, to 
‘becoming’ the dominant route to progress. The chapter contributes to our 
understanding of some of the barriers that entrepreneurs of identity might face when 
proposing political change, by becoming constrained by pre-existing and legitimized 
identity discourses that have developed over time. Namely, the example of Kosovo 
highlights the challenges pro-EU politicians faced when attempting to decouple the 
question of Kosovo’s independence from the question of EU accession, a task which, 
as seen in Chapters 4 and 6 (focus group discourses) has had limited success.  
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Chapter 5 and 7 also emphasized the idea of temporality in relation to identity 
(Condor, 2006) by considering how there might be several dimensions of the same 
identity managed within one particular speech or discussion, and how managing 
continuity becomes possible by focusing on core elements of continuity while 
attributing change to peripheral, less ‘essential’ aspects of a social category. A 
temporal dimension to the discursive management of identity allows us to track the 
movement of an identity project from ‘being’ a possible version to ‘becoming’ the 
present, taken-for-granted construction of who we are. In turn, applying a temporal 
dimension in this way, both theoretically and methodologically, provided an 
opportunity for truly analysing identities as processes.  
Lastly, in Chapter 6, while the emphasis was on the role of power in self-other 
processes (as discussed below), the inclusion of a temporal dimension to power 
showed the nuanced ways in which it relates to identification and political attitudes. By 
distinguishing between perceptions of power in the present and perceptions of power 
in the future, as part of the EU, the chapter shows how there seem to be different 
dimensions out power playing out in a temporal context. Namely, perceptions of 
current power-dynamics influenced process of identification with a superordinate 
group while perceptions of future power-dynamics more closely related to attitudes 
towards political integration itself. As such, an important contribution of a temporal 
perspective on social identities is that it shows how other, core related phenomena, can 
have different consequences for intra-group processes when different temporalities are 
made salient.  
 
The role of power in self-other processes  
The role of power in shaping processes of identification, superordinate belonging 
and how history is remembered permeated all empirical chapters of this thesis and 
featured either implicitly or explicitly within the analysis of the data. Most evident is 
the role of power in Chapter 6. A key contribution of this chapter focused on 
illustrating the complex dynamics that permeate superordinate membership by 
showing that there are two processes that come into play; one is the process of the 
subgroup relating towards the superordinate group, and the other is focused on the 
dynamics between subgroups within a superordinate group. The findings in Chapter 6 
highlight that the construction of the meaning of a superordinate group is not devoid of 
the subgroups that compose it (similar to the argument of both CIIM and IPM) but also 
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that this meaning-making process is inherently bound up with questions of intergroup 
power-dynamics. Perceptions of power, both current and future, can be instrumental in 
shaping how low-power groups construct a sense of belonging within a larger, 
common ingroup and the extent to which they perceive that others recognize this 
belonging as legitimate. These findings extend beyond the Serbia-EU context and can 
be considered useful in understanding other examples of subgroup-superordinate group 
dynamics. Namely, theories such as the Common Ingroup Identity Model and Ingroup 
Projection Model could benefit from considering how power relations inform both the 
meaning given to a superordinate category, and the process of identification with it.   
In addition to Chapter 6, Chapters 4, 5 and 7 show how power permeates intra-
group discourses on identity, history and change through the presence of meta-
representations. The concept of meta-representations, or what we think other people 
think was part of most focus group discussions but also political speeches. Examples 
of politicians and citizens engaging in imagined dialogue with relevant others shows 
their awareness of the role of more powerful others in influencing how they remember 
the past, how they construct their identities and how political change is defined. These 
findings in turn emphasize the importance of situating identity processes in relation to 
self-other dyamics, as is discussed below.  
 
Insecure nationalism: the complexities of historical continuity for national identity  
The previous two subsections address contributions to the literature on social identities 
and intergroup dynamics by emphasizing how these processes play out across time and 
in context of asymmetric power dynamics. In turn, these contributions come together 
to provide insights into the most important contribution of this thesis, namely to the 
literature and conceptualization between historical continuity and national identity. A 
key finding from the thesis is that the negotiation of both continuity and identity occur 
in a context of self-other, where questions of power are central. Yet this finding also 
places limitations on the extent to which historical continuity becomes feasible, and 
desirable, for the negotiation of a positive national identity when the role of relevant 
others is given explicit acknowledgement in this process.  
Chapter 7 in particular provides support for the need to extend the work of 
historical continuity by considering the ways in which the past is remembered in 
relation to, rather than isolation from, relevant others. Historical continuity, its valence 
and therefore role for national identity becomes shaped by what is remembered and 
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how, as well as how we perceive others to remember it. More specifically, historical 
continuity, particularly in times of change, can become strategically constructed 
through temporal references, a dimension of analysis, which is underexplored in both 
social identity and social representations research. This emphasis on placing historical 
continuity in a context of self and other, where meta-representations become crucial in 
shaping the extent to which historical continuity is seen as potentially stigmatizing, 
highlights the important role of relevant others (particularly more powerful others) in 
recognizing identity claims or potentially undermining them, and thus becoming 
stigmatizing.   
The question of how collective continuity is managed in times of socio-political 
change could only be answered by situating a seemingly intra-national political process 
of change within the context of the interface between the nation and other nations. This 
context, in turn, was 1) conceptualized through a self-other framework, where national 
identity negotiation was seen as inherently bound up with the conceptualization and 
management of an ‘Other’ (or at times, ‘Others’) and 2) situated temporally, by 
considering how the past and future came to bear on the processes of identification and 
attitudes towards politics in the present by providing a sense of attachment to, or 
alienation from a particular social group. These contributions were discussed more 
specifically in Chapter 7, which emphasized how insecurities in the content of social 
categories, and an inability to agree on what it means to be ‘us’,  has implications for 
joining a larger, common ingroup. In other words, if ‘we’ are unable to define what 
makes us distinct and unique, then how will we be able to keep that alive and 
sustainable once part of a larger us, which can permeate the boundaries of our national 
ingroup, and allows us not only to physically leave the group, but potentially to 
psychologically exit it.  Several key themes of this PhD thus seem to support the 
notion of a growing sense of what might be called ‘insecure nationalism’ in Serbia.  
 Firstly, as EU integration entails a removal of the boundaries between nations, 
it also makes them less taken-for-granted, and, therefore, problematized as a part of 
answering the question ‘who are we?’. In Serbia in particular, the inability to agree on 
whether Serbia integrates with or without Kosovo becomes one dimension through 
which a sense of insecurity around the national category manifests itself.  
Secondly, the conditionality placed on the country as part of the integration 
process emphasizes the necessary changes required to join, but also inadvertently 
communicates a sense of inferiority and lagging behind on the part of Serbia, a meta-
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perspective which permeated much of the discussions of EU membership and 
identification. This sense of stigma became at the root a debate about agency and 
dependence, where EU integration and the enforced changes that came with it removed 
a sense of agency from Serbia in ‘fixing itself’ and instead being ‘forced to do the right 
thing’. This, coupled with a perception of change as not only shaping our institutions 
and the civic domain (the dominant way it has been presented by political supporters 
of EU integration), but as affecting the mentality and everyday expressions of banal 
nationalism of Serbs (Billig, 1995), caused feelings of threat and resistance to the EU.  
Lastly, and most crucially, awareness of political changes implemented for the 
betterment of Serbia and its European future led to debates about whether these 
changes were actually necessary, and if so, whether there was something inherently 
wrong with Serbs. Frequent expressions of critical nationalism, of negative attitudes 
towards ‘other’ Serbs and the country’s institutions, and of essentializing the Serbian 
mentality as inherently different from its neighbours in Europe, culminated in 
conclusions that it would perhaps be better if Serbia joined the EU and ceased to exist. 
This, it seems, was at the core of the cause of a sense of nationalism combined with 
psychological insecurity. As a theoretical contribution, the concept of ‘insecure 
nationalism’ can be defined as a consequence of a growing blurring of the national 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ brought on by global changes coupled with a 
growing intra-national divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In other words, while the world 
is becoming increasingly integrated, nations can become increasingly internally 
divided, due to polarising population stance toward recent socio-political history (in 
the case of Serbia), historical colonial legacy (in the case of the UK), or other 
representations of national uniqueness. At the core of this idea of insecure nationalism 
then, is a rupture to a sense of perceived collective continuity: as much a rupture 
between the past and the present, as a rupture between citizens. As chapter 7 has 
illustrated, the comparison between the past (Serbia as geographically larger and 
powerful as part of Yugoslavia) and the present (Serbia as powerless and no longer 
able to balance political allegiances) has implications for identity; an identity built on 
inbetweenness was possible to the extent that Serbia was powerful. As it is no longer 
in a position of power today, both the image of the nation, and its identity, has begun 
to dismantle.  
 
Societal Relevance 
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Taking the specific perspective of Serbia in investigating the social psychology of 
supranational integration, from the specific perspective of Serbia necessarily places 
limits on the generalisability of the empirical findings and the basis for claims about 
universal psychological processes, a significant focus within social psychology. 
However, as Reicher (2004, p. 926) argues; 
[a] stress on contextual variability and an opposition to the idea of behavioural 
universals is in no way opposed to the notion of a general human nature. However, 
it is based on a very different conception of that nature and of how its generality 
reflects itself (and hence is to be found) in our behaviour.  
Thus, the relevance of these findings to contexts beyond Serbia comes not from 
predicting that the processes of identification, integration and intergroup relations will 
be expressed in other contexts. Instead, it is most fruitful to locate these findings as 
unique expressions of broader trends of national political psychology within global 
contexts. It is in this vein that I will draw links between the findings of this thesis and 
broader social and political trends we see beyond this particular region.  
 To begin with, the current thesis has illustrated the a social and political 
psychology of supranational integration becomes crucial as it allows us to dig deeper 
into the more societal and cultural dynamics that shape how political change is 
understood in relation to nation’s identity. It further illustrates that social psychological 
process at a national level (i.e., at the level of the ingroup) become shaped by, and 
negotiated within a context of, relevant others. Feeling European, being able to be 
Serbian in Europe, whether historical continuity to the Serbian past becomes desirable 
and whether EU integration is seen as beneficial, all these processes unfold through 
self-other relations. In other words, research on historical continuity and national 
identity, needs to account for the importance of relevant others and the perceived 
meanings they give to the ingroup and its history.  
More concretely, the changing face of nationalism in internationally connected 
worlds needs to be addressed, rather than ignored or dismissed as archaic expressions 
of prejudice. Within Serbia, the attempts of politicians to alleviate fears of ‘cultural’ 
change by distinguishing between a cultural Serbia and a civically changing Serbia has 
not resonated with its citizens, and has instead caused fears and insecurities about the 
extent to which these changes will permeate everyday life. This has led to a growing 
disconnect between the public and the political, and a situation which either will lead 
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to the growing political apathy or a context ripe for a more populist leadership. 
Similarly, across Europe, the growing support for populist parties and right-wing 
parties is likely linked to the fact that these groups address the growing intersections of 
the national and the international, albeit often in a radically biased way. When futures 
are seen as uncertain, and individuals feel insecure about their social groups (vis-à-vis 
others) in the present, the past becomes an increasingly powerful and uncompromising 
source of stability.  
Lastly, albeit slightly targeting a different audience, the understanding of the 
dynamics between identifying and being identified in contexts of dual identities and 
subgroup – superordinate group dynamics, can have important practical implications 
for programs intended to integrate not only nations into supranational unions, but 
individuals moving from one country to another. While less situated within the 
acculturation literature, this thesis does inform intergroup relations within this context 
by emphasizing how self-other dynamics shape intra-group processes, and how 
attachment and belonging is managed dialogically. Among policymakers, an 
awareness of how integration into a new social group, whether a new host country or a 
new supranational group, entails the dialogical management of the identities of both 
those who join, and of those who are already ‘there’, will be useful in considering how 
to devise integration strategies that meet the needs of both minority and majority 
groups.  
 
Limitations and future research   
The research presented in this thesis has a number of limitations which can in turn be 
considered as providing promising avenues of future research. As each empirical 
chapter addressed the specific limitations of that method or research design, I will 
focus here on more general limitations and future directions of research.  
The first limitation lies in the use of national identity and history as defining 
lenses through which individuals make sense of EU integration. Although the 
qualitative studies attempted to address the complexity of representations associated 
with EU integration in Serbia, it is likely that the framing of the project itself limited 
the extent to which other possible representations of the EU were presented. However, 
it becomes important here to take into consideration the specfic historical context of 
Serbian national identity in accounting for these decisions. Namely, during the fall of 
Yugoslavia, national borders between the various nations composing Yugoslavia were 
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draw along ethnic lines; citizens of Serbia were ethnic Serbs of an Orthodox faith. 
Thus, what is quite distinct for Serbia, and the region at large, is the intimately close 
links between national, ethnic and religious identity. As such, in many focus group 
discussions, being Serbian entailed being an ethnic, Orthodox Serb and thus 
constructing a very exclusive national category. Awareness of this in turn informed the 
decision to focus on national identities as it encompasses several other crucial 
dimensions of identification.  
Nevertheless, other dimensions might become important, such as regional 
identities or generational difference.  The thesis did try to unpack some of the potential 
differences across northern and southern Serbia in Chapter 4, however the lack of 
specific focus on regional differences in discourses limited the extent to which 
meaningful comparisons could be drawn. One avenue for future work within the study 
of historical continuity in times of socio-political change is to consider the significance 
of region and age in shaping attitudes towards integration. For example, within the 
focus groups participants did discuss their perception of generational differences in 
both how a Serbian identity was seen, and also whether EU integration was considered 
beneficial, with older generations being more sceptical than younger ones towards the 
change. This in turn supports existing literature (Fligstein, 2010).  
A second limitation, but also a very fruitful potential avenue for future research 
on collective continuity, identity and change, is the role of emotions. The exploration 
of how emotions permeate political thinking and decision-making has been linked to 
identities (Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009) and this link should be explored not 
only in relation to politics but also towards historical continuity. Within this thesis, 
feelings of shame from stigmatization, of fear and of uncertainty were present in the 
qualitative data, but emotion was not explicitly considered as a significant dimension 
through which issues of identity and politics were understood. Chapter 7 came closest 
to focusing on emotions by considering how valence shaped discussions around 
historical continuity or discontinuity.  
Another limitation lies in taking a single national context as the focus of this 
study. Although focusing on a single national context was a strength in providing an 
in-depth understanding of the complex ways in which Serbian individuals (and 
politicians) make sense of supranational integration, it does limit the extent to which 
these findings can be generalized across national contexts. As mentioned previously, it 
is likely that issues of power relations, identity continuity and intergroup histories, 
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though all important to consider, manifest themselves differently in regards to the 
domestic and international politics of other nations. Nevertheless, while the meaning 
given to these various concepts might differ, the process of growing intra-national 
divides and their expressions in reaction to larger, global political processes, can be 
seen in countries such as the UK, the USA, and also the Netherlands, Germany and 
Greece. Therefore, it is likely that, while the specific themes expressed in this thesis 
are unique to the Serbian context, the issue of managing a sense of perceived collective 
continuity and of positioning this in a globalizing world will have relevance for 
understanding intergroup and intra-group dynamics within other countries, a 
possibility worth exploring in future research.  
 
Conclusions 
The aim of the present thesis has been to answer the question of how continuity is 
managed in times of socio-political change and what the implications are for identity. 
It has done so by examining the role of history, power and national identity in the 
process of supranational integration, focusing on the context of Serbia and its 
prospective membership of the European Union. The first part of the thesis (Chapters 
1-3) provided the empirical, theoretical and methodological contexts of the thesis and 
introduced the importance of a theoretical understanding of national identity as a social 
category negotiated in a context of self and other, given meaning through historical 
representations and narratives of continuity between the past, present and future. The 
second part of the thesis (Chapters 4-7) presented the empirical studies intended to 
address the research question in specific ways by analysing both lay and political 
discourses around continuity and change, as well as testing some of these relationships 
on a larger sample of the Serbian population. The findings from this middle section of 
the thesis emphasized 1) how history becomes an important resource in shaping a 
national identity and in turn how political change is understood in relation to this 
history, 2) how national identity features prominently in discussions of the present and 
future of the nation and can constrain which strategic constructions of change become 
legitimate and valid, and finally, 3) how power plays a crucial role in shaping a sense 
of belonging to, and willingness to join, a supranational union. The third, and last, part 
of the thesis (Chapter 8) discussed the empirical, theoretical and societal contributions 
of these findings and how to address relevant limitations in future research.   
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In conclusion, the social psychology approach towards supranational integration 
offered in this thesis illustrated when, why and how international integration (or 
change) is perceived to mean becoming less like ‘us’. It did so by exploring and 
analysing how the management of the tensions between continuity and change can 
have implications for identities by bringing into question their meanings and thereby 
their stability and cohesiveness. In contexts of national identities, this can in turn lead 
to a sense of insecure nationalism, where intra-national divides emerge based on 
questions of who we are, brought about by larger, global changes taking place around 
us. Taken together, the thesis illustrated the usefulness and necessity of considering the 
psychosocial dynamics related to collective continuity, intergroup relations and social 
identity processes in explaining international processes. Yet it also highlights the limits 
of this literature in its application in contexts where historical continuity can be seen as 
stigmatizing to national identities not because of how the ingroup remembers the past, 
but because of how this process of constructing the past becomes negotiated by both 
self and other. Thus, perceptions of stigmatization, of a lack of recognition of a 
positive history and thus positive national identity, become attributed to more powerful 
others who are also seen as the gatekeepers of the superordinate category within which 
the group is trying to negotiate a place and space.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet for Focus Groups 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before deciding to participate it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information. Feel free to discuss issues with 
anyone, and if there is anything which is not clear or any questions you have, feel free 
to ask. Take your time reading, and don’t feel rushed.  
 
What is this research about? The research that you are asked to be a part of is on the 
topic of EU integration in Serbia. You will be asked to answer a series of questions 
related to EU integration, Serbian politics and the influence of political change on 
people in Serbia.   
 
Who is doing this research? 
The research is being conducted by me, Sandra Obradovic, as part of my PhD 
dissertation in Social Psychology, under the supervision of Dr. Caroline Howarth at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)  
 
To get in touch with either of us, I have provided our email addresses below:  
Researcher: Sandra Obradović – S.Obradovic@lse.ac.uk  
Supervisor: Caroline Howarth – C.S.Howarth@lse.ac.uk    
 
Why have you asked me to participate?  
I have asked you to participate in this study as you live in one of the cities chosen for 
inclusion in this study.   
 
What will participation involve?  
Participation in this research will be in the form of focus groups. Together with another 
5-7 people, you will discuss certain topics and questions that will be provided by me. 
All I ask you to do is state your honest opinion about these topics and engage in 
discussion with the other participants. This research is about understanding your 
opinions on certain topics and so I ask you to be as honest and truthful about it as 
possible.  
 
How long will participation take?  
The focus groups will run between 1 – 1.5 hours in order to cover all the topics.  
What about confidentiality?  
The group discussions will be audio-recorded, however you will remain completely confidential 
from the moment the session is over. Your signature will only be used as part of the informed 
consent and once the session is over, each participant will be assigned an anonymous number 
and will not be mentioned by their real name in any subsequent publications of the data.  
If you are willing to participate, then please sign a Consent Form. You can keep this 
information sheet for your records. 
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Consent Form 
Researcher: Sandra Obradović, PhD Candidate in Social Psychology, LSE.  
Email: S.Obradovic@lse.ac.uk  
Supervisor: Dr. Caroline Howarth, Assistant Professor in Social Psychology, LSE. 
Email: C.S.Howarth@lse.ac.uk  
 
    To be completed by the Research Participant  
Please answer each of the following questions: 
Do you feel you have been given sufficient information about the  
research to enable you to decide whether or not to participate    Yes  No 
in the research?  
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions about the research?   Yes  No  
Do you understand that your participation is voluntary, and that  
you are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason   Yes  No 
and without penalty? 
 
Are you willing to take part in the research?      Yes  No  
Are you aware that the interview/focus groups will be audio recorded?   Yes  No  
Will you allow the research team to use anonymized quotes in    Yes  No 
presentations and publications?  
Will you allow the anonymized data to be archived, to enable secondary 
analysis and training future researchers?      Yes  No  
 
Participant's Name:______________________________ 
 
Participant's Signature:___________________________ Date:________________ 
 
If you would like a copy of the research report, please provide your email or postal 
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Appendix 2: Topic Guide for Study I 
FG Round 1:  
General Questions to Start Discussion 
1. There have been many discussions about Serbia joining the EU. What have been some 
of the benefits and some of the downsides discussed?  
2. Identity / Compatibility 
3. What is your opinion about Serbia joining the EU? Are you for or against it?  
4. Meta-perspective 
5. Do you think Serbia is welcomed in the EU, from the perspective of other member 
countries? 
6. Politics 
7. Serbia has (or has had) a close relationship with Russia, which has at times conflicted 
with its pro-EU politics. Do you think that Serbia should be more political oriented 
towards Russia or the EU? Or both, if possible.  
8. In many media reports, EU membership and the question of the status of Kosovo have 
been placed in opposition. Do you think accepting Kosovo’s independence is worth it if 
it would guarantee Serbia membership into the EU? 
9. Future 
10. When the year 2020 comes, the year by which politicians predict Serbia will have 
finally become a member, what do you realistically think the situation will look like?  
11. Considering the past 25 years and everything that has occurred in Serbia and the region, 
do you think that the people, as a nation, has changed in comparison with the past?  
 
FG Round 2:  
General Question to Start Discussion 
1. When we last met in April I asked you if you thought Serbia joining the EU was a good 
idea, has your opinions changed at all since then?  
2. Identity / Compatibility 
3. Do you consider Serbian culture as compatible with European culture?  
4.  Do you think Serbia’s way of life is representative of a European way of life? How are 
they similar, and how are they different?  
5. Meta-perspective 
6. Do you think that the majority of Serbia is pro- or against EU integration? 
7. Politics 
8. Since the EU integration process came on the Serbian agenda, there have been various 
government in Serbia in support or against the process. Who are some of the most 
important politicians in this process? 
9. do you feel like you can trust politicians in Serbia? 
10. Future 
11. If Serbia becomes a part of the EU in the future, do you think anything will change [in 
Serbia] and if so, what exactly? 
12. Do you think people in Serbia have a voice in shaping Serbia’s future and politics?  
 
FG Round 3:  
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General Question to Start Discussion 
1. Within our last two FGs there’s been a lot of talk about the politics around Kosovo. What is 
the historical significance of Kosovo? 
2. What are some media sources (whether it is print or broadcast tv) which you use and 
consider to be unbiased in their news-reporting? 
3. Politics 
4. What role do you think the media has is in shaping the political attitudes and opinions of 
people in Serbia?  
5. This year there is an election on the 24th April, do you plan to vote and if so, why?  
6. Meta-perspective 
7. Prompts 1 and 2: Texts from FGs in South (Niš and Vranje) introduced in North FGs (Novi 
Sad and Belgrade) and vice-versa to stimulate discussion (specifically, the prompts selected 
included both commonalities and differences to the discourses of the FG itself, and was 
intended to function as a way of engaging with the perspective of an ‘Other’)  
8. Future 
9. If you had the possibility to imagine the future of Serbia, how would this Serbia look?  
 
Text Prompt 1, from Niš  
In many media reports, entry into the EU and the Kosovo issue are set against each other, do 
you think that the recognition of Kosovo's independence would be totally worth if it would 
guarantee entry into the EU? 
 
7: I think generally people would not accept it because, 
9: out of spite! 
7: literally, out of spite, and because some so-called pride. We have come to terms with the fact 
[that Kosovo is lost] but we wouldn’t necessarily go public and say “we accept” 
6: my friend, are you aware that 80% of the population don’t know the words to the national 
anthem? Are you aware that 90% of people don’t know the order of the colors on the flag? 
What territory are we even talking about?  
4:  
6: where nothing is certain anymore, where you lived in four countries without even crossing 
the street. That’s all consciously and purposefully done so that you would lose your identity, 
and lose sense of everything around you. And that it’s whatever to you whether tomorrow this 
place is called Bangladesh or Serbia.  
4: that’s right 
6: or whatever. 
4: we’d complain for a while but that doesn’t matter.  
Text Prompt 2, from Vranje 
Do you think that the majority of Serbia is pro- or against EU integration? 
6: I think that our younger population is more pro-EU, meaning, the more mature population, 
those who have already formed their lives, those who have families, I don’t think they’re that 
pro-EU, but the younger population is because they hope that they’ll make more money there 
and so for that reason [they’re pro-EU]. So the point is, they’re pro-EU because they think it’ll 
be easier –  
4: but those kids are enticed, they don’t even know what –  
207 
 
6: yes, to get a job there, to get a higher paycheck. And I think that’s the basic reason why 
younger people are more pro-EU. 
4: but they’re only fooling themselves, because they haven’t even seen how it is in Vladicin Han 
(city beyond Vranje) let alone how it is in the EU. But they’ve heard that there’s money there, 
that life is good.  
6: but that means, again, that’s that part of the population that hasn’t yet, isn’t experienced, in 
all areas of life. It’s those who don’t have a mature way of thinking about life or standards of 
living or anything really.  
Text Prompt 3, from Novi Sad 
In many media reports, entry into the EU and the Kosovo issue are set against each other, do 
you think that the recognition of Kosovo's independence would be totally worth if it would 
guarantee entry into the EU? 
6: It’s been a long time since Kosovo –  
3: Kosovo is lost  
6: [was lost] 
4: It was lost a long time ago 
R: Yes, but officially? 
2: Officially that will never happen 
5: If we recognize it or don’t recognize it, at the end of the day, no one will mind anymore, it’ll 
be like “oh well we had to do that too, we recognized it” 
R: Do you think that Kosovo being a part of Serbia is no longer important for people then? 
4: It’s not 
6: No it isn’t important because people have realized that it was lost a long time ago. More than 
10-15 years ago.  
Text Prompt 4; from Belgrade 
If Serbia becomes a part of the EU in the future, do you think anything will change [in Serbia] 
and if so, what exactly? 
4: Nothing will change. Maybe some, the system will improve a little, some laws might actually 
be respected. Maybe … I don’t know, but maybe … we’ve gotten so used to the system 
functioning to screw you over, so I don’t know, it will be extremely hard… 
1: maybe some institutional apparatus will improve, reducing the number of forms for 
everything, so that you can, I don’t know, get your ID card within 5 minutes or something like 
that … you know, those kind of smaller things, but again, you know, it’s all about the 
mentality… 
2: But surely those are thing we can do ourselves? 
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1: It seems that we can’t … 
4: You know why I think it’ll be a problem for people to become part of that system, of proper 
laws, because when Serbs go anywhere, then they people there go “ooooh, your’re such 
animals look at how you’re acting”, and maybe that’s right in relation to some of their criteria 
coming from an orderly Western country  
1: I swear to God there are many of them who are just as bad when they go –  
4: no, no, no, im not saying – but when a Serb goes there he immediately tries to think of a way 
to screw the system …. How am I supposed to judge him when he’s gotten used to, since birth, 
since his first encounters with the state and system, which the system exists not as it should, to 
help him, or solve his problems, but to take his money and create problems or screw him over?  
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Appendix 3: Thematic Codebook for Study I 
 
The Myth of Origin 
Narrating the battle of Kosovo 
Institutional 
representations 
of 1389 
Coded when participants 
discussed how schools described 
the events of 1389 and narrated 
the battle.  
“2: Generally, in school you learn most about 
that part of history. 
1: Yeah, the Kosovo battle. 
2: And what happened after.” 
(Niš, 3) 
Kosovo battle 
1389 as a 
myth 
Coded when participants referred 
to the Kosovo battle explicitly as 
a myth rather than a series of 
historical events 
“2: and after this many centuries, it [Kosovo] 
still belongs to you. 
1: yeah that’s what’s been developed as part 
of the Kosovo myth.” 
(Belgrade 2) 
Kosovo battle 
as beginning 
of historical 
victimhood 
Kosovo battle narrated as the last 
time Serbia was a kingdom, was 
powerful, after which decline 
began as it fell under Turkish 
slavery for several decades 
“2: But there’s a reason for that. We were 
under Turkish rule for so long, that whenever 
you worked, you worked for someone. We’ve 
used to cutting corners because we’ve always 
had to give [what was ours] to someone who 
won us and then we’ve learned that over 
centuries and you can still feel it to this day.” 
(Novi Sad, 3) 
The Political Reality of Kosovo 
Kosovo as a 
burden on 
Serbia 
Coded for when participants 
discussed Kosovo as a burden on 
Serbia, whether financially or 
internationally.  
“4: We’ve had it up to here with Kosovo. 
2: It’s because the biggest embezzlements 
took place on Kosovo, and it’s – 
3: like a bottomless pit.” 
(Niš, 2) 
Kosovo is 
objectively 
lost but not 
recognized 
Coded when participants 
contrasted the de-facto and de-
jure status of Kosovo 
recognizing the many markers of 
its independence while resisting 
to officially recognize it as such.  
“1: You know how it is, theoretically that 
sentence ‘Kosovo isn’t Serbian’ no one will 
say it. But everything else goes. So what do 
you then have to gain from not saying it in 
public when you have a border, they have 
officials, I mean, we’ve recognized Kosovo 
we’re just not saying we have.” 
(Belgrade, 3) 
Kosovo 
‘temporarily’ 
lost 
Coded for when participants 
discussed the loss of Kosovo in a 
wider temporal context, by either 
admitting it is lost for now, but 
has a long history of being 
Serbia, or anticipating that it will 
be taken back and become 
Serbian again in the future. 
“2: I don’t think anyone’s ever had a problem 
saying Ksoovo is lost, but it’s what follows 
that that matters.  You can always add 
‘currently’. Which means, there’s always 
some potential, today’s current constellation 
of the world, Europe, so it’s simply realistic 
for now, but I don’t think anyone thinks that 
it’s anything final.” 
(Belgrade, 3) 
Physical 
border as a 
divider 
between 
Serbia and 
Kosovo 
Coded for when participants 
talked about the role of the 
border between Serbia and 
Kosovo, often in a negative and 
definite way as separating the 
one from the other. 
“6: that kind of border doesn’t exist between 
Scotland and England. And then the EU is all 
about removing borders and yet it’s creating 
them, within Europe.” 
(Niš, 1) 
Symbolic Meaning of Kosovo 
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Kosovo as the 
foundation of 
Serbia 
Coded for when participants 
discussed the historical 
foundations of Serbia as rooted 
in the physical territory of 
Kosovo, and the place as a 
heritage of Serbia nation 
building. 
“5: It’s the cradle of Serbia somehow, it’s 
always been Serbian, you fought wars for 
Serbia with the battle of Kosovo and so that’s 
why it matters. History ties you to it, as a 
beginning.” 
(Vranje, 3) 
Kosovo as the 
root of 
national 
identity 
Coded for when participants 
discussed Kosovo in relation to 
national identity, such as its role 
in shaping the mentality of 
Serbs, the collective 
consciousness or values and 
norms.  
“3: It’s the source of modern-day Serbian 
national identity, that’s where it started, it’s a 
key territory which was under Serb rule and 
from where, whether Serbia expanded or 
shrunk, it always moved…”  
(Novi Sad, 2) 
Kosovo’s 
meaning as 
religious 
Coded for when participants 
discussed the religious ties of 
Serbs to Kosovo due to the many 
churches and monasteries build 
and preserved on the physical 
territory.  
“3: We have a lot of monasteries there, the 
sacred Serbian Pec Patriarchy which is, from 
the 13th Century. When the US wasn’t even 
discovered, we had churches down there. 
2: Generally it’s through religion that people 
feel connected to the territory, more than 
anything.” 
(Niš, 2)  
Kosovo as 
place of 
Serbian 
sacrifices  
Coded for when participants 
discussed the many historical 
battles and sacrifices Serbs made 
to keep Kosovo part of Serbia.  
“2: A lot of blood was spilled there, I don’t 
know how many but about a third of the 
population died there, and so, I think that the 
root is so deeply planted that we’re very tied 
to it.” (Vranje, 1) 
Tension: De 
facto vs. de 
jure status of 
Kosovo 
While coded across various other 
codes, this code includes larger 
sections of focus group data 
which address the tensions 
between various codes related to 
the de facto vs. de jure 
recognition of Kosovo and how 
participants argue about it.  
“2: We’ve already recognized Kosovo, on our 
TV Hasim Taci is called the prime minister of 
Kosovo, we have officials who –  
1: and we negotiate with their government  
6: none of that ever matters unless you add 
your signature to the official document, so 
they have to go there, we’ll never recognize 
it.  
1: well that’s like she was saying, de facto or 
de jure really.” (Belgrade, 1)  
People vs. Politicians 
Politicians as immoral  
Politicians are 
criminals 
Coded for when participants 
discussed either directly the idea 
that politicians were thieves, 
gangsters or criminals, or 
indirectly referred to them as 
such through references to 
criminal activity or other 
examples of breaking the law.  
“1: Good governance means a person cannot 
be bought. To be honest, meaning you don’t 
have to be some expert, but you have to be 
honest. [That’s] the principle behind good 
governance, meaning good domestic 
governance. But the host shouldn’t steal from 
his own home. […] If I steal from my own 
home, let’s say a TV, then my wife and kids 
won’t have anything to watch. Meaning, they 
need that TV.  
5: you’ve got that right, with this political 
system now we’ve managed to do nothing, 
we’re even going backwards.”(Vranje, 1) 
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Political 
apathy among 
public 
Coded for when participants 
discussed themselves and other 
citizens as politically apathetic 
and disconnected from anything 
political. 
“2: I’m slightly pro-EU because I think the 
benefits outweigh the costs. 
1: no one asks us what we think, it doesn’t 
matter if we join no one asks us anything.  
2: well yeah, now no one asks us and we 
don’t care.” (Niš, 2)  
Political active 
citizens are 
corrupt 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how citizens who got 
politically involved ended up 
becoming corrupt through 
association with political parties 
and the pressures these place on 
citizens. 
“1: You know who cares about politics? 
Those people who can benefit from it. Who’ll 
get a job, or cut the line, those are the people 
that care about politics. Those of us who care 
about politics, they’re the biggest thieves.” 
(Novi Sad, 3)  
Politicians 
bribe voters 
Coded for when participants 
explicitly spoke of examples of 
politicians paying for votes 
either directly with money or by 
offering other resources/services. 
“3: I talk about all these things by way of 
example. I have a friend, he was, when Dinkic 
was giving 1000 Euros, he said, I’m going to 
vote for Dinkic, I get 1000 euros, my 
grandmother does, an my mom. He didn’t get 
anything, he got some 5,6,7000 dinars 
[equivalent to 5-60 Euros]. After that it was 
Toma Nikolic. Now it’s Vucic, and now I 
don’t even know any longer who it is.” 
(Niš, 2) 
Serbian 
politicians as 
puppets for 
foreign powers  
Coded for when participants 
discussed how foreign influences 
and powers were controlling 
Serbian politicians, making them 
make decisions that didn’t 
benefit the people but bigger 
international companies or other 
countries.  
“6: And then at one moment, Vucic will be let 
go as well, and someone else will be brought 
to power, when he’s finished the job that he 
has to finish for them. And we’re going to 
think ‘oh finally Vucic is gone’ and someone 
else will come and it’ll be the same.” 
(Belgrade, 1)  
People as bearers of ‘real’ Serbian values 
Serbian people 
‘collectivistic’ 
Coded for when participants 
discussed Serbian people as 
collectivistic, as taking care of 
each other and sticking together 
through thick or thin. 
“2: Nowhere else [in Europe] do you have 
that possibility that, as you said earlier, live a 
social life. And socialization is a disaster over 
there. While here you can go and talk to your 
neighbours, go out with friends for a coffee, a 
drink, whatever, regardless of how much 
money you have or don’t have, you can 
always go out and enjoy yourself.” (Vranje, 2) 
Meeting Serbs 
reduces 
stereotypes 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how encounters with 
Serbs for non-Serbs usually 
disconfirmed their negative 
stereotypes about Serbia, often 
made in relation to statements 
about how politicians or the 
government is to blame for 
stigmatization of Serbia. 
“7: I think when people come here and see 
what it’s like, that they like and it and find it a 
pretty country. People are hospitable and kind 
and that’s probably what matters the most for 
those who visit.” (Novi Sad, 2) 
The Serbian 
mentality 
Coded for when participants 
explicitly talked about the 
Serbian mentality and what it 
meant, how it differed from that 
“2: Well take for example, sorry to interrupt 
you, but take for example Sweden. At home 
they have three trash cans, one for plastic, one 
for this, one for the rest. 
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of others, or the consequences of 
it for behaviour. 
1: and what’s so bad about that? 
2: hold on, no that’s great. But our mentality 
just isn’t like that!” 
(Vranje, 2) 
 
Ideological 
changes 
threatening 
collectivism 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how changes, both 
political and ideological, were 
threatening Serbian collectivist 
values, often constructing this 
process as top-down enforced. 
“2: We were there for the last of communism, 
that’s now a whole other story but again, it 
was a system. You had a school program, 
which now you don’t, now you watch Big 
Brother instead. I mean, everyone doesn’t 
have to have a university degree, I’m not 
saying that, but everyone used to have 
something that brought them together, at least 
that’s what I think.” (Belgrade, 1)  
Degradation of 
cultural values 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how cultural and 
traditional values, specifically, 
were being degraded and 
replaced by more individualistic 
and materialistic values. 
“3: We just need some time, when things 
become a bit more stable I’m sure the right 
way of thinking will return. 
1: We’re going more towards the US than the 
EU. For your 18th birthday, all of us got, I 
don’t know, golden jewellery as memorable 
gifts. Now everyone in Belgrade is getting 
breast implants. Girls are literally getting 
credit cards to get their whole bodies 
lasered.”(Niš, 2) 
Anti-
establishment 
mentality 
Coded for when participants 
discussed their political attitudes 
and do so through an ‘anti-
framework’, defining who they 
were against (rather than for), 
which was often the current 
government or the power-
structure and system in general.  
“1: I might go and vote for whoever really, 
someone totally different 
6: I’ll vote for the minority party  
1: that’s what I wanted to say. Purely so my 
vote doesn’t end up in the wrong hands.” 
(Novi Sad, 3)  
Institutional Censorship 
Media 
manipulating 
public opinion 
Coded for when participants 
discussed the role of the media in 
shaping public perceptions of 
current events and also their 
opinions on them, often in a very 
negative way. 
“4: People buy it all, especially the most 
uneducated people.  
1: that’s true, that’s what I was going to say. 
4: they just eat it all up.” (Novi Sad, 3) 
National 
media 
censured by 
political 
parties 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how media outlets in 
Serbia were controlled by 
political parties (or individual 
journalists were controlled) and 
so they were forced to censor 
their news reporting 
“4: And those media companies all cater to 
the politicians who are in power 
2: of course 
4: otherwise they wouldn’t survive 
1: I think this is a new level of censorship 
worse than ever before. For f**ks sake they 
even censor agricultural shows! They let him 
go, did you know that? The guy who ran the 
show ‘Good Earth’ on B92, who said they 
imported I don’t know how many thousand 
tons of cows and thereby threatened livestock 
in Serbia. They fired him. (laughter)” 
(Belgrade, 3)  
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Politicians 
‘spin’ reality 
in their favour 
Coded for when politicians are 
discussed in relation to their 
appearance in newspapers, on 
TV or other media outlets and 
how the things they say are 
always favourable to their 
political position (but not 
necessarily true). 
“4: I’m sorry, of course you have freedom of 
speech here. You do, on the news and any 
other TV show. But with that it’s important to 
note that they appropriate every news for their 
needs. You see? They twist it. As Nr 2 was 
saying, we’re starving and he [Vucic] says ‘I 
know that’ 
3: ‘I know better than you how hungry you 
are!’ (Vranje, 3) 
Public stripped of agency 
Citizens 
unable to bring 
about change 
Coded for when participants 
discussed change for the better 
and its possibility in the future as 
‘stories’ or ‘dreams’ that only 
fools believed in and that 
citizens of Serbia had no in-put 
into. 
“3: Okay sure there are some people who still 
believe in ideals, there are enough idiots out 
there who think they can change something 
here.” 
(Novi Sad, 3) 
Serbs as 
disenchanted 
people 
Coded for when participants 
discussed Serbs as generally 
disenchanted, disengaged and 
disappointed with the present-
state of politics, often in a post-
90s comparison framework. 
“3: Don’t you agree that there’s a sense of 
depression about the whole idea of Serbia in 
the EU? 
2: yes 
4: of course. 
3: What did we even know about it when it 
first started happening?” (Novi Sad, 2) 
 
Local rather 
than national 
political focus 
Coded for when participants 
discussed political engagement 
as a strategic choice for local 
change, to either help a friend 
get elected into local office or to 
support the party of a liked local 
politician. 
“5: I voted to support our local mayor, 
because that man is the first one in a long 
time to do anything for this city. 
3: And I went to school with him.” (Vranje, 2)  
Collective 
mobilization 
oppressed 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how collective action 
such as protests, strikes or other 
campaigns in opposition to the 
government were suppressed or 
silenced. 
“5: What are we doing, as a society, to change 
all of this? 
4: nothing 
2: well okay I went to protest the other day, 
against the Belgrade Waterfront project, and 
they had arranged trams to block our view so 
that other people couldn’t see us, us 500 or so 
people. And successively they just pushed us 
away from the street for heaven’s sake.” 
(Belgrade, 1) 
Political 
system to 
blame for 
corrupt 
citizens 
Coded for when participants 
argued and rationalized their 
own or others corrupt behaviour 
as way of adapting to the system, 
rather than a choice. 
“2: Explain to me then, if it’s the people that’s 
the problem, how one of our own lived here 
and then moved to Canada and the completely 
adapted to that system, and is living a good 
life. That tells me that it’s not the people, but 
the system. You’re just a screw in the 
system.” (Novi Sad, 3) 
Politically 
divided people  
Coded for when participants 
discussed their nations politics, 
and their own interpersonal 
discussions of politics, as 
divided between Russia and the 
“3: I honestly have no idea whether the 
majority is for or against EU integration 
1: I think the majority is undecided, because 
people change from today until tomorrow, 
they change their opinion.” (Belgrade, 2) 
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EU or divided whether they want 
to join the EU or not.  
Negative Stigma of Serbs 
Lack of 
critical 
thinking 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how the general 
population, or the average 
citizen, was easy to manipulate 
because they do not think 
critically or question 
information.  
“1: People don’t stop to think, it’s like what 
they hear goes into their head and that’s it. 
There’s no, at least in my opinion, critical 
thinking.[…] people have gotten used to not 
being critical. It’s a habit here.” 
(Belgrade, 3) 
Ingroup 
criticism 
Coded when participants openly 
criticizes not politicians but 
Serbian citizens for their 
behaviours, attitudes, lack of 
education or other characteristics 
which they saw as causing 
Serbian to be either stigmatized 
or lag in progress.  
“3: now, how would our country look if now, 
the law was equal for all? So that it’s not 
only, who are you and what are you, but if 
you get pulled over, and you’re a minister of 
some government department, then you 
should be treated like me. That’s fist. That’s 
basic. But in Serbia that’s very hard.  
Politicians 
portray 
negative 
image of 
Serbia 
internationally 
Coded when participants 
discussed how the image Serbian 
politicians portrayed externally 
was very negative, and how they 
were to blame for any negative 
representations outsiders might 
have of Serbs and Serbia.  
“5: But it comes back to what she was asking, 
what does the EU think of us? When they see 
him [prime minister] with a button missing on 
his shirt, two different socks, help me God, 
doesn’t know English, it’s sad. What should 
they think about us?” (Vranje, 1)   
Politicians 
self-stigmatize 
own people 
Coded when participants 
discussed how negative 
representations of Serbia were 
being perpetuated by politicians 
themselves, criticizing the 
Serbian people for acting in 
certain ways. 
“4: that whole topic earlier, whether Serbs are 
hardworking, Germans are geniuses and all 
that, that story’s been forced upon us by 
Vucic, that’s his story and I don’t hear any 
normal people, I’ve never heard it from them, 
but from him all the time. Those phrases ‘oh, 
well that’s Serbia for you, that’s the Serbian 
mentality.’ The man insults his own people. ” 
(Belgrade, 1)  
Justifying 
corruption if 
beneficial 
Coded when participants talked 
about corruption not being all 
that bad if it led to positive 
outcomes for the people, not just 
for individuals.  
“1: Take Palma. He steals but at least 
Jagodina [his city] is booming. We need 
someone like that.”  
Lack of normalcy 
Communism 
as ‘stable’ past 
Coded when participants talked 
about the communist past as a 
time of stability, whether in 
terms of employment, culture, 
national rule or everyday life.  
“1: Think about old Yugoslavia, to the time of 
Tito. We didn’t need Europe and they didn’t 
need anything of ours, but again we simply 
functioned so much better then, this one big 
state, with Belgrade as the capital.” (Belgrade, 
2)   
Lack of 
institutional 
order 
Coded when participants talked 
about, either directly or 
indirectly, the lack of 
institutional order in Serbia, the 
lack of good regulation and the 
appropriation of good 
“5: I’m absolutely pro-EU, I am. But like he 
said earlier, we’re definitely not ready for it. 
We don’t have any pension schemes, we 
don’t have women’s rights, children’s rights, 
we don’t have any kind of protection […] our 
hospitals are falling apart and we have no 
funds to help them.” (Vranje, 1) 
215 
 
regulations, often giving 
personal anecdotes.  
Lack of 
national 
progress 
Coded when participants talked 
about the present, and 
anticipated future, lack of 
political and social progress in 
Serbia. This often was discussed 
in context of expectations for the 
future of the nation. 
“3: As far as the rest of it, I’m not living any 
better now than I was in 2000, nor 2006 not 
2008, 2012. The last 15 years it’s been the 
same and nothing has gotten better, whatever 
party in power, whether left or right-wing. 
Vucic, Milošević, Seselj, they’re all the same, 
and me as a regular citizen I’ve experienced 
no improvement from it, from their rule. “ 
(Niš, 3)  
Good life 
depends on 
leaving Serbia 
Coded when participants talked 
about leaving Serbia as the way 
to achieve success in life, to gain 
access to more opportunities for 
self-improvement and 
development. 
“5: our educational system is a disaster in 
comparison to Europe. So that’s why so many 
people leave. And standards of living and 
everything in combination.” (Vranje, 2)  
Need for better 
laws 
Coded when participants talked 
about how change in behaviour 
came from better regulations, 
and punishment, and therefore 
Serbians laws needed to become 
harsher, so that people’s 
behaviour would improve. 
“1: They say that over there, there are laws 
that you can’t throw trash on the street, but 
here people do. And when you once fine him 
he might get a bit distressed and change his 
ways.” (Niš, 2)  
Tension: The 
people or the 
system to 
blame for lack 
of progress 
and 
stigmatization 
While coded across various other 
codes, this theme includes larger 
sections of focus group data 
which address the tensions 
between various codes related to 
placing accountability and blame 
for Serbia’s lack of progress and 
its international stigma, either 
with the people, as being 
inherently ‘bad’ or with the 
system and politicians.  
“1: it’s basically the question of the chicken 
and the egg; is it that we don’t have what they 
have [in the West] because we’re like this, 
irresponsible and what not, and not capable of 
working, or is it the opposite?” (Belgrade, 2) 
The Nation and the EU 
Cultural mismatch with EU 
EU as 
bringing 
capitalist 
values 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how the EU was a 
union built on capitalist values, 
which give status and preference 
to money above all other values.  
“6: During communism we had titles that 
mattered, doctors, lawyers, engineers, but 
today you can be shit, a whore, a monkey, a 
thief, as long as you have money? You’re a 
king.  
8: That’s right.” (Niš, 1)  
Serbian social 
life as richer 
than in EU 
Coded for when participants 
discussed Serbian social lives as 
stronger as and richer than those 
of EU countries, emphasizing 
Serbia’s cultural emphasis on 
enjoying life and socializing, in 
contrast to the EU where the 
emphasis is on work.  
“1: All over Europe, in some of those 
countries, they say ‘we don’t have any 
kinds of lives, we work 10 hours a day, go 
home and sleep and that’s that. Good for 
you for being able to socialize, go out, we 
don’t have that’. So that’s better here.” 
(Niš, 2)  
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Hard to make 
Russia ‘the 
bad guy’ 
Coded when participants 
discussed that Serbia cutting 
social and political ties with 
Russia (because of the EU) 
would be difficult, particularly 
for the public, to accept.  
“4: No one is looking for a bad relationship 
with Russia. Why should anyone force-feed 
your mind with things like ‘no Russia is a bad 
nation’, since we obviously, as a people, like 
Russia…” (Belgrade, 1)  
Western 
values as 
individualistic  
Coded when participants 
discussed Western values as 
potentially conflicting with 
Serbian values.  
“1: that’s coming from the West, and those 
influences are felt more and more.  
2: well yeah, before marriage, marriage used 
to be whole. Whatever a husband or wife did, 
divorce wasn’t an option. Now it’s all about 
you.” (Vranje, 2) 
EU as limiting 
banal practices 
Coded when participants drew 
on changes to banal practices 
(parking your car, going to lunch 
during week-days, making 
plumb brandy, roasting a pig in 
your backyard) etc. as potentially 
being undermined or threatened 
through increased EU regulation.  
“4: Our people, an average citizen with a 
High School education says “we’ll get this 
and that [benefits], that’s great!” but when 
you tell him “you can’t park your car 
wherever you want man” then it’s “oh, what, 
the EU? What’s the point?” (Niš, 1) 
 
Loss of sovereignty in the EU 
EU burdened 
by Serbia 
Coded when participants talked 
about the EU being financially 
burdened by Serbia as a poor and 
dependent country, and the 
stigma that arose with this 
perception. 
“4: We’re in a state of crisis, and then we 
wouldn’t bring [anything], because we can’t 
bring anything to an already orderly state, 
nothing positive, we can only be yet another 
problem for them which they have to 
finance.” (Belgrade, 2)  
EU wants to 
exploit Serbia 
Coded when participants 
discussed Serbia’s role in the EU 
as one of a country being 
exploited, politically, financially, 
socially, both now and in the 
future.  
“6: We’d like to have a good economic 
cooperation with Russia, which doesn’t suit 
the EU because then we’d be doing okay and 
they wouldn’t be able to keep us in their 
control, that’s how it is. They’re conditioning 
us to take as much as they can and to be able 
to monopolize control here.” 
(Vranje, 1)  
 
EU abusing 
power over 
prospective 
members 
Coded when participants talked 
about EU conditionality as a type 
of normative power to coerce 
Serbia into making changes, 
even when these were 
counterproductive. 
“1: I think we’re very specific in regards to 
that question, Serbia concretely, because so 
many conditions have been placed on Serbia 
which haven’t been placed on any other 
members until now, and there’s no end to it. I 
don’t know why, I’m assuming it’s about 
some political games but generally a lot is 
being asked of us.” (Novi Sad, 1) 
Serbia 
financially 
dependent on 
EU 
Coded when participants 
discussed being financially 
dependent on the EU and 
therefore being unable to make 
decisions without the EU’s 
approval, or resist EU integration 
as a whole.  
“2: The core of the story is that we’re so small 
that we can’t act independently and be so 
financially dependent on the EU at the same 
time, it’s done. We’re conditioned and 
controlled, our budget is filled with EU 
money.” 
Serbia as 
cheap labour 
for EU 
Coded when participants 
discussed being a source of 
cheap labour for the EU, in terms 
“4: So I think that, there’s not a lot to gain 
there, we’ll be cheap labour, and maybe, 
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of companies either investing in 
Serbia and paying Serbs less 
than for example Germans, or by 
getting to buy produce or 
machinery for a cheaper price 
than domestically. 
maybe get some relief from okay being able 
to travel without applying for visas.” (Niš, 2) 
Serbia a 
‘colony’ in 
Europe 
Coded for when participants 
explicitly referenced Serbia 
being a ‘colony’ in the EU.  
“2: We gave foreign companies access to 
come search for minerals in Serbia, knowing 
very well we have them. And they found them 
and said ‘these are ours’. So basically we’re 
just one big colony, and in the world, at large, 
people just go where the colonies are better.”  
Serbia should 
change itself 
Coded when participants 
discussed Serbia’s responsibility 
in bringing about change for 
itself, rejecting the need for EU 
integration or rejecting the need 
for external help, instead 
emphasizing that Serbia’s 
problems were hers, and should 
be dealt with internally.  
“1: Why are you against it [EU integration]? 
2: Because whatever problems we have we 
can figure them out ourselves, within our 
country, we don’t need anyone from the side 
to come and tell us what to do. “ (Vranje, 1)  
EU 
membership 
not worth it at 
any price 
Coded when participants 
discussed EU integration as a 
process which needed to be 
reflected on, not blindly entered.  
 
“6: I haven’t changed my mind since we last 
spoke, I mean in general it’s a good thing but 
not at any price. I mean, I said it last time too. 
All these pressures being placed on us now, 
it’s below the belt.” (Novi Sad, 2)  
EU as a 
power-
hierarchy led 
by West 
Coded when participants 
discussed the EU as a hierarchy 
where Western countries were 
afforded more power, privileges 
and rights than non-Western and 
recent EU members.  
“1: It’s well known that there’s a first, second, 
third, fourth, fifth league within the EU, with 
the first being German, France, and the rest 
are below.] 
2: And we expect that.” 
(Belgrade 1) 
Negative 
experiences of 
recent EU 
members 
Coded when participants 
discussed their impressions of 
how people from Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Romania (as recent 
members of the EU) felt about 
the changes taking place as part 
of the EU, often positioning 
these as negative.  
“1: I don’t know but if you’d ask an average 
Romanian or Bulgarian if something has 
improved for the better since he joined the 
EU, I assume the answer will be negative.” 
(Novi Sad, 1) 
Serbian politics historically positioned against the EU 
Losing 
Kosovo due to 
foreign 
pressures 
Coded when participants 
discussed that Kosovo was either 
a pawn in a larger international 
power struggle or that it had 
been lost because of international 
pressures on Serbia to give it up 
in order to not face 
repercussions.  
“7: I think we can all agree that this is 
something that’s being forced upon us from 
the side, regardless of whether we want to 
recognize it or not. And whatever the people 
think, who cares.” 
(Vranje, 3) 
West has 
caused a lot of 
damage for 
Serbia 
Coded when participants 
discussed how the West had 
caused a lot of damage for 
Serbia, either through historical 
references or discussing the 
“5: And, they’ve brought a lot of damage onto 
our country, I mean those Germans, English, 
the French also, they’ve also devastated us, I 
don’t know what happened with them. But we 
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aftermath of the NATO 
bombing, WWII, Yugoslavia etc.  
know who’s in charge there, who’s puling the 
threads, it’s the US.” (Niš, 2) 
EU disproves 
of Serbian ties 
to Russia 
Coded for when participants 
discussed similarities between 
Serbia and other ‘Eastern’ states; 
whether Russia, Turkey or other 
Balkan countries which were 
seen as East to ‘West’ and not 
recognized in a positive way by 
the EU.  
“6: Europe has always seen us as ‘little 
Russia’ and that’s the problem.  
9: I think that Europe’s doing that out of spite 
–  
6: It is out of spite, against us.” (Niš, 1)  
Stigmatizing 
representations 
of Serbia in 
the EU 
Coded when participants 
discussed how they thought the 
EU viewed them, representations 
which were often very negative. 
“2: And the Brits, and Swedes, and them, they 
all look at us like citizens of some third-world 
country, in every way.  
1: yeah probably 
3: they think we’re these savages. 
1: that’s right.” (Novi Sad, 1) 
Religious and 
historical ties 
with Russia 
Coded when participants spoke 
about Serbia’s ties to Russia 
either through references to 
orthodox Christianity or a shared 
history or friendly relations.  
“6: you just can’t compare. Do we, here, 
meaning any one of us, personally like Russia 
more because they’re orthodox or because 
they defended us by beating up our Slovenian 
‘brothers’, or this or that, or think they’re our 
friends, whether they are or aren’t, that’s fine. 
Whatever the reality of it is, that’s how we 
feel.” 
Positive civic changes as part of EU 
EU can limit 
corruption in 
Serbia 
Coded when participants talked 
about how EU integration could 
improve Serbia by limiting the 
amount of corruption in the 
government and the country at 
large. 
“5: I’m saying I would expect it to have some 
influence, by either changing the political 
landscape, to force you to do the right thing, I 
think that makes sense, but maybe I’m totally 
uninformed.” (Vranje, 1) 
EU as a source 
of order and 
stability 
Coded when participants 
discussed the civic benefits of 
EU integration as those which 
can bring about more order and 
stability to Serbia as a nation but 
also in the sense of everyday 
interactions with institutions 
such as schools, hospitals etc.  
“2: I think that we will critically return 
whenever we join the EU, whether that’s in 5, 
10 or 15 years. The German’s are serious 
people, not like us. […] 
6: meaning, everything, to fix every state 
institution, to give disability rights and 
services to people, all of it. Until the last one, 
if even a single one isn’t changed, we won’t 
join the EU. That’s how they work.  
Financial 
security (for 
individuals) 
within EU 
Coded when participants talked 
about the EU as potentially 
improving the financial status of 
individuals in Serbia but also for 
Serbia as a whole, by bringing in 
more investments and thus 
raising salaries.  
“6: When you start a family there, it’s 
currently a lot, it’s currently because of that, 
because of the financial situation, they live 
much better lives that we do, and so in that 
sense I think it would be useful. Nothing 
else.” (Vranje, 2)  
Serbia as 
lagging behind 
in making 
progress 
Coded when participants talked 
about Serbia as lagging behind in 
terms of making process, and 
how joining the EU was a way to 
make up for lost times, to 
become an equal to other 
European countries  
“1: I think it would be better to join. Our 
country is just, I mean, we’re always late in 
making the right decisions, in choosing the 
right side, but, it’s not too late, and I still 
think that it’s the right side to choose. (Niš, 1)  
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Questioning the idea of the EU as progress 
EU as utopian 
illusion 
Coded when participants 
discussed how the EU was/is 
portrayed as utopia, entry into 
which will solve all of Serbia’s 
problems, but either criticising 
this idea or rejecting it 
completely. 
“5: A lot of it is because of lack of 
knowledge, people don’t know why we’re 
going there, what we’ll do, why it would be 
good for us. People just think of it’ll be better 
like in all other EU states there, but then look 
at Greece falling apart…” (Novi Sad, 1)  
EU countries 
not superior to 
Serbia 
Coded when participants argued 
that the EU was not superior to 
Serbia because it was financially 
better off 
“2: They throw around words like ‘European 
values, European values’ but no one really 
tries to explain –  
5: what that means 
4: Something better than what we have here, 
but what that is no one knows.” (Belgrade, 1)  
EU fragile 
union 
Coded when participants 
discussed the instability of the 
EU, the potential that it might 
fall apart and the many internal 
divides and tensions within the 
union that made it appear fragile. 
“6: The EU itself is falling apart, we’ll have 
nothing to gain from joining.  
1: by the time we join it’ll no longer exist. 
6: Industry at zero, everything’s at zero and 
yet we want to join.” (Novi Sad, 3)  
Tension: 
Integration 
with 
Independence  
While coded across various other 
codes, this theme includes larger 
sections of focus group data 
which address the tensions 
between various codes related to 
how Serbia could manage to join 
the EU but remain independent 
(and keep its sovereignty) in the 
process. 
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Appendix 4: List of 20 political events used for survey in study II 
Survey N = 467  
1. Milošević’s speech in Gazimestan (Kosovo) – 1989/90  
2. First anti-Milošević demonstrations, 9th March – 1991 
3. The beginning of sanctions against Yugoslavia – 1992 
4. Signing of the Daytona agreement; end of war in B&H and Croatia – 1995 
5. Student demonstrations after voting scandal (voting manipulation) – 1996 
6. Beginning of Kosovo war – 1998  
7. NATO bombing of Yugoslavia – 1999 
8. UN Resolution 1244 and the end of the Kosovo war – 1999 
9. Murder of Ivan Stambolic – 2000 
10. 5th October demonstrations – 2000 
 
11. Murder of Zoran Djindjic – 2003 
12. Election of Boris Tadic – 2004 
13. Apology for atrocities in Croatia – 2007 
14. Kosovo declaring independence – 2008 
15. Signing of SPSS agreement with EU – 2008 
16. Official apology for Srebrenica – 2010 
17. Presidential election of 2012 – 2012 
18. EU talks begin; Official candidacy status given – 2012 
19. Political dialogue between BG and Pristina begins – 2012 
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20. Elections of 2014 – 2014  
 
Appendix 5: Participant Demographics for Qualitative component of 
Study III 
 
1. Snapshot FG compositions  
FG (City) Participants Median 
Age 
Belgrade (New Belgrade) 8;  3 Female & 5 Male 30 
Belgrade (Old Town) 6; 4 Female & 2 Male 35 
Belgrade (Vračar) 9; 3 Female & 6 Male 23 
Čačak 7; 5 Female & 2 Male 54 
Niš 9; 5 Female & 4 Male 29 
Novi Sad 7; 1 Female & 6 Male 31 
Paraćin 8; 1 Female & 7 Male 31 
Surdulica 5; 3 Female & 2 Male 31 
Vranje 8; 2 Female & 6 Male 39 
Total: 67; 27 Female & 40 Male  
 
2. Detailed participant demographics 
 
Participant Gender Age Occupation City 
1 Male 55 Business owner Belgrade (New Belgrade) 
2 Female 28 Student (PhD) Belgrade (New Belgrade) 
3 Male 27 Insurance Agent Belgrade (New Belgrade) 
4 Female 28 NGO Employee Belgrade (New Belgrade) 
5 Male 25 Engineer Belgrade (New Belgrade) 
6 Male 29 Student  Belgrade (New Belgrade) 
7 Male 26 Engineer Belgrade (New Belgrade) 
8 Male 27 Journalist Belgrade (New Belgrade) 
9 Male 28 Unemployed Niš 
10 Male 30 Unemployed Niš 
11 Female 27 Retail Worker Niš 
12 Female 24 Student  Niš 
13 Female 27 Unemployed  Niš 
14 Female 24 Student Niš 
15 Male 28 Electrical Engineer Niš 
16 Male 26 Medical Technician Niš 
17 Female 50 Office clerk Niš 
18 Male 31 Architect Novi Sad 
19 Female 35 Architect Novi Sad 
20 Male 31 Accountant Novi Sad 
21 Male 31 Taxi Driver Novi Sad 
22 Male 30 Unemployed Novi Sad 
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23 Male 28 Lawyer Novi Sad 
24 Male 34 Waiter Novi Sad 
25 Male 30 Military Employee Vranje 
26 Female 28 Military Employee Vranje 
27 Male     36 Unemployed Vranje 
28 Male 57 Self-employed 
farmer 
Vranje 
29 Female 55 Casino Employee Vranje 
30 Male 47 Lawyer Vranje 
31 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje 
32 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje 
33 Female 28 Secondary Teacher Surdulica 
34 Male 28 Unemployed Surdulica 
35 Female 35 Secondary Teacher Surdulica 
36 Female 28 Librarian Surdulica 
37 Male 36 Farmer Surdulica 
38 Male 35 Lawyer Belgrade (Old Town) 
39 Female 35 Lawyer Belgrade (Old Town) 
40 Male 36 Lawyer Belgrade (Old Town) 
41 Female 34 Lawyer Belgrade (Old Town) 
42 Female 32 Lawyer Belgrade (Old Town) 
43 Female 38 Lawyer Belgrade (Old Town) 
44 Female 50 Veterinarian Čačak 
45 Male 49 Electrical Engineer Čačak 
46 Male 57 Agricultural 
Engineer 
Čačak 
47 Female 52 Secondary teacher Čačak 
48 Female 53 University Professor  Čačak 
49 Female 58 University Professor Čačak 
50 Female 47 Unemployed Čačak 
51 Female 22 Student Belgrade (Vračar) 
52 Female 23 Student Belgrade (Vračar) 
53 Male 22 Student Belgrade (Vračar) 
54 Female 24 Student Belgrade (Vračar) 
55 Male 22 Student Belgrade (Vračar) 
56 Male 22 Student Belgrade (Vračar) 
57 Male 22 Student Belgrade (Vračar) 
58 Male 23 Student Belgrade (Vračar) 
59 Female 32 Teacher (University) Belgrade (Vračar) 
60 Female 34 Lawyer Paraćin 
61 Male 32 Economist Paraćin 
62 Male 30 Archaeologist Paraćin 
63 Male 31 Unemployed 
(lawyer) 
Paraćin 
64 Male 30 Economist Paraćin 
65 Male 32 Small-business 
owner 
Paraćin 
66 Male 31 Legal Aide Paraćin 
67 Male 30 Computer Engineer Paraćin 
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Appendix 6: Topic guide for qualitative component of study III  
General, warm-up question 
1. There have been many discussions about Serbia joining the EU. What have been some of the 
benefits and some of the downsides discussed?  
 
Personal opinions 
2. What is your opinion about Serbia joining the EU? Are you for or against it?  
 
Meta-perspective 
3. Do you think Serbia is welcomed in the EU, from the perspective of other member countries? 
 
International relations 
4. Serbia has (or has had) a close relationship with Russia, which has at times conflicted with its 
pro-EU politics. Do you think that Serbia should be more political oriented towards Russia or 
the EU? Or both, if possible.  
 
Domestic policy 
5. In many media reports, EU membership and the question of the status of Kosovo have been 
placed in opposition. Do you think accepting Kosovo’s independence is worth it if it would 
guarantee Serbia membership into the EU? 
 
Anticipations for the future 
6. When the year 2020 comes, the year by which politicians predict Serbia will have finally 
become a member, what do you realistically think the situation will look like?  
 
Reflecting on the past 
7. Considering the past 25 years and everything that has occurred in Serbia and the region, do 
you think that the people, as a nation, has changed in comparison with the past?  
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Appendix 7: English version of survey for quantitative component of 
study III 
Overview of measures:  
1. Open ended (Serbia reps and EU reps): 2 Questions, 2 free-text answers 
2. National ID: 5 Questions; 5 items  
3. European ID: 5 Questions; 5 items  
4. SDO: 1 Question; 8 items 
5. Prototypicality and Metaprotoypicality: 2 Questions; 14 items  
6. HE/HA: 1 Question; 6 items  
7. Threat (symbolic 4 items; realistic 2 items); 1 Question; 6 items 
8. Political attitudes / policy support: 1 Question; 7 items  
9. Future power in the EU (previously perceived powerlessness): 1 Questions; 5 items 
10. Personal control: 1 Questions; 4 items   
11. Power-positions within Europe: 1 Questions; 7 items 
12. Political orientation: 2 Questions; 2 items 
13. Demographics: 6 Questions; 6 items 
14. Subjective Societal Status: 1 Question; 1 item  
 
Open-ended questions: 
Representations of Serbian identity: 
Thinking about Serbia, please specify what things (images, ideas, beliefs, values etc.) come to 
mind when you think about what it means to be Serbian. Feel free to write down as many / few 
as you wish.  
Representations of Europe:  
Thinking about Europe and the EU, please specify what things (images, ideas, beliefs, values 
etc.) come to mind when you think about what it means to be European. Feel free to write down 
as many / few as you wish.  
 
National Identity: 5 items, 7-point Likert scale 
1. To what extent do you feel Serbian? (1= Not at all, 7= Completely)  
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Serbian people (1= No ties at all, 7= 
Extremely strong ties)  
3. How similar do you think you are to the average Serbian person? (1= Not at all similar, 7= 
Extremely similar)  
4. How important to you is being Serbian? (1= Not at all important, 7= Extremely important)  
5. When you hear someone who is not Serbian criticize the Serbs, to what extent do you feel 
personally criticized? (1= Not at all criticized, 7= Extremely criticized) 
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European Identity: 5 items, 7-point Likert scale 
1. To what extent do you feel European? (1= Not at all, 7= Completely)  
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other European people (1= No ties at all, 7= 
Extremely strong ties)  
3. How similar do you think you are to the average European person? (1= Not at all similar, 7= 
Extremely similar)  
4. How important to you is being European? (1= Not at all important, 7= Extremely important)  
5. When you hear someone who is not European criticize the Europeans, to what extent do you 
feel personally criticized? (1= Not at all criticized, 7= Extremely criticized) 
 
SDO-D: 8 items, 7-point Likert scale 
For all statements, indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree.  
1=Completely disagree, 7=Completely agree  
 
1. Having some groups on top really benefits everybody (reverse-code) 
2. It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom (reverse-coded) 
3. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom (reverse-
coded) 
4. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. (reverse-coded) 
5. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top  
6. No one group should dominate society  
7. Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place  
8. Group dominance is a poor principle  
 
Prototypicality and Meta-prototypicality: 14 items, 7-point Likert scale 
Prompt: Bring to mind individuals who were born and live in the greater European area. In 
your mind, how “European” are people who belong to the following countries? That is, how 
strongly do you identify them with Europe and all things European? 
1= Not at all European, 7 = Extremely European 
1.Turkey 
2. France 
3. Germany 
4. Romania  
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5. Serbia 
6. Ireland 
7. Spain  
Now think about one of these countries, Germany, and the perspective of German people on 
Europe. According to Germans, how “European” are people who belong to the following 
countries? That is, how strongly would Germans identify the following groups with Europe and 
all things European?    
1= Not at all European, 7 = Extremely European 
1. Turkey 
2. France 
3. Germany 
4. Romania  
5. Serbia 
6. Ireland 
7. Spain  
 
HE-HA: 6 Items, 7-point Likert scale 
Prompt: Now think of the European Union (EU). How much do the following statements 
characterise the EU? Please indicate whether you agree or disagree that the following 
statements accurately describe the EU. 
1=Completely disagree, 7=Completely agree 
1. Differences in status between national groups are fair  
 
2. For unfair reasons, certain nations have poorer living conditions than other nations 
(reverse-coded) 
 
3. The goal of the EU is to reduce the differences in wealth between European countries. 
 
4. The EU exists mostly to maintain the existing inequalities between European countries. 
(reverse-coded) 
 
5. The EU works toward equality in the wider world. 
 
6. The EU is a way of continuing Europe’s colonial power in the wider world (reverse-
coded) 
 
Threat: 6 items, 7-point Likert scale 
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1=Completely disagree, 7=Completely agree 
Symbolic 
1. Becoming part of the EU will allow Serbia to keep its specific and separate identity  
2. If Serbia becomes part of the EU, Serbian values will be corroded by alien values which are 
imposed on them. (reverse-code) 
3. Becoming part of the EU will help Serbia to preserve its identity more than if Serbia stands 
alone.  
4. If Serbia becomes part of the EU it will undermine the Serbian way of life (reverse-code) 
 
 Realistic  
1. Joining the EU creates a threat to Serbia’s economic progress. (reverse-code) 
2. If Serbia joins the EU, its economic conditions will only improve. 
 
Political Attitudes: 7 items, 10-point Likert scale 
Considering the following political goals (both domestic and foreign), please rate the 
importance of each, ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 10 (highly important).  
1= Not at all important, 10 = Highly important 
1. The fight against corruption  
2. Improving the health care system  
3. Gaining EU membership 
4. Increase the protection of human rights 
5. Continue to ensure Serbia’s rights to Kosovo  
6. Judicial reform 
7. Educational system reform 
 
Future power in the EU (Perceived powerlessness): 5 items, 7-point Likert scale 
1= Completely disagree, 7= Completely agree 
1. If the Serbs really wanted to, they could get their way in determining EU policies. 
(reverse-code) 
2. The Serbian interest will play a part in determining EU government decisions. (reverse-
code) 
3. Decisions in the EU are based on what Western European countries want, irrespective 
of what others want.  
4. When push comes to shove, Western European countries always get their way in EU 
policy. 
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5. Western European people too often take advantage of their stronger power to make their 
point of view prevail in the politics of the EU,  
 
Personal control: 4 items (from the Pearlin Mastery scale, 7-point Likert scale 
1= Completely disagree, 7= Completely agree 
1. What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me (reverse-code) 
2. There is little I can do to change many important things in my life  
3. I can do just about anything I set my mind to (reverse-code) 
4. There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have  
 
Power-position within Europe: 7 items, 7-point Likert scale 
It is said that different countries hold different levels / positions of power in Europe. For the 
following countries, rate each on a scale of 1 (Powerless) to 7 (Too powerful). 
1= Powerless, 7 = Too powerful 
1. France 
2. Germany 
3. Romania  
4. Ireland 
5. Spain  
6. Serbia 
7. Turkey 
 
Political orientation: 2 items, 4-point Likert scale 
1. In terms of economic issues, would you say you are (1= Very left wing; 4= Very right wing) 
2. In terms of social issues, would you say you are (1= Very liberal, 4= Very conservative)  
 
Demographics: 6 items 
1. Gender (please choose) 
Male / Female 
2. Age (fill in text box)  
3. Education (according to JUS -  
4. Occupation (choose from options below) 
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Man
ager 
Profes
sional 
(e.g., 
doctor
, 
lawye
r, 
accou
ntant, 
profes
sor) 
Techni
cian or 
associ
ate 
profes
sional 
(e.g., 
compu
ter 
progra
mmer, 
medic
al 
techni
cian, 
parale
gal) 
Cleri
cal 
supp
ort 
work
er 
(e.g., 
secre
tary, 
payr
oll 
offic
er) 
Servi
ce 
and 
sales 
work
er 
(e.g., 
resta
urant 
wait
er, 
store 
assis
tant) 
Skille
d 
agricu
ltural, 
forestr
y, and 
fisher
y 
worke
rs 
(e.g., 
farme
r, park 
ranger
) 
Craft 
and 
relate
d 
trades 
work
s 
(e.g., 
electr
ician, 
carpe
nter) 
Plant 
and 
mach
ine 
oper
ator 
or 
asse
mble
r 
(e.g., 
skille
d 
facto
ry 
work
er, 
textil
e 
mach
ine 
oper
ator, 
drive
r) 
Eleme
ntary 
occup
ations 
(e.g., 
cleane
r, 
food 
prepar
ation 
assista
nt) 
Armed 
forces 
occupat
ion 
(e.g., 
army 
private, 
commis
sioned 
or non-
commis
sioned 
officer) 
Do 
not 
know 
/ Not 
appli
cable 
 
5. Income: 
Please state your monthly income by choosing from the following options; 
a.  below 20,000.00 RSD 
b.  from 20,000.00 to 30,000.00 RSD 
c.  from 30,000.00 to 40,000.00 RSD 
d.  from 40,000.00 to 50,000.00 RSD 
e.  from 50,000.00 to 60,000.00 RSD 
f.  from 60,000.00 to 70,000.00 RSD 
g. from 70,000.00 to 80,000.00 RSD 
h. from 80,000.00 to 90,000.00 RSD 
i. from 90,000.00 to 100,000.00 RSD 
g. over 100,000.00 RSD 
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13.6. Region 
Considering that Serbia is divided into 7 admiNištrative territories, please indicate which one 
you belong to/ live in. 
a. AP Vjovodina 
b. Beograd 
c. Northern Serbia 
d. Eastern Serbia 
d. Sumadija 
f. Southern Serbia 
g. AP Kosovo and Metohija 
 
14. Subjective Societal Status: 1 item  
Imagine that this ladder pictures how Serbian society is set up. At the top of the ladder are the 
people who are the best off – they have the most money, the highest amount of schooling, and 
the jobs that bring the most respect. At the bottom are people who are the worst off – they have 
the least money, little or no education, no job or jobs that no one wants or respects. Now think 
about your family. Please tell us where you think you would be on this ladder. Fill in the circle 
that best represents where you would be on this ladder. 
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Appendix 8: Detailed Demographics and Procedural Details for Study 
I 
Focus Groups Duration Number of 
Participants 
Belgrade (1) 
Niš (1) 
Novi Sad (1) 
Vranje (1) 
87 mins. 
66 mins. 
53 mins. 
75 mins. 
8 (5 M & 3 F) 
9 (5 M & 4 F) 
7 (6 M & 1 F) 
8 (6 M & 2 F) 
Belgrade (2) 
Niš (2) 
Novi Sad (2) 
Vranje (2) 
67 mins. 
59 mins. 
33 mins. 
78 mins. 
8 (5 M & 3 F) 
6 (5 M & 1 F) 
6 (5 M & 1 F) 
7 (5 M & 2 F) 
Belgrade (3) 
Niš (3) 
Novi Sad (3) 
Vranje (3) 
77 mins. 
47 mins. 
65 mins. 
67 mins. 
5 (2 M & 3 F) 
4 (4 M & 0 F) 
6 (5 M & 1 F) 
5 (3 M & 2 F) 
 
Participant Gender Age Occupation City 
1 Male 55 Business owner Belgrade  
2 Female 28 Student (PhD) Belgrade 
3 Male 27 Insurance Agent Belgrade 
4 Female 28 NGO Employee Belgrade 
5 Male 25 Engineer Belgrade 
6 Male 29 Student  Belgrade 
7 Male 26 Engineer Belgrade 
8 Male 27 Journalist Belgrade 
9 Male 28 Unemployed Niš 
10 Male 30 Unemployed Niš 
11 Female 27 Retail Worker Niš 
12 Female 24 Student  Niš 
13 Female 27 Unemployed  Niš 
14 Female 24 Student Niš 
15 Male 28 Electrical Engineer Niš 
16 Male 26 Medical Technician Niš 
17 Female 50 Office clerk Niš 
18 Male 31 Architect Novi Sad 
19 Female 35 Architect Novi Sad 
20 Male 31 Accountant Novi Sad 
21 Male 31 Taxi Driver Novi Sad 
22 Male 30 Unemployed Novi Sad 
23 Male 28 Lawyer Novi Sad 
24 Male 34 Waiter Novi Sad 
25 Male 30 Military Employee Vranje 
26 Female 28 Military Employee Vranje 
27 Male    36 Unemployed Vranje 
28 Male 57 Self-employed farmer Vranje 
29 Female 55 Casino Employee Vranje 
30 Male 47 Lawyer Vranje 
31 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje 
32 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje 
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Appendix 9: Focus Group Transcript for Study I  
 
R: There have been many discussions about Serbia joining the EU. What have been 
some of the benefits and some of the downsides discussed? 
1: we’re hoping for benefits but we’re not sure 
3: we’re striving towards joining the EU and praying to God that we never join the EU, 
that is the position of our government 
1: for the politicians it currently suits them to be leaning towards the EU but to never 
join because then all those thieves would go to jail 
6: well those negative things that come from joining the EU aren’t made public  
(general agreement) 
6: or a person has to, on his own, that is people, eventually figure out those negativities 
and that first and foremost comes from the experiences of some other nations that 
recently joined the EU, like Croatia, Bulgaria. First and foremost Slovenia and 
Bulgaria 
3: Croatians are yet to –  
6: Slovenes are actually the ones expressing most negative sentiments and 
consequences 
4: we know they’re smarter than us 
R: one positive thing that’s been mentioned is the opening of borders 
6: well essentially –  
3: the borders have always been open 
6: We don’t have that, regime, the borders are open even more now and that 
international trade is absolutely free. So as far as permanent capital is concerned, in 
entering our country, everything is open. So as long as there are investors who want to 
invest in Serbia and everything that means, in my opinion, from that perspective we 
don’t even need the EU if that’s the whole point of joining the EU. On the other hand, 
the only thing that I can personally conclude to be negative is that our state, and the 
people isn’t mature enough to enter that system which is dictated by the EU, primarily 
in relation to the material status of the population because in relation to that status 
people here are living on the edge of existence. But, for example, there in the EU the 
standards are different and the regulations are different and it’s a lot more precisely 
regulated, from work, workplace and all that. Here, that is harder to implement, that is, 
to uphold the laws that are implemented in European countries, that are in the EU’s 
borders, meanwhile here this cant be fixe because laws are being implemented hastily 
and these laws are not adapted to our circumstances, above all our social opportunities 
and the general possibilities of citizen, institutions and in general the state of our State.  
So that, any law that is adapted if it is in accordance with the regulations or laws in the 
EU has a certain version in our country so that in practice it cannot be 100% 
applicable, it has a lot of holes, many things are not covered and some provisional laws 
signed aren’t even compatible or implementable here. So the law is just there an 
ineffective. And these are some, in the sense that we are not yet ready to join that EU 
system, but on the other hand that economic cooperation with EU countries, do we 
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have open borders, and then the question becomes whether we even should join that 
system. I mean, I am for the unification of countries and not ripping them apart and 
creating new countries and all that, so that is why I respect the integrity of all 
countries, the borders of every state, and for respecting people and nationality and 
religion and all that. But that’s not an reason for not having borders between 
neighboring countries at all.  
R: What are your personal opinions about joining the EU?  
4: I’m against 
6: I’m against too  
7: I’m against too 
4: we’re all against 
8: I’m against too  
1: why? 
5: I am not against it, I’m for it. But like he said, we are absolutely not ready for it. We 
don’t have fund for pensions, we don’t have women’s rights, family rights and 
protections, we don’t have protection for anyone 
1: men  
(laughter) 
5: I’m sorry, men. Our hospitals are in ruins, we don’t have funds that can cover all of 
that, it’s all in ruins, schools, all institutions, I mean nothing. When you look at that 
western system or the conditions the EU is placing on us which we cant fulfill for 
many years to come, because all of that has to be deal with, those laws like you were 
saying –  
6: and besides that –  
5: if you just went to one hospital, sorry, just one hospital, you’d start crying.  It’s all 
old and rusty, it’s, I just start from there, from those instruments they use, that’s all, 
just start from there. Go to any school, okay those who are in middle school, in the last 
few years, they’re okay. But you have, I mean, something that’s so far from a normal 
level where a child is supposed to spend its day. I’m just telling you, 2-3, uhm, some 
2-3 sectors for the protection of women, who aren’t protected by any laws, and all of 
that has to be completely different to be in the EU. We don’t have that level at all. No 
way 
8: nor will we ever 
5: I think so too, no way, we wont.  
6: Serbia as Serbia, you can live a nice life. Serbia has certain natural resources, from 
which we could extract enough money to live a normal prosperous life in this country 
and a good solid life for citizens. First and foremost, Serbia is a semi-industrial 
country, a farming country, so w have great capacity in that sense, only that that’s now 
stalled a little and those sectors are on the verge of collapsing, but, this means that we 
are not some industrial country but we do have something, so Serbia simply has to be 
better organized for it to prosper  
5: that’s right 
6: and then there are plenty of, uhm, natural resources that could be used for tourism. 
You know, we have many beautiful mountains, lakes, spas, and all of that can be used, 
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there’s just a lack of money right now. I think that people, who is for the EU and who 
is pro joining the EU are so for the reason that they hope that the EU will finance 
something here, recover something, get something going, and that’s that only, in my 
opinion, story that people, that is, individuals, fall for; ‘oh now it’ll be ideal once we 
join the EU’ which I don’t think it can be and which we’ve seen from those countries 
that are in the EU and then they till don’t function as they should. On the other hand – 
R: they do these surveys every year where they ask people if they are pro or against, 
and the majority are pro. But form what i see in my FGs most people seem to be 
against, or at least have a negative perception and attitude towards the Eu.  
6: Well exactly like he said, that’s more of a political tension and that’s being placed in 
the media, as if the people are absolutely for EU integration but actually it’s just so 
they [politicians] can gain political points and conceal the various things they’ve done 
to come into power and how their have managed to get their ideological equals into 
certain high positions, whether it’s in the government or the party in power.  
5: but you see, you say that people don’t expect that, but my opinion is different. 
Safety, lawfulness, order, normalcy, security that tomorrow you’ll be able to live a 
humanitarian way of life and expect a normal retirement with a pension and that 
everything is covered by the law. We currently don’t have that. 
6: yes but let’s say –  
5: but listen –  
3: but we need to begin from ourselves. The EU cant come here and be like “oh, its 
gonna change my mentality”, that has to start from us. So, everything start from here. 
5: my consciousness, but you see that has to change –  
6: but look, let’s take you as an example, what would EU membership bring, how 
would you prosper from it?  
5: but no, I’m saying that I expect it to because they would probably have some 
influence, or the political structure would change or there would be some –  
6: but will that, that change in structure –  
5: if someone makes you work properly, I thinks there’s some idea behind that that’s 
my opinion, but maybe I’m totally uninformed  
6: is the question about the style of governance of some financial one? 
5: both, one influences the other 
4: over there the Bulgarians are bragging, Romanians, everyone (sarcasm) 
5: we’ll that’s because they’re all miserable like us – 
4: so what did the EU bring them? 
5: okay, but no he said it nicely, we’re not mature enough for it, that’s definitely true 
6: we’re not 
5: but we expect to be in a minimum of 10-20 years 
1: the Bulgarians have now, for example, enacted a law, but in English because they 
didn’t have time to finish the translation before joining the EU (laughter) 
4: and then they have salaries of 150 euros a month, that’s EU for them.  
6: You know what’s typical with us? Let’s say, in order to enter the EU, we’re selling 
successful companies for small change, and to whom, if not individuals from countries 
that are part of the EU. And then they monopolize. They control the monopoly. So in 
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that business, even they themselves, here, wherever foreigners have come and bought 
companies, they’ve created a monopoly. In Serbia. And in Serbia, we currently don’t 
have fair economic competition.  
4: I’m against joining, im against the EU because it never brought anyone anything 
good.  
1: yes, yes it did, the Germans 
2: that’s not the problem –  
4: all the countries that have entered the EU have only served as guinea pigs, for land 
waste and for –  
2: for monopoly, basically for monopoly.  
4: and for the sale of their goods. We’re eating Danish cheese, we’re eating this from 
Spain –  
 2: but no one else is to blame for that. For you and me, no one else is at fault just 
because we’re stupid and voted for that politician who will make that –  
3: who voted? 
1: irrelevant. The current situation, as it is, is solely our problem.  
R: participant nr 2, did you respond? 
2: I’m against it, against 
1: why are you against it? 
2: because all the problems that we have we should deal with ourselves, within our 
country and we don’t need anyone to come from outside. So if that’s the government 
that I have then someone else who is the same will come and bring –  
1: they cant change the government. The EU is constructed in such a way that it cant, 
for some domestic politics it cant get involved. The state still has its own independence 
–  
4: that doesn’t agree with them – 
1: but it’s still a part of some larger union. Indirectly, that’s something different, in 
indirect ways. But directly, that doesn’t exist. They can give recommendations for 
something but whether we’re going to implement that or not, that’s solely our choice. 
Now, just because a lazy waiter come from the EU and has worked in Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, irrelevant, and says ‘I think that the hotel here should make bigger 
windows and have bigger curtains” and the director of the hotel, because he doesn’t 
know that it’s a waiter from the EU and not the director of hotel services, changes the 
windows and curtains -  
4: and ruins the hotel  
1: and ruins the hotel. Why? Because someone else told him to.  
3: but that’s what im saying, we need to start from within. 
2: from ourselves, yes 
1: we were talking earlier when you arrived about the good things about the EU 
3: there are good thing 
1: but there are also many examples of bad things, for example the prohibition of 
making rakija  
(laughter) 
3: and the piglets?  
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(laughter) 
3: we wont give them up 
6: because over there, see, in the EU, the average citizen has such a good salary that he 
simply doesn’t have to mow his own lawn. He has the possibility to pay someone to do 
it for him. He simply doesn’t have the need to, like we do, as he said, make rakija to be 
able to make a living off of that rakija, to collect the fruit and to bother with making it, 
to make some money to support his family. And let’s not talk about slaughtering 
animals, pigs –  
4: yes 
1: the problem here isn’t so much the law, they aren’t that incompatible with the EU, 
there are, from country to country the laws aren’t the same, in Spain and Norway, 
they’re not the same.  
(general agreement)  
1: here the problem is the enforcement of laws 
2: yes  
1: and that’s the biggest problem. The application of the rule of law and so on. Another 
thing, we have a very big, we have a very big problem with bringing about laws. And 
then once we do, we don’t enforce them if we see that they don’t suit us, so we have no 
chance of –  
5: how do you expect a country that has been financially ruined, ruined by war, ruined 
by everything and anything, that it will be okay within a year? 
1: no one expects that 
5: so that, but no, no, that has nothing to do with joining the EU, absolutely  -  
6: it does have something to do with the EU because in the current state that we’re in 
they won’t accept us. So that’s just empty words “it’ll happen today, it’ll happen 
tomorrow, or this year, or in this many years, we’ve received a date.”  
5: so that means then that – 
6: so you can freely say that Serbia –  
4: never –  
6: until it fulfills all the conditions to join the EU, the EU might fall apart. 
5: that’s right  
6: those are just political games, political games, and it’s general knowledge that in 
Serbia, the various political parties that come into power are financed by certain 
countries within the EU that have certain interests and people from those countries 
come and buy our successful firms, and that’s a known fact. That they’re more 
interested in that, than helping us, that’s basically it.  
3: to profit 
6: to profit  
3: clear as the sky  
4: we’re just another market for them, nothing else. 
6: and if this keeps up Serbia will literally have to sell itself and will become –  
4: bankrupt  
6: bankrupt. To be a visitor in your own country and to depend completely on the EU. 
Meaning, from a cup of milk to bigger products. 
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1: EU integration doesn’t sit well with scam artists. The smugglers and scammers in 
our country are currently in positions where they manage to provide for 11 people.  
2: but there are many people that live off of –  
1: scamming. I know, they benefit from it.  
R: Do you think Serbia is welcomed in the EU, from the perspective of other member 
countries? 
4: such hard questions. 
1: depends on who you ask, whether its Croatia or Germany or England. I think the 
Bulgarians would be the first to vote for us (laughter). What does Sweden think about 
Serbia joining? 
R: I don’t know, I don’t think it has an opinion 
6: the question is, do they even know that we exist at all?  
4: how can they not know, they give us 12 points every Eurovision song contest! 
(laughter) 
3: do they know? They don’t care, they live a good life there. We have talk about it 
because we’re bothered by it.  
5: yes 
3:  I’ve learned that one man can be the Minister of Industry, then the next term he’s 
the Minister of Health, then the Minister of Defense, and you know, you have one man 
that can be everything. Give me a break! 
1: and no one bats an eye. Here the situation’s just like that, everything goes. Our 
problem isn’t the EU, we’re just like that – 
4: let me tell you, no one from the EU wants us there. No one. 
5: I think so too. 
3: they’re smart people, they need – 
1: I think that there are companies that want us in the EU 
4: which ones?  
2: I think so too, because –  
1: if they can influence government decision-making –  
4: they see Serbs as an inferior race, they think we’re illiterate, lack culture and have 
bad traditions, bad morals, so the worst  
2: I also think they have –  
6: on the other hand I think that it doesn’t suit them for other reasons, because the 
Serbian people are highly intelligent, very able and hardworking, very –  
5: adaptable  
6: that too 
5: and know how to persist 
6: resourceful, and them over there they’ve used to living under some stable freedom 
and we have, because of our normal intelligence and the conditions we’ve faced, we 
have a lot of flexibility when faced with every situation –  
4: you can adapt to survive, that’s right  
6: and I think, that we don’t suit them for that reason  
3: well yes because they’re frivolous  
1: yes but the situation here has forced you to know everything  
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3: of course, that’s why you have a sense of awareness 
1: you have to know how to play basketball or football and to run away from bombs, 
it’s not normal 
4: but why then are you surprised when one man can be a minister of everything, hold 
all those positions? 
6: our education is so strong compared to theirs that our child, let’s say after 8 years of 
school, had a much stronger knowledge-base than their 8th year students 
1: but we have problems at university level, because it’s not focused enough 
6: that’s right 
1: we’re still broadly focused 
6: we’re TOO broadly focused 
1: and maybe that’s good. Sometimes it can be good. In 99 for the army, that proved to 
be good.  
R: Serbia has (or has had) a close relationship with Russia, which has at times 
conflicted with its pro-EU politics. Do you think that Serbia should be more political 
oriented towards Russia or the EU? Or both, if possible.  
1: both Kosovo and Serbia and Europe  
(laughter) 
1: who are you rooting for? 
7: well we cant whore around and be with both Russia and Europe  
6: I think that we shouldn’t be too orientated towards Russia, nor exclusively pro-
European. We should have an absolute correctness, and as good a cooperation as 
possible, with Russia and with EU countries, not only with the EU but with the rest of 
the countries in Europe and other continents. I even think that it’s a mistake to think 
that we are exclusively turned towards Russia. I don’t see a reason for Russia, firstly 
there are some points of similarity, they’re an orthodox country too, I don’t see a 
reason why we shouldn’t have good cooperation with Russia in every situation, on the 
other hand, I don’t see why we shouldn’t also cooperate with other countries that are 
around the EU. And with those of different religion in our surroundings, for example 
Albania, and I don’t know who.  For example, these Muslim countries, I don’t see why 
not. That’s the thing.  
1: but you need to have boundaries, how far should a man be able to enter –  
6: of course –  
1: whoever is with him, but still to keep their own –  
2: just to –  
6: on the other hand – 
3: use them, it doesn’t suit them if –  
6: on the other hand, no one should wrongfully be sing or influencing you, to condition 
Serbia to, like currently with the Ukraine crisis, that Serbia should block every 
cooperation with Russia –  
5; yes 
6: that to me is abusing one state 
4: nowhere. Russians aren’t up to any good, and these guys too, no, with no one.  
2: we just need a Putin here 
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4: We need Tito to come back  
5: I’m for a relationship with Russia, but you know why? To create some 
counterweight in the world, the way it used to be. A strong Russia, which was ruined 
just like Serbia, so what I mean is, then you used to know who was powerful in the 
world, and I’m for that. 
3: I’m more pro-Russian –  
2: that’s true –  
5: to return that balance. So that the West doesn’t direct our lives, not just for us but 
everyone. Because if its equal everywhere then there wont be so much domination, so I 
think that should be brought back. So that Russia could be what it once was. I’m still 
for Russia. 
2: more so, yeah, because they’ve managed to create a dictatorship then, and I think 
they're more strategically on our side than the EU. 
1: who? And on what basis have we concluded this, besides the fact that they’re 
orthodox? 
3: nothing, just that 
1: I mean, we’re speaking freely here, I’m more for cooperation with Russia 
6: me too  
1: there is a counterweight in the world and that’s BRIC, brazil, Russia, India and 
China.  We’re also in a situation currently where there is no room for us –  
2: yes 
1: that’s the situation, we’re small, we’re irrelevant and we just need to keep our asses 
from – 
4: do you know who’s bombarded Serbia the most? 
2: who? 
4: the Russians 
1: bombarded who? 
4: our people  
1: yes in WWII 
4: Belgrade was ruined more by the Russians than the Germans 
2: okay well now – 
5: we’re talking about the present  
1: irrelevant 
4: and the Russians have always caused more devastation – 
1: that’s irrelevant, and whatever the situation is like right now, why didn’t the 
Russians stop 99? Why didn’t Russia, I mean in some ways we have – 
3: there’s nothing there 
1: but again I think it’s more rooted in some personal relations, perhaps between the 
president or prime minister –  
3: that’s it, personal relationships –  
1: and then when Putin was here for example, he was greeted by Dacic  
2: yes 
1: more closely than with the rest, even if Toma (Nikolic) was kissing him 17 times  
2: yes 
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5: let me ask you something, the war ended after how many months in 99? How did 
they not help us? 
2: after 78 days 
5: wait, weren’t they standing behind us the whole time, the figures? Yes they were. 
That’s how I’ve understood it. What do you think would have happened if they war 
went on much longer, like it was planned, for the troops to enter, don’t you think they 
would have reacted? That they would have allowed that? 
1: hold on, hold on. Just so we’re on the same page here. We’re talking about the 
troops entering or whether they wouldn’t have entered? They didn’t enter only because 
of the fact that they signed the capitulation  
3: they didn’t enter, actually, because it wasn’t their plan  
1: we signed the capitulation so that they wouldn’t have to enter –  
5: that’s right 
1: and the Russians, without it –  
5: I’m just asking whether you think they wouldn’t have reacted if much worse things 
started happening to us?  
1: no way 
6: I agree 
3: if they saw some benefit to it, they would have come, if not –  
8: and with that, when we signed it, or when we as a state reacted, I recall there was a 
referendum or something like that, we don’t want foreign troops in our country, then 
people didn’t have a legal basis for entering our country. For that reason what 
happened to us happened, they respected our wishes or whatever of not wanting help, 
that’s how I’ve understood it, and because of that we got what we got. And then, when 
99 started –  
2: for a week – 
8: I mean if you just watch a few o our movies –  
5: I don’t think you’re right, because they, no one is that foolish to drag themselves 
into a war. 
8: hold on,  I think they wanted to, that they were preparing to bring their troops when 
we signed it. 
1: and nothing ever materialized in regards to that, why? For 15 days my father went to 
Kosovo, and I know how he cried when we was leaving and I know how he was when 
he came back. What happened down there, and who was selling cigarettes to Russians 
and who was trading with them, and how were the Russians greeted and how were the 
Americans greeted? And after 4 months, how was the relationship between Serbs and 
Kosovars and the Russians and the Americans? Those are two completely different 
armies, two different systems, meaning, we’re not talking about why is leaning 
towards whom, whether Serbia is leaning towards this one or that one, but rather one 
system and another system. So we’re comparing incomparable things. Do we, that is, 
us here at the table, whether we personally like the Russians more because they 
orthodox and because they fought our Slovenian brothers, or whether we think they’re 
our friends or not, it doesn’t matter. They consider it to be that way, whether that’s 
how it was, -  
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5: that’s another story  
1: that’s a whole different thing 
5: but our opinion is –  
1: everyone has a right to their own opinion – 
8: you know what, I’ve always been of the opinion that history repeats itself, and if 
you go through history, the Russians never hindered you,  even if they didn’t help you, 
they surely never hindered you.  
5: that’s what im saying  
8: while the German, French, American, English, who didn’t hold back on any 
ammunition and those things, if you see what I mean? 
1: yes  
2: yeah yeah 
8: they screwed you over at least once or twice in life –  
1: do you know of a situation where the Germans screwed with us? When the Germans 
agreed to something with us and didn’t respect that agreement and instead screwed us 
over?  
3: we’re always pro-German! Between the EU and Russia, I’m pro-German! 
8: you know what, 100 to 1, our 1 to 100, that’s how I see it –  
1: there are documents –  
8: even if it were 10 to 1 
1: it’s not important, it was 10 to 1 everywhere, and for Serbia someone signed on for 
that. It’s irrelevant, I mean completely irrelevant. But they didn’t screw us over, we 
didn’t agree on anything other than that [which happened] 
3: they just overwrote it (laughter) 
1: but hold on, no one forced you to kill, did the Cetniks and Partisans capture and kill 
140 Germans in Villamovci, they divide them into groups of 70, and the Cetniks 
handed theirs over, and took supplies, food and ammunition, everything they needed 
[from Germans] while the Partisans shot [them]. And because they shot 70 Germans, 
Kraljevo happened. And in Kragujevac what happened happened.  
5: look, she’s neutral, and she nicely asked what opinion we think the EU has of us, 
which I was saying earlier. That whole system, has a very negative opinion about us, 
over there, that we’re an inferior race, that we’re illiterate, someone who you can 
simply wipe off the map. Russians don’t have that kind of opinion about us.  
1: we don’t know – 
5: I’m assuming.  
1: how many Russians do you know? 
5: what he said – 
1: how many Russians do you know?  
5: I’m talking about this in relation to history, what he’s been talking about this entire 
time. If they didn’t help you, they were always there –  
6: in regards to history, Russia’s never helped us 
1: never 
5: but I’m just –  
6: and she could have in many key moments, and she didn’t  
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5: I’m going to explain to you –  
3: in the second world war –  
6: let’s say for example, the NATO bombing, they could have helped us a lot by using 
their veto – 
3: using their veto 
6: and it wouldn’t have come to, so many -   
5: well there are conditions – 
6: innocent victims  
7: it didn’t come to that because the UN didn’t get to attack – 
1: the American started harassing us before that  
7: there was no veto and they started bombing 
1: that’s right, but the UN could have condemned the actions. There's that too, do you 
know how much, how can America put pressure on a country like Russia? It’s an 
enormous power. 
5: I’m going to explain –  
7: I agree that they couldn’t do a lot then, we’re in agreement there, that there wasn’t 
really a situation where –  
5: look, imagine a family. Husband, wife and two kids. The woman is the one that 
deals with the children, ‘where are you going, when and how’. I’m going to paint you 
a picture.  A man, who is on the side, like a father, who doesn’t get too involved in the 
upbringing of the children, leaves that to the mother, for her to deal with any problems 
with the children, but he’s there, that figure. That’s what I’ve been talking about this 
whole time, and if there’s a need to react and to help and to threaten, that’s what I'm 
talking about 
1: and what if he doesn’t? who then is the figure of the father? 
5: he does! 
1: no 
5: you count on it  
1: not just a little but –  
5: and the world expects that figure to exist  
1: just a minute, to make sure we understand each other. What is Serbia in this 
connotation? Russia, I'm assuming is the father, and Serbia is then what, the mother? 
5: mother 
1: and the citizens, are the children?  
5: that’s right 
1: okay so that’s the connotation. Where has the father appeared for us up until now? 
5: he’s there, he exists –  
1: Russians have –  
5: what are you talking about? She asked, and I would rather be with them, because 
they’ve been in the right, as he said earlier. 
1: whether we’re for them or not, that’s a personal opinion  
8: I like Germans, but my family the most  
6: and why wouldnt we look at Germany as an example ?  
1: did the Germans have, under their control., Italy? 
243 
 
3: it still does 
7: yes 
8: let me tell you, all that wealth was created, meaning, they gave them two, three 
financial vaccinations to recover. And this country, which is so independent, there’s no 
way it’ll recover in a few years like them, like a Phoenix bird. That’s not possible, 
without help from outside.  
1: of course 
3: ‘we’ll give you, we’ll give you a financial shot if you accept black people from 
Africa, we’ll give you a financial shot if you accept this” – there are conditions, 
nothing’s –  
6: not even Germany recovered like a Phoenix  
3: , 1: yes 
6: and you’re forgetting one fact, how many countries they’ve –  
8: that’s what I said 
6:  robbed and how many they’ve plundered  
8: that’s what I said  
1: and all of that was taken from them by Russians and Americans when they were –  
6: they’re not –  
1: - when they entered – 
3: they put some of it away I'm sure  
(laughter)  
R: In many media reports, EU membership and the question of the status of Kosovo 
have been placed in opposition. Do you think accepting Kosovo’s independence is 
worth it if it would guarantee Serbia membership into the EU? 
3: you’re asking the wrong people 
1: no 
2: no  
6: absolutely not 
1: and you have five military employees here  
4: it doesn’t matter, it’s her question 
6: absolutely not 
2: no way 
4: no, we’re all 100% in agreement on that question 
1; we can put the question like this; we look at the relationship between Serbia and the 
EU, and we have a lot of money and some average person moves into my house. Okay, 
maybe I’ll accept that man, and I’ll give him some money to buy clothes and I teach 
him something and he’ll go to work. If that simple man has some illness which could 
infect everything in my home, do I accept that man into my house or not? 
3: never 
6: totally normal  
1: now, do we have a problem with Kosovo Albanians? 
3: clear as the day is long  
1: has Europe begun realizing that it has problems with Kosovo Albanians?  
3: it will have a problem [with them] 
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1: it does 
2: it already does 
1: it already has a problem with them now 
3: on a smaller scale yes, but it’s yet to come  
1: that’s what my friend was talking about.. that Serbs in Sweden also have a big 
problem with Kosovars. All of EU, in Germany there’s no telling how many of them 
there are. Either way, and now we come back to that original point, do you bring in an 
average person  who has a disease that can infect everything in your house?  
6: of course not  
1: would you try to save that man? 
7; never 
8: never 
1: you’ll wear a protective glove (laughter) 
4: so we’ve made clear that this isn’t even an issue  
5: so that means, no one would agree to giving it up, to give up Kosovo to join the EU. 
If that was a condition [of membership] I don’t think anyone would agree to that.  
7: no but this isn’t, because no one here is all that pro-EU to begin with so it’s not –  
1: I am, I am completely pro-Western, but only for the good things 
6: in any case, that’s that’s a matter of –  
3: it’s not important here  
1: I’ve been to those places where work is valued  
4: what’s valued? 
1: work, not like smuggling and under the table kind of work. But work work  
2: okay but that’s not gonna help you if –  
3: I get it  
7: just tell me this, what kind of benefits does Bulgaria have now from being in the 
EU? 
1: none whatsoever 
7: and let’s say, Croatia, which joined, and has closed, what, three shipyards, and 
they’re shooting themselves in the head! 
5: our country, in this world -   
4: we only serve as a market to them  
1: do you remember in high school when X (identified friend) was saying why does a 
worker here work in agriculture and drive a Yugo and have a factory, why doesn’t he 
just work in agriculture and drive a Mercedes? That’s professionalization. You’re an 
agriculturist and you have 700 acres but you work with agriculture and you live off of 
that. That’s nice.  
5: So, all those who don’t have Serbian passports should be deported and returned to 
Albania (parallel conversations occurring) 
5: it is what it is, can’t expect too much from the government.  
R: When the year 2020 comes, the year by which politicians predict Serbia will have 
finally become a member, what do you realistically think the situation will look like?  
3: We won’t have joined the EU and we won’t have changed in comparison to now. 
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7: because of the fact that there will be a condition placed on us to say goodbye to 
Kosovo, through a referendum  
2: and we won’t do it  
7: and it’ll never pass  
2: and that’s that.  
1: which referendum up until today hasn’t been tampered with?  
7: you know what, they can tamper with about 5% but with 30%, they can’t  
3: but what will change?  
1: you know that there’s a central commission, no one has the right to control that 
commission, it has how many, 10 members, that’s 10 million euro man, that’s a lot of 
money, if every one of us, for a million, said ‘write the results like this and that’, that 
would be it. So?  
7: if they’re corrupt, yes, but don’t been so cynical about it 
1: I’m not cynical I’m being realistic.  
7: I honestly don’t think it would be possible. 
1: What, you want to bring out the army? If your commander in chief calls you and 
says ‘let’s go’, what are you going to do? And what happens? You ruin your own life  
2: hold on, Nr 4 has something to say 
4: the other day, on B92 (TV channel) they were saying that until 2025 there’s no way 
the EU is expanding. So? 
R: 2025?  
4: yeah, it won’t enlarge until then. 
8: and by then lots of things will have happened and it’ll fall apart 
4: so that’s the big question really 
R: What’s the situation going to look like on the political scene? 
6: What political scene? 
R: Here in Serbia, in 5 years’ time 
6: in five years we can make a comeback 
4: in 555 years maybe  
6: definitely by 50%, if not even more, if the state is governed properly  
1: hold on a second, in relation to what standards?  
6: In relation to the current situation, if the state is governed in a normal way, and if 
the adequate measures are taken, and if our politics, doesn’t politicize everything in 
Serbia. Meaning, politics should deal with politics and competent people should deal 
with their professions, for whatever they’re experts, and competent people should lead 
our institutions, firms, which means people who are professionals within those fields. 
In 5 years we can recover 50% and should first and foremost develop our agriculture, 
farming and tourism.  
3: I don’t think we’ll recover, because we don’t have that strength within ourselves to 
do so 
6: we can use, if we’re smart, we can use the EU, and not just them use us, in the sense 
of their sanctions against Russia and instead make closer ties to Russia which is a huge 
market. 
3: and to sell what we have  
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6: Right, so –  
3: by the books, but at most 10% [progress] but I think that’ll be hard 
6: Serbia isn’t able to, with 100% of its capacity from its agriculture, livestock, 
whatever, it wouldn’t even be able to feed all of Moscow. And that’s a huge financial 
source for Serbia 
  [3: but it’s because of that –] 
6: we just need to be smart about it 
[7: but it’s because of that, that they’ve –]  
6: and go towards Russia in this sense   
7: of course  
6: we should have a good economic cooperation with Russia, which now, morally, 
doesn’t suit the EU because they want to keep us in their grip, and that’s that  
7: that’s where they’re waiting for you  
6: which means, they’re conditioning us as much as they can to be able to take 
everything they can from Serbia at as cheap a price as possible, for their tycoons, and 
to have a monopoly on everything, and that’s the whole story. 
3: I highly doubt that we’ll be able to make use of –  
6: but only under the premise that the state is governed intelligently  
1: but intelligent governance means that a person cannot be bought. He has to be fair, 
meaning he doesn’t have to be some sort of expert, but he has to be fair.  
3: and how long will he survive?  
2: he can’t  
1: the principle behind good governance, of a nation means a domesticated 
governance, but the man of the house can’t steal from his own home. We’re talking 
about what Nr 6 was saying –  
 [4: yes yes yes] 
1: and we all absolutely agree with that  
3: well simple common sense really  
1: so, just to make sure we’re all on the same page. If I steal, I don’t know, a TV, from 
my own home, like I take the TV out of the house and sell it, then my wife and kids 
will have nothing to watch. Which means I need that TV. 
5: you put that nicely, and with the current way of thinking in politics, we’re getting 
nowhere, we’re even going backwards. If the values change and are recognized, and 
the right people are put in place, we can make progress.  
3: now the question is, are we going backwards, stagnating or moving forwards? We’re 
still balancing  
4: no 
[1: but just so we’re -] 
4: no  
3: we don’t know –  
6: we’re lost in the fog 
1: and maybe the problem isn’t the politicians but the people. There’s 8 of us here, and 
we’re members of some sort of social group –  
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6: the problem, in my opinion, isn’t the people, the problem is the politicians because 
in Serbia today, politics is a business, it a business of personal profit and personal 
interests, and everyone is getting involved in politics to make a profit, to get a higher 
position – 
1: position, yes that’s what I’m talking about  
6: today, a successful politician isn’t in the business of politics for the people  
 [2: yes] 
6: for the nation 
 [1: but for his own -] 
6: but for his own personal profit 
1: and this is evident to everyone  
6: and so, politics as politics, if politicians could just stick to politic and not get 
involved in everything else –  
4: that’s impossible  
3: impossible  
1: I completely agree, but how –  
3: to not engage in politics. Be ready to be led by people more stupid than you 
2: I’m mean come on, just start with our current president and there’s no need to go 
any further  
3: the president is insignificant  
[2: he’s not] 
3: he’s insignificant, he’s just a figure 
2: and it’s enough to see that figure and everything is clear  
3: those 200 or so are more –  
[2: who’s speaking of any kind of prophet?] 
1: employees of the government are more important than him 
6: the Serbian president has no influence  
2: I get that, but –  
6: he’s just a figure –  
2: a figure yes, but at least he could be a good one  
5: but he’s supposed to represent you, like that  
6: whatever we could even bring a gypsy and it wouldn’t –  
5: but that’s what she was saying earlier, what kind of opinion does the EU have of us? 
When they see him like that, with buttons on his suit jacket and two different socks, I 
mean I'm sorry but, he doesn’t speak English, it’s pathetic. And then what is the EU 
supposed to think about us?  
3: but who should they look at? Who? I’m telling you that Slobodan Milošević was the 
last president that we had, after him we’ve had no one.  
1: yeah after him we haven’t –  
3: after him we haven’t had presidents, just figurines.  
4: today I saw something on the news, saying it’s 25 years since Tito died 
5: 30 
4 20 
2: 30 
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1: 35 
4: 35 since he passed. And he ruled 35. that’s what they said.  
7: yesterday it’s been 35 years since Tito passed 
4: and he ruled 35 years, and 35 years since his death until now, and how are we living 
better? What else is there to say.  
8: hold on, hold on, are you trying to say that we lived better during Tito’s time?  
4: I did, yes 
8: oh come on 
4: Well you asked me, all I can do is answer 
8: okay sure 
4: my father was working, he was a plain old fireman  
8: okay  
4: he had three kids, my mom was a stay at home wife who cooked and raised us  
8: okay 
4: breakfast on time, lunch, she kept track of who we were and what we were doing. 
And he built the house –  
8: tell me –  
4: now we all work in this house –  
8: okay 
4: I don’t even have, I’ve been married 30 years and I don’t have anything that’s mine 
for god’s sake.  
8: just tell me this, did you, back then, did you go on school field trips all the time? 
Were there call for employment for the state? 
4: that should come back  because -  
8: hold on, just to – 
4: I would be happy if that was brought back, okay 
8: does anyone work for the state for free nowadays? 
4: no  
8: no. that’s right. Did you have a cell phone?  
4: no 
8: did you have internet? 
4: no  
8: that’s right. Did you go on vacation every year? No 
6: but then there wasn’t even  -  
8: now you have a different life, you travel –  
4: I’m sorry but you’re conflating –  
8: but not everything can –  
6: hold on, we didn’t –  
8: then you didn’t have anything, no one had anything but now look at how good our 
lives are  
4: since Milošević that hasn’t  -  
7: what do you mean no one had anything?  
8: how many people –  
5: hold on let me tell you something –  
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2: are you trying to say that there’s less of a need for –  
6: but tv and technology –  
5: can I say something? The amount of times ive been on vacation you don’t have hairs 
on your head  
(laughter)  
8: good for you as an individual but I’m talking about generally  
5: every year 10 days on vacation 
8: I’m talking globally  
5: yeah globally, everyone went on summer and winter vacation 
8: no that’s not true 
5: I know what im talking about  
8: and good for you as an individual, maybe you lived a good life but im talking about 
people in my surrounding here  
4: but you’re quite young. Back then we lived a safer life, you had a stable job, a lot of 
things were different. A lot a lot. And the technology that you mentioned doesn’t 
depend on the president but progress in genera;  
8: no no I just wanted to say that now no one is doing anything to help the government 
to make progress 
4: that’s right 
8: but everyone is expecting something from the state. How many today are on 
welfare? Before that didn’t exist  
4: I would bring that all back 
8: now every other person is on welfare, before that wasn’t the caase 
4: so are we then not in agreement that it was better before?  
6: of course 
5: listen let me tell you –  
4: when there was work wasn’t it better then? And all of that has been lost, and 
replaced, with that unsatisfied sentiment. That’s all passed on from root to root. That 
you need to be a crook to live, a thief to live, all the worst and you have to live like 
that. That, those values didn’t exist before 
8:  but in the 80s was Tito in power? 
4: no he wasn’t 
1: it changed what, every year, the government in Yugoslavia  
5: for 45 years you have to work four jobs to get here. An officially this year we’re 
either at a zero or at a loss.  
8: no no I don’t agree that it’s but, but I believe that –  
5: whatever let’s just continue with the next question 
R: Considering the past 25 years and everything that has occurred in Serbia and the 
region, do you think that the people, as a nation, has changed in comparison with the 
past?  
4: yes they are 
6: not only have they changed –  
4: people have had to adapt to the current system, and that’s where they all got ruined 
6: people have gotten worse 
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4: no tolerance, no traditional values, everythings been lost, they’ve become miserable. 
Everything is worse, and for one simple reason, just to survive.  
6: yes, existentially  
4: respect has been lost towards everyone, you wont see anyone giving up their seat to 
a pregnant woman anymore, no way. I mean it’s really sad. Before it wasn’t like that  
6: when we say this and they hear it in they EU they’ll say ‘these crazy people’  
4: no no no that has nothing to do with –  
6: no but think about it –  
4: are you socializing with people the way you used to do?  
6: I absolutely agree with all of that because, see, if you go back 25 years, our people 
have survived such trauma, first of all a financial crisis, sanctions, lack of ability, wars, 
NATO aggressions, loss of work places, the shutting down of factories, loss of 
territory, uhm, and all that influences, in a stressful way, a people. And it’s a true 
wonder –  
5: that we’ve survived  
6: that our nation has persisted, that we’re still exceptionally mentally healthy, of 
course we have our problems, with being – 
7: on the brink of our tolerance  
6: I think that everyone is at the limits of their tolerance because of those everyday 
stressors and everyday survival, we’re still here. So I think that, had this happened to 
any other nation, that would have been a disaster. 
1: but people are, more or less the same everywhere the only difference is how their 
circumstances have forced them to act  
6: but that’s only evidence of how resilient and able we are as a people. That we’re 
ready to prevail and endure in every crisis 
3: that’s how we’ve been raised, that’s what we learned 
4: and now if you look back, 20 years earlier, people were social, you traveled, you 
had visitors –  
3: but you never worried when you sat in a bar and looked at the bill whether someone 
else had 1000 dinars to give you or whether you’d have to pay for it all yourself  
4: that’s what im telling you. You were safe. You were a lot more safe even in regards 
to work and everything. But now,  now it’s just, the mantra is ‘how to survive the day’ 
7: but it’s not 
4: no no, 20 years ago, you could imagine your life in the long run, you could look 10 
years ahead and think about what you would be doing, right? 
6: yeah 
4: can you do that now? No  
3: yes you can 
1: why wouldn’t you? 
4: no, okay you can but it’ll change 200 times  
1: back then it was the same -  
4: today you live for tomorrow 
1: everything was changing  
251 
 
6: okay let’s say, banal example, but let’s say I want to get a loan, and a small one at 
that, for let’s say a 5 year period, or even 3 years. I would have to think long and hard 
whether to take it for a 3 year period because it’s unsure whether there will be 
employment and work and whether I’ll be able to pay that money back, just in three 
years.  
4: that’s right 
6: meaning, the current situation is so unstable because of our current financial 
situation in the country that you simple aren’t safe in a single place of employment  
4: that’s right 
6: and that’s the biggest problem, the problem isn’t whther you’re gonna lose your job. 
You want to work, and whatever, even if you have a higher education, you’re willing 
to work the dirtiest of jobs just to make enough to feed your family, but unfortunately 
you cant even find a job like that, there isn’t even anywhere for you to find 
employment, no work place. So, currently the situation is like that that it’s totally 
unsafe.  
4: and then again we end up in those political streams, where there’s no employment –  
6: but on the other hand –  
4: and there’s no work anywhere, and you go to 
 
6: and then she’s supposed to squeeze you into some made up hob and you have only 
one sense of satisfaction from that, and now, whether you’re politically likeminded or 
not, whether you support the politics that that party is propagating, isn’t important at 
all.  
1: meaning we’ve come to the point where our political beliefs absolutely don’t matter, 
we currently support the governing party but we’re, as a nation, completely political 
inactive. There’s simply people for whom this is a profession, who exclusively deal 
with politics, like 6: was saying, that’s a business, and he makes a living off of that.  
There are people there who are there to make a profit, I mean ‘there’, in whichever 
political party that they find themselves in, just to be clear, they’re there to make a 
profit, to survive, but they don’t do anything, they’re not intelligent enough, or they’re 
lazy –  
3: oh yeah, we just make up places of employment –  
4: and how are we going to enter the EU in five years? No way.  
1: but who’s the problem here?  
3: you just make up places so that people can get jobs 
1: but that’s what im talking about. Who’s to blame here? Is the politician at fault or 
the people? That boss, that director? It’s impossible that there’s not a single person 
who works along that man who is his superior, who can say ‘hello, enough already!”  
6: those are public, primarily public institutions. Public institutions finance themselves 
or they’re financed by a local budget. Those aren’t institutions on a stately level. But 
they’re mainly self-funded. But municipal like municipal, there’s always a state 
6: not even them, and it’s normal that they’d justify their vote and grab on to cliques of 
unemployment, and they make up places to work and finance the furnishing of those 
companies –  
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4: and all of that, at the end of the day, comes out of our pocket. Our pensions are 
made smaller and their pay checks just get bigger.  
6: at least to have a consistent work, they’re all for 6 months, a year, and then in a 
circle. Even place of work isn’t consistent, they change the location all the time.  
3: but it’s no better than it was 20 years ago 
5: 25. 25 years ago all the bad stuff started happening  
3: but 20 year’s ago Sloba (Slobodan Milošević) was alive 
4: okay, she was asking about 25 years ago. Vladicin Han; Giga is ruined, Pop, 
Cerepana, Yumko, Simpco, all of those were giant and not a single one remains. It’s 
all, as he said, stolen, ruined. In Surdulica, in Vranje, and think about how capable that 
power is to ruin everything. And then how we can say that it’s better now? I don’t get 
how it’s better. Myself personally I’ve been looking for a job for 6 months. At the 
Chinese shop, the farmers marker, wherever. No one is interested, whatever your 
education, knowledge, schooling, not even higher-education diplomas. They’re just 
interested in who you are, whose you are and how to squeeze you in. and how am I 
supposed to be doing better?  
4: my life is chaos. And I’ve never been more afraid than now. And I’m 50 years old, 
and I don’t know what I’ll do tomorrow or for how long, or on what pension I'm 
supposed to live on later in life.  
 
 
 
Appendix 10: Table of critical discourse analysis for Study II 
Year/ 
Speaker 
Quote Thematic 
Content 
 
Argumenta
tion 
Scheme  
Marco-
Strategy 
 
1. 
1992 Draskovic 
After 603 years, the St Vitus Day battle is 
being repeated. The first battle lasted one day, 
ours lasted 8 days. In the other one around 
1000 Serbs participated, in this one a couple 
of million […] in that one, no Serbs survived, 
in this one, no one was killed. Because of that, 
the other one was physically lost but morally 
and spiritually won. This one led to some type 
of defeat, as the goals were not realized. After 
that moral victory Serbs endured 500 years of 
Turkish slavery, after this St. Vitus Day, we 
cannot even endure 5 years of communist 
slavery. 
 
Victimhood Topos of 
threat 
Strategy of 
constructing 
ingroup as 
victims of 
external other 
2. 
1998. 
Djindjic 
We in the Balkans are a part of Europe, and 
Europe is incomplete without the Balkans. It 
like with a troubled child in a family. He is part 
of the family regardless of if the other family 
members want him or not. 
European 
belonging 
Metaphor of 
‘exclusive 
club’  
Strategy of 
constructing  
superordinate 
membership as 
natural. 
 
3. 
1998.  Marjanovic 
Kosovo and Metohija is the root and 
foundation of Serbian statehood and the 
national identity of the Serbian people. 
Identity 
through 
Kosovo 
Topos of 
definition, 
Metaphor of 
roots 
Strategy of 
constructing 
identity 
continuity 
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4. 
2000. 
Milošević 
Serbia has to, and deserves to, defend herself 
against invasions, which have been put in 
place through various forms of subversion. 
Victimhood Topos of 
threat 
Strategy of 
perpetuating 
ivictimhood 
identity 
5. 
2004.  
Tadic 
EU membership will help us in further 
economic developments, as well as guarantee 
security and indivisibility of our territory. For 
our citizens it will mean higher standards, 
better educational opportunities and a lot of 
freedom of movement.   
Europe as a 
political 
strategy 
Topos of 
favorable 
time 
Strategy of 
transforming 
Serbia’s 
political and 
civic landscape 
6. 
2008. Kostunica 
Is there a nation in the world that is being 
asked to renounce everything that makes it a 
nation, as is being sought of the Serbs today? 
Victimhood Rhetorical 
suggestive 
question  
Strategy of 
justification for 
rejecting 
change by 
emphasising 
continuity 
7. 
2008.  
Delic 
…yesterday’s signing opens up a European 
perspective in our country. This was a 
watershed moment; we passed that rubicon, 
now Serbia unequivocally emerges as a full-
fledged future member of the EU. 
EU as a 
destination 
Metaphor – 
Rubicon ; 
threshold 
which once 
passed 
cannot be 
returned to. 
Strategy of 
constructing EU 
as only future 
of Serbia 
8. 
2008. Kostunica 
Kosovo – that is the first name of Serbia … that 
is how it has always been. That is how it will 
always be. 
Identity 
through 
Kosovo 
Anthropom
orphism  
Strategy of 
constructing 
identity 
continuity 
9. 
2012. 
 Tadic 
I will say this is a great thing, of course it’s not 
epic. It will be epic when Serbia crosses that 
border, enchanted border, and become a 
member of the community of European 
societies with the ability to use all the potential 
accession funds and everything that is 
available to any country that is a full member 
EU. 
EU as a 
political 
strategy 
Topos of a 
favorable 
time 
Strategy of 
transforming 
Serbia’s 
political and 
civic landscape 
10. 
2012. 
Tadic 
The position of Serbia is crystal clear in 
terms of the recognition of Kosovo. Serbia is 
not going to recognize Kosovo’s 
independence under any circumstances and 
that is all that I can say today, tomorrow and 
after tomorrow. That position is not 
changeable.  
 
Kosovo 
Politics 
Temporal 
references, 
topos of 
similarity  
Strategy of 
constructing 
identity 
continuity 
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Appendix 11: Coding and theme frequency for study III 
 
Code Reference 
(numbers) 
% of all codes 
EU as source of civic improvement 
Benefits to EU integration 44 12% 
EU has better laws 8 2% 
EU entails possibility to leave dysfunctional 
nation 
7 2% 
EU entails more freedom of trade 6 2% 
EU represents national progress 14 4% 
Want EU standards of living 9 2% 
Limits to Serbian self-improvement 38 10% 
Incompetent political leadership 15 4% 
Organizing Theme  References (in 
numbers) 
Reference (in 
percentage of all 
coded) 
EU as a source of civic improvement 82 20% 
EU as a source of inferiority 137 34% 
Rupture to collective continuity 187 46% 
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Lack of accountability for the past 9 2% 
Public powerless in political decision-making 14 4% 
Rupture to collective continuity 
Choosing a political ‘side’ 64 18% 
Historic ties to Russia 14 4% 
EU enforces common foreign policy 2 1% 
EU unstable as a union 6 2% 
The West support Albanian expansion on Serb 
territory 
4 1% 
Serbian politics straddling East and West 38 10% 
Every day-level change  64 18% 
EU means changing mentality 9 2% 
EU places limits on banal expressions of 
nationalism 
6 2% 
Fears of identity loss 18 5% 
Loss of collectivist values 11 3% 
Serbia incompatible with EU way of life 13 4% 
Unable to imagine the future  7 2% 
Losing national sovereignty  27 8% 
EU makes decisions for new members 14 4% 
Losing territory over time 6 2% 
The importance of national borders 7 2% 
The political status of Kosovo 26 8% 
Historical significance of Kosovo 4 1% 
Kosovo a ‘parasite’ on Serbia 3 1% 
Kosovo is de facto independent 3 1% 
Kosovo only ‘temporarily’ lost 6 2% 
Resistance to ‘de jure’ recognition of Kosovo 10 3% 
EU as a source of inferiority 
Feeling subordinate & stigmatized 28 7% 
Internalized stigma 5 1% 
Negative views of Serbia in EU 23 6% 
Negotiating accountability for stigma 47 12% 
Critical of ingroup 31 8% 
Institutions causing corrupt behaviour 12 3% 
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Institutions censor criticism 4 1% 
Power-asymmetry within the EU 42 10% 
EU exploits incoming members 12 3% 
Hierarchy of countries in the EU 17 4% 
Serbia dependent on EU aid 9 2% 
Serbia implementing change mindlessly to 
please EU 
4 1% 
Rationalizing lack of progress 20 5% 
Ideological shift from communism to capitalism 13 3% 
Institutional instability 7 2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 12: Codebook for thematic analysis of Study III 
 
EU as source of civic improvement 
 
Benefits to EU integration  
EU has better 
laws 
Coded when participants spoke of 
the benefits of EU including 
better laws, better social and 
institutional order, and the more 
serious implementation and 
respect for regulations compared 
to in Serbia currently. 
“Safety, legality, order, some 
normalcy, certainty that you’ll be able 
to live a normal life tomorrow, a 
humanitarian life, and to live and 
expect a normal retirement with a 
pension and that everything is covered 
by the law. We currently don’t have 
that.” (Vranje) 
EU entails 
possibility to 
leave 
dysfunctional 
nation 
Coded for when participants 
spoke of EU integration not as a 
potential route to improving 
Serbia, but to allow for 
individuals to leave a bad country 
for a ‘better’ one. 
“3: Bulgaria and Romania joined and 
their countries are no better off  
2: There are 7 million less of them 
since they joined the EU, Romanians, 
and 2 million Bulgarians 
1: Well yeah, everyone left.” 
(Surdulica) 
EU entails 
more freedom 
of trade 
Coded for when participants 
discussed EU as a benefit to trade, 
through the opening of trade 
borders, the decrease in 
government monopoly on prices 
“Usually around benefits people talk 
about, the economic benefits, the 
opening of trade borders and the 
increase in investments.” 
(Belgrade 1) 
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in Serbia and better trade 
opportunities.  
EU represents 
national 
progress  
Coded for when the EU was 
discussed as represented as a 
symbol of progress in the media 
and political discourse, but 
progress in an abstract sense, 
rather than concretely discussing 
how. 
“1: They used to talk about ‘European 
values’ as some sort of thing that was 
thrown around but no one really tried 
to explain to the people what that 
means. […] just ‘European values’ as 
if that’s something better than what we 
have now.” (Belgrade 2) 
Want EU 
standards of 
living 
Coded for when participants 
spoke about housing, pay and 
access to resources which made 
the EU have a higher standard of 
living than Serbia, something that 
was both envied and desired.  
“6: We’ll see what happens but we do 
want to join the EU, of course we all 
want, I mean, not EU as it currently is, 
but we want to achieve, we don’t want 
EU with 200 Euro salaries. 
3: To keep what’s ours but to have 
better standards of living.” 
(Belgrade 1)  
Limits to Serbian self-improvement 
Incompetent 
political 
leadership 
Coded for when participants 
critiqued or ridiculed either the 
qualifications or competencies of 
existing, or previous, political 
leaders and painted them in a 
negative light.  
“4: We’ll be better off the day we have 
honest politicians. 
6: Never, my friend 
1: Is that even a real thing?” (Novi 
Sad) 
Lack of 
accountability 
for the past 
Coded for when participants 
discussed both political and 
public lack of accountability for 
the past (in terms of the Yugoslav 
war and its aftermath) and its 
effects on the present. 
“4: But hold on, ‘Tito did that to us’; 
Tito didn’t do anything to us. I mean, 
somewhere, we, we chose those people, 
those that have been ‘forced upon us’. I 
don’t mean we, you and me, that we’re 
to blame, but our people, we chose 
those leaders, no one else is to blame 
for that.” 
Public 
powerless in 
political 
decision-
making 
Coded for when participants made 
claims to being powerless, either 
themselves or as a group, for 
implementing any kind of change 
in Serbia, or having any kind of 
voice in shaping how politics 
progress.  
“1: No one ever asked us whether we 
wanted to give up Kosovo or not, I 
don’t think that’s up to us. The people 
don’t dictate those decisions. That’s 
politics.” (Surdulica)  
Rupture to collective continuity 
Choosing a political ‘side’ 
Historical ties 
to Russia 
Coded when participants talked 
about Serbia-Russia relations, 
particularly drawing on history 
(WW1, WW2 etc.) or religion 
(Orthodox) to argue for a positive 
relationship between the nations, 
sometimes to contrast this with 
Western European countries 
(historical enemies or the Catholic 
majority of EU countries) 
“3: They’re our brothers. (sarcastic) 
2: Well okay it’s not that easy, I’m no 
type of Russophile but again there is a 
certain historical and religious 
connection with the Russians and it’s 
not nonsense, it’s not nonsense, it’s not 
unreasonable that that feeling towards 
Russia and the people of Russia exists. 
It didn’t fall from the sky.” 
(Belgrade, 2) 
EU enforces 
common 
foreign policy 
Coded when participants talked 
about Serbia not being able to 
maintain its separate foreign 
“4: It’s simply impossible that we will 
join the EU while not having done with 
Russia what has to be done to join the 
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policy agenda but rather had to 
assimilate to an EU perspective of 
foreign policy 
EU’s way of thinking in relation to 
Russia. 
2: Foreign policy. 
4: Because if they let you in they surely 
will not allow you to have anything 
independently [of them].” 
(Belgrade, 1) 
EU unstable 
as a union 
Coded for when participants 
discussed the EU’s internal 
disputes, instabilities and possible 
breakdowns of the union in the 
future 
“1: You’re going to think that I’m in 
opposition in purpose, but it is realistic 
that you want to join a union that you 
don’t even think will exist in four 
years?” 
The West 
support 
Albanian 
expansion on 
Serbian 
territory 
Coded for when participants 
either drew links between 
Albanian and Western interests or 
implicitly and explicitly 
positioned the West as helping 
Albanian expansion on what they 
considered to be Serbian territory 
“1: We’ve already given them territory, 
and already, in the name of Great 
Albania, territory has systematically 
been taken from Serbia by the West. 
They’re buying everything, they’re 
buying Serbia.” (Cacak)   
Serbian 
politics 
straddling 
East and 
West 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how Serbia politically 
was on the fence between Europe 
and Russia, trying to balance the 
two or maintain positive relations 
with both, or to decide which side 
to be on. 
“1: Today they [politicians] sit on two 
chairs, and there’s no – 
3: they shouldn’t get involved [EU in 
Serbia’s relations to Russia] but it is a 
problem to sit on two chairs. […] [we] 
should be on one, but we’re on two, 
and the problem is that we’re small, so 
sitting on two chairs isn’t possible. 
4: because it’s hard for us to choose.” 
Every day-level change 
EU means 
changing 
mentality 
Coded when participants 
discussed differences in ways of 
thinking, consciousness, world-
view, and explicitly also 
‘mentalities’ that differed from 
one another, in relation to for 
example child rearing, but also 
the extent to which Serbia will be 
able to fully and successfully 
implement EU-rooted changes 
without public resistance 
“The most difficult thing to change 
here is our consciousness. Here, one 
way of life exists and essentially no 
matter how much people protest they 
still adhere to it and it works for 
them… and that’s that. When working 
hours were first introduced as 9-5, 
according to European working hours, 
people were passing out.” 
EU places 
limits on 
banal 
expressions 
of 
nationalism 
Coded when participants 
discussed how EU regulations 
might limit or even forbid the 
practice of making plum brandy 
or roasting a pig in your 
backyard, two of the most 
common ‘traditional’ everyday 
practices mentioned 
“4: Now you won’t be able to make 
your own rakija, really, it’s a big 
problem. 
5: I heard that Croatia has a serious 
problem with making brandy now. 
4: And making winter preserves, that 
won’t be allowed.” 
Fear of 
identity loss 
Coded when participants 
discussed losing their (personal 
and national) identity because of 
recent political changes related to 
EU integration, as well as future 
possible threats to losing it. 
“1: loss of national identity. 
2: We will become a colony. 
3: we already are.” 
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Loss of 
collectivist 
values 
Coded when participants spoke 
about how the systems of values 
upheld in the EU differed from 
the more traditional ones in 
Serbia, particularly in contexts of 
considering how these values 
would be lost if Serbia joined 
“7: We’re much more neurotic as a 
people. 
9: No, not neurotic but much more free 
in our behaviour, that’s probably 
what’s come from Europe, the 
behaviour of young girls and boys, 
everything is somehow allowed, what 
you previously wouldn’t think to do is 
now possible and okay for everyone.” 
(Niš)   
Serbia 
incompatible 
with EU way 
of life 
Coded for when participants 
spoke about Serbia being 
incompatible with a way of life, 
often in relation to certain 
behaviour or ways of being.  
“1: First of all I think there’s more to 
be lost than gained there, because of 
the fact that, we’re that kind of people 
where we’re not ready to live by those 
rules and regulations. I don’t think 
we’d be able to assimilate.” (Belgrade, 
3) 
Unable to 
imagine the 
future 
Coded when participants 
discussed the future of Serbia and 
the expectation of it being a 
member of the EU in the near 
future 
“2: [in 2020] the finish line will be 
moved to 2030. 
1: And then nothing will happen. 
2: Everything stays the same. There 
will be more conditions [to meet].” 
(Paraćin)  
Losing national sovereignty 
EU makes 
decisions for 
new members 
Coded for when participants 
discussed the EU as a normative 
and real power over new member-
states, often drawing on recently 
joined member-states as 
illustrations of these claims.  
6: We’d like to have a good economic 
cooperation with Russia, which doesn’t 
suit the EU because then we’d be doing 
okay and they wouldn’t be able to keep 
us in their control, that’s how it is. 
They’re conditioning us to take as 
much as they can and to be able to 
monopolize control here.” 
(Vranje)  
 
Losing 
territory over 
time 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how Serbia, across its 
recent and extended past had lost 
a lot of territory (whether due to 
the loss of Yugoslavia or political 
conflicts) but also how they 
anticipate losing even more 
territory in the future. 
“8: I think we’re going to lose 
Vojvodina too. 
2: No way 
8: Everything is centralized in 
Belgrade. 
2: I’m more afraid for Southern Serbia. 
People are fleeing, and those Albanians 
from Kosovo can come here so easily, 
just show their ID and enter into 
Serbia.” (Belgrade, 3) 
 
 
The 
importance of 
national 
borders 
Coded when participants 
discussed the role of borders in 
defining the nation, both in Serbia 
and elsewhere. Also discussion of 
current Serbian borders.  
“The question is, when the moment will 
come where the last condition will be 
the de jure acknowledgment, both the 
de jure and de facto acknowledgement 
of Kosovo, because you can’t join the 
EU, objectively, when you don’t have 
and don’t know how to define your 
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borders.” 
(Belgrade, 1) 
The political status of Kosovo 
Historical 
significance 
of Kosovo 
Coded when participants talked 
about Kosovo as either the root of 
Serbhood, using metaphors 
related to home or in other ways 
constructed Kosovo as the heart / 
centre of Serbia (symbolically) 
either by drawing on history or 
religion. 
“We’re all descendants of Kosovo, one 
way or another, that’s literally how it 
is.” 
(Paraćin)  
Kosovo a 
‘parasite’ on 
Serbia 
Coded for when participants 
discussed Kosovo as a burden on 
Serbia, whether financially, 
internationally or symbolically.  
“1: Let’s put the question this way. The 
relationship between Serbia and the 
EU, I have a lot of money and some 
average person comes to live in my 
house. Okay, I accept him, give him 
some money to get dressed and teach 
him something so he can work. But if 
that somebody has some kind of illness 
which can contaminate everything in 
my house? Do I accept that man into 
my house or no?  
3: never 
1: okay, and now do we have a problem 
with Kosovo Albanians? 
3: Clear as day.” 
(Vranje) 
Kosovo is de 
facto 
independent 
Coded when participants 
acknowledged that Kosovo was 
more and more its own 
independent country, referencing 
either the existence of a border 
control, their own Prime Minister, 
flag etc. 
“2: We’ve already acknowledged 
Kosovo, our media calls Hasim Tacin 
the Prime Minister of Kosovo 
1: and we negotiate with their 
government.” 
(Belgrade, 2) 
Kosovo is 
only 
‘temporarily’ 
lost 
Coded for when participants 
discussed the loss of Kosovo in a 
wider temporal context, by either 
admitting it is lost for now, but 
has a long history of being Serbia, 
or anticipating that it will be taken 
back and become Serbian again in 
the future. 
“2: From the perspective of history, 
50-60 years is nothing, but 100 years 
from now, let’s say, when the global 
order changes and you go to Moscow 
or Beijing and complain about losing 
Kosovo, and they tell you ‘well dear, 
you signed its independence. Bye.’ 
That’s why we should recognize it.” 
(Paraćin) 
Resistance to 
‘de jure’ 
recognition of 
Kosovo  
Coded when participants spoke 
about the fact that despite Kosovo 
being lost, the constitution would 
not allow for the public, or any 
politician to officially 
acknowledge it, or, it was argued 
that publicly acknowledging it 
(via broadcast / legal changes to 
the constitution) wouldn’t be 
accepted by the public. Thus 
somewhat of a circular argument 
“6: they should fight for [Serbs in 
Kosovo]. We can’t because the 
constitution doesn’t allow it, no one 
has a right to sign – 
1: of course yes 
6: The constitution doesn’t allow it.” 
(Niš) 
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(constitution won’t allow for 
change by public, public won’t 
allow for change to constitution). 
EU as a source of inferiority 
Feeling subordinate & stigmatized 
Internalized 
stigma 
Coded for when participants 
voiced stigmatizing 
representations of the ingroup as 
correct (at least for parts of the 
population). Inclusive of the self. 
“5: The majority of the population has 
some kind of sense of, they can never 
turn us into the Swiss, our temperament 
is different. 
(Belgrade 2) 
Negative 
views of 
Serbia in EU 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how they perceived 
themselves to be negatively 
viewed in the eyes of EU member 
countries 
“2: And the Brits, Swedes, whatever, 
all look at us, not as citizens of a 
second class, but a tenth. In every way 
possible. 
1: probably yes. “How miserable it 
must be there” 
3: Well when they think we’re 
savages.” 
(Belgrade 1) 
Negotiating accountability for stigma 
Critical of 
ingroup 
Coded for when participants made 
claims about Serbia as a whole as 
accountable (the people included 
in this) and to blame for various 
political and social issues.  
“1: what does that tell you? That we’re 
an unstable - 
5: That we’re an uneducated people 
2: that we’re generally uneducated.” 
(Belgrade 2) 
Institutions 
causing 
corrupt 
behaviour  
Coded for when participants 
discussed the ways in which the 
institutions such as hospitals, 
police, universities etc., were 
corrupt and allowing individuals 
to prosper via corruption, causing 
individuals who are law-abiding-
citizens to in turn ‘adapt’ to the 
system. Justifying corrupt 
behaviour of citizens (not 
politicians) due to the actions of 
institutions and politicians. 
 
“1: Surely, people don’t change that 
easily but simply, show different faces 
and characteristics depending on the 
external [context] and all that people 
have to do in abnormal conditions. And 
us too. We’ve been living 25 years in 
abnormal conditions and now we’re 
supposed to be normal. 
3: Tough. 
1: to be nice and kind and courteous 
and well raised – 
2: but see if we had better standards 
we’d probably be better. 
4: one implies the other. 
1: not just standards but also laws, and 
no corruption, you look at all we have 
now [negatively] and then you’re 
supposed to be normal.” 
(Vranje) 
Institutions 
censor 
criticism 
Coded for when participants 
discussed institutions, such as 
schools and the media, as being 
part of the overall censorship of 
criticism in Serbia and thereby 
allowing bad things to happen 
without taking responsibility or 
informing the public about the 
truth.  
“7: When you’re living in a media war, 
you only see what they want you to 
see.” 
(Paraćin) 
Power-asymmetry within the EU 
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EU exploits 
incoming 
members 
Coded when participants 
discussed the ways in which the 
EU was abusing its power against 
Serbia and other new member-
states to make profits and gain 
institutional control  
“People from those [EU] countries to 
buy our firms, successful firms, and 
that’s a known fact, that they follow 
their interests, not with the intention to 
help us, but simply, to make a profit.” 
(Niš) 
Hierarchy of 
countries in 
the EU 
Coded when participants 
discussed a perceived power 
hierarchy within the EU, with 
Western countries at the top, and 
non-Western (including Serbia) at 
the bottom – giving them less say 
in the regulation of common 
practices. 
“1: It’s well known that there’s a first, 
second, third, fourth, fifth league within 
the EU, with the first being German, 
France, and the rest are below.] 
2: And we expect that.” 
(Belgrade 1) 
Serbia 
dependent on 
EU aid 
Coded when participants 
discussed Serbia’s financial 
dependence on the EU due to the 
funds / money being given to 
Serbia by the EU, thereby limiting 
Serbia’s political choices 
(particularly choices against EU 
interests) 
“Again we come back to the fact that 
our budget is pumped with money from 
the EU and they dictate what we do and 
that’s it.” 
(Novi Sad) 
Serbia 
implementing 
changes 
mindlessly to 
please the EU 
Coded for when participants 
discussed the contra-effect that 
conditionality and EU integration 
was having on Serbia as it was 
leading to the blind 
implementation of EU regulations 
and expectations without 
considering their appropriateness 
in Serbia. From very small to very 
radical statements.  
“6: I wouldn’t be surprised if they told 
us ‘do you accept that we rape your 
women in order to join the EU?’ and 
we wouldn’t even be surprised by that. 
Or to give our children to NATO. 
Nothing would surprise us anymore.” 
(Niš) 
Rationalizing lack of progress 
Ideological 
shift from 
communism 
to capitalism 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how Serbia’s 
ideological landscape had 
changed from communist to 
capitalist, and the implications 
this had for politics, social 
relations, cultural practices etc.  
 
“1: I always think about the people, 
and base my impressions on what’s 
going on around me. If collective sports 
were once good and a team spirit was 
supported and nurtured and people 
thought, there was that system, if you 
had a house you gave up your 
apartment, and people didn’t want to, 
that’s really how it was, I know, my 
parents said no to an apartment from 
my wife’s parents because they thought 
‘well hold on, what if someone else 
needs it’, so the system taught you to 
think fairly. To think about others. 
Unlike now.” 
(Belgrade 2) 
Institutional 
instability 
Coded for when participants 
discussed how key institutions, 
such as academia, the theatre or 
hospitals, in local and national 
terms, were ruined or had cease to 
“5: I’m sorry but our hospitals are in 
ruins, we don’t have any funds to help 
them, our schools are falling apart, all 
of our institutions. Everything. When 
you look at that Western system and 
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exist and thus did not provide a 
source of continuity.   
those conditions for joining the EU, 
we’re never going to reach them.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 13: SPSS Output from Quantitative Component of Study 
III 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
**************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.00 ***************** 
          Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.       www.afhayes.com 
    Documentation available in Hayes (2018). www.guilford.com/p/hayes3 
************************************************************************** 
Model  : 14 
    Y  : POL_EU 
    X  : FU_POW_S 
    M  : ST_MEAN 
    W  : NAT_ID 
Sample 
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Size:  1048 
************************************************************************** 
OUTCOME VARIABLE: 
 ST_MEAN 
Model Summary 
R     R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
.4170      .1739     1.7563   220.2326     1.0000  1046.0000   .0000 
 
Model 
          coeff      se         t        p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant  5.9320    .1248    47.5435    .0000     5.6872     6.1768 
FU_POW_S  -.6465    .0436   -14.8402    .0000     -.7320     -.5610 
************************************************************************** 
OUTCOME VARIABLE: 
 POL_EU 
Model Summary 
R     R-sq     MSE       F        df1        df2          p 
.5722 .3274   6.2825   126.9458   4.0000  1043.0000      .0000 
Model 
          coeff     se         t      p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant  6.6604   .7439   8.9531   .0000     5.2007     8.1202 
FU_POW_S   .5508   .0908   6.0652   .0000      .3726      .7289 
ST_MEAN    -.5042  .1578   -3.1949   .0014     -.8138     -.1945 
NAT_ID     .2908   .1519    1.9136   .0559     -.0074      .5889 
Int_1     -.0998   .0336   -2.9734   .0030     -.1657     -.0339 
 
Product terms key: 
 Int_1    :        ST_MEAN  x        NAT_ID 
 
Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s): 
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       R2-chng          F        df1        df2          p 
M*W      .0057     8.8409     1.0000  1043.0000      .0030 
---------- 
    Focal predict: ST_MEAN  (M) 
          Mod var: NAT_ID   (W) 
 
Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s): 
     NAT_ID   Effect    se     t        p       LLCI       ULCI 
     2.8222   -.7859    .0792  -9.9164  .0000    -.9414     -.6304 
     4.3689   -.9403    .0607 -15.4792  .0000    -1.0594     -.8211 
     5.9157  -1.0946    .0806 -13.5865  .0000    -1.2527     -.9365 
****************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y ***************** 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
      .5508      .0908     6.0652      .0000      .3726      .7289 
Conditional indirect effects of X on Y: 
INDIRECT EFFECT: 
 FU_POW_S    ->    ST_MEAN     ->    POL_EU 
     NAT_ID     Effect     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
     2.8222      .5081      .0722      .3741      .6559 
     4.3689      .6079      .0623      .4858      .7317 
     5.9157      .7077      .0726      .5679      .8491 
 
      Index of moderated mediation: 
            Index     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
NAT_ID      .0645      .0238      .0178      .1119 
*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************ 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
  95.0000 
Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals: 
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  5000 
W values in conditional tables are the mean and +/- SD from the mean. 
NOTE: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect output. 
      Shorter variable names are recommended. 
------ END MATRIX ---- 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
************************************************************************** 
Model  : 14 
    Y  : EU_ID 
    X  : Pow_mism 
    M  : Prototyp 
    W  : NAT_ID 
Sample 
Size:  1033 
************************************************************************** 
OUTCOME VARIABLE: 
 Prototyp 
Model Summary 
R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
.1973  .0389     6.6348    41.7464     1.0000  1031.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
           coeff     se       t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant  7.2858     .2979   24.4539    .0000     6.7012     7.8705 
Pow_mism  -.4059     .0628   -6.4611    .0000     -.5291     -.2826 
************************************************************************** 
OUTCOME VARIABLE: 
 EU_ID 
Model Summary 
R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
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.3543   .1255     1.7811    36.8975     4.0000  1028.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
           coeff      se       t         p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant  3.8155      .3200    11.9222  .0000   3.1875     4.4435 
Pow_mism   .1097      .0333     3.2971  .0010    .0444      .1749 
Prototyp  -.0407      .0472     -.8624  .3887   -.1334      .0520 
NAT_ID    -.3064      .0567    -5.4074  .0000   -.4176     -.1952 
Int_1      .0475      .0095     4.9766  .0000    .0288      .0662 
 
Product terms key: 
 Int_1    :        Prototyp x        NAT_ID 
 
Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s): 
       R2-chng          F        df1        df2          p 
M*W      .0211    24.7664     1.0000  1028.0000      .0000 
---------- 
    Focal predict: Prototyp (M) 
          Mod var: NAT_ID   (W) 
 
Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s): 
NAT_ID   Effect      se        t         p       LLCI       ULCI 
2.8180   .0930      .0239     3.8898     .0001    .0461      .1400 
4.3608   .1663      .0166    10.0180     .0000    .1337      .1988 
5.9036   .2395      .0203    11.7988     .0000    .1997      .2793 
****************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y ***************** 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
      .1097      .0333     3.2971      .0010      .0444      .1749 
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Conditional indirect effects of X on Y: 
INDIRECT EFFECT: 
 Pow_mism    ->    Prototyp    ->    EU_ID 
 
     NAT_ID     Effect     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
     2.8180     -.0378      .0130     -.0658     -.0140 
     4.3608     -.0675      .0141     -.0971     -.0420 
     5.9036     -.0972      .0194     -.1392     -.0614 
 
      Index of moderated mediation: 
            Index     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
NAT_ID     -.0193      .0056     -.0316     -.0093 
*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************ 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
  95.0000 
Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals: 
  5000 
W values in conditional tables are the mean and +/- SD from the mean. 
NOTE: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect output. 
      Shorter variable names are recommended. 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
************************************************************************** 
Model  : 1 
    Y  : EU_ID 
    X  : NAT_ID 
    W  : Prototyp 
 
Sample 
Size:  1052 
************************************************************************** 
OUTCOME VARIABLE: 
 EU_ID 
 
Model Summary 
R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
.3311   .1096     1.8292    43.0134     3.0000  1048.0000      .0000 
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Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant     4.4392      .2629    16.8859      .0000     3.9234     4.9551 
NAT_ID       -.3144      .0566    -5.5530      .0000     -.4255     -.2033 
Prototyp     -.0673      .0464    -1.4503      .1473     -.1585      .0238 
Int_1         .0499      .0095     5.2665      .0000      .0313      .0685 
 
Product terms key: 
 Int_1    :        NAT_ID   x        Prototyp 
 
Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s): 
       R2-chng          F        df1        df2          p 
X*W      .0236    27.7365     1.0000  1048.0000      .0000 
---------- 
    Focal predict: NAT_ID   (X) 
          Mod var: Prototyp (W) 
 
Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s): 
 
Prototyp     Effect         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
2.8037     -.1745      .0358    -4.8782      .0000     -.2448     -.1043 
5.4354     -.0432      .0275    -1.5727      .1161     -.0972      .0107 
8.0670      .0881      .0384     2.2925      .0221      .0127      .1634 
 
*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************ 
 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
  95.0000 
 
W values in conditional tables are the mean and +/- SD from the mean. 
 
NOTE: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect output. 
      Shorter variable names are recommended. 
 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
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Appendix 14: Map of Serbia and Focus Group Cities 
